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I. CORPORATE LEGAL THEORY
AN ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LEGAL THEORY
Inaugural Lecture, Peter P. Weidenbruch, Jr., Professorship in Business
Law, presented on October 19, 2007 at the Georgetown
University Law Center
SALUTATION
If you asked me five years ago what I had accomplished as an
academic I would have told you I was really proud of three things, two of
which involved faculty politics. There was also one articlean article that
wasn’t about business law. Four years ago, I got a fourth thing to be proud
of when I became a member of the Georgetown Law faculty. You know,
in academic life the only capital is reputation and the only income is
recognition. For me, joining this faculty made me fully funded and fully
paid. That makes today’s installation a sort of unexpected bonus, but it is
very welcome nonetheless because it gives me two more things to be proud
of. First, it has prompted me to admit to myself that I am proud of my work
in business law. And, second, I am very proud to take a professorship
named for our colleague Peter Weidenbruch. Peter, in taking it, I commit
myself to doing my best to live up to your example in our community.
INTRODUCTION
This presentation’s title makes quite a claim, so I’d best begin by
explaining it. Some years back our erstwhile colleague, Mitu Gulati,
organized a conference to honor his mentor, Bill Klein of UCLA. Bill had
this paper in his drawer that laid out the properties of good corporate law.
Bill had doubts about the paper but Mitu thought it should be published.
So Mitu organized a conference at which Bill brought out the paper and a
room full of people made comments. I was a commentator and I found that
in order to register my thoughts on Bill’s thoughts, I had to lay out the
parameters of the things corporate law professors fight aboutthe points
of ongoing debate in corporate legal theory. That comment was published
along with Bill’s paper,1 but I don’t recommend that you read it unless you
read Bill’s paper first, otherwise, it makes no sense.
I thought that was a shame, quite apart from my great respect for Bill
Klein. So some time later I took out the comment and removed every
reference to Klein’s paper and expanded and rearranged to see what it
1. William W. Bratton, Welfare, Dialectic, and Mediation in Corporate Law, 2 BERKELEY BUS.
L.J. 59 (2005).
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looked like. I was well pleased. The last thing I did was add today’s title,
which effects a reference to a book by Reiner Kraakman and others
entitled, An Anatomy of Corporate Law. That’s an ambitious project that
aspires to synthesize elements of corporate law common in the legal
systems of every developed country. I greatly admire it, but note that,
while descriptive, the book has some normative presuppositionsthe
implications of which remain largely unconfronted. So I felt justified in
purloining and modifying its title.
Having gotten that far, I wasn’t quite sure what to do with the paper,
so it went back into the drawer, where it has sat quietly much as did Bill
Klein’s original. I took it out last summer to send to a collaborator as a
way of explaining some points I was making in discussions about a project.
But I changed my mind and didn’t send it because on the rereading I was
no longer well-pleased. One of the problems with a paper that merges and
restates one’s views on fundamentals is that one’s views can change.
Sometimes it indeed is better to let a project germinate.
This lecture is a step in the project’s reconstruction.
THE PURPOSE OF THE FIRM
Unlike the Kraakman book, my paper does not aspire to synthesize—
corporate legal theory is more a series of ongoing and unresolved debates
than a unitary system of assertions. But the paper does start out with some
general synthetic assertionspoints as to which I believe everyone in the
field concurs.
The synthesis starts with the assertion that corporate legal theory,
although the occasion of unruly debate, has implicit boundaries. The
boundaries follow from two positive observations. First, because corporate
law addresses only a limited set of matters concerning business
organizations, corporate legal theory is not all encompassing. Second
comes a fact about what corporations dothey exist to create wealth by
producing goods and services at a profit. There would be no reason to put
up with them if they didn’t thus succeed as economic producers. Indeed,
real world firms that fail to do so disappear in the long run.
The home truth about production for-profit in turn implies an
objective function for corporate law. But, setting it out in a form that
garners general agreement is difficult, notoriously difficult. So for the
moment I will stick with a minimalist assertion: corporations exist to
create wealth by producing goods and services at a profit, corporate law is
there to help them do so.
This minimally stated objective function can be expanded by
reference to the inherited doctrinal context. Corporate law has pursued the
stated objective in history so as to determine regulatory results,
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bequeathing a context. The context provides a base for fleshing out the
objective function’s terms. The exercise carries risks, of course. A body of
law’s statement of its own purpose and zone of operation carries more
positive than normative weight, and for now I want to stay on the positive
side of the line. I had better—a regulatory framework cannot by virtue of
its own long past and present existence establish its own legitimacy. Nor
does competitive evolution in history guarantee a single, first-best
outcome. Nor, finally, can one assert that an inherited regulatory context
controls by right, for at a theoretical level everything remains contestable
even if the doctrinal context tends toward stasis.
Having entered the caveats, I proceed. Our corporate law emerged in
its present form in the state of New Jersey between 1888 and 1896. It took
shape as an enabling regime that accorded management a wide zone of
freedom of action respecting production management and financial policy.
Two legal mandates provided the means to the ends. Management was to
have absolute control over investment and financial decisions, and agenda
control respecting both the terms of the corporate contract and end period
decisions like mergers. Beyond those two mandates lay a largely enabling
regime. The framework changed little during the twentieth century.
Subsequent innovation occurred primarily at the national level, centered
on the capital markets and the federal securities laws. There, the purpose
was the assurance of liquidity, a means to the end of the lowest possible
cost of capital in a system characterized by widespread holding of
securities.
The doctrinal template suggests a more particular statement of the
general purpose of encouraging wealth creation. It can be broken down
into two primary components, each of which implies a regulatory
corollary, one pair situated on the left side of the balance sheet and the
other on the right side. On the left side, it is corporate law’s job to
encourage long-term investment and the risk-taking implicated therein.
The corollary is that the law should facilitate a delegation of decisionmaking authority from the providers of capital to the expert managers who
deploy it. (The corollary extends over to the right side of the balance sheet
to include substantial management discretion over financing). On the right
side, it is corporate law’s job to facilitate investment in producing assets
at the lowest cost of capital. At least one corollary again is impliedthe
law should secure the presence of liquid trading markets in corporate
securities.
At this point, I need to confront the objective function as usually
formulated in the field: under this, corporate law seeks to maximize the
wealth generated by firms. The restatement presents some problems. The
first is positive. You can model maximizationthat’s what economics
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does. But in the real world of going concerns no one really knows when
wealth is being maximized, and, even if someone derived a plausible
maximizing template, corporate law would make no attempt to impose it.
So I prefer to relax and restate: corporate law facilitates the firm’s attempt
to maximize the value it produces.
The inclusion of the maximand takes us across the line to
normativity, even in my relaxed restatement. The step cannot be avoided.
Corporate law has no choice but to acknowledge the maximand to succeed
in its mission of facilitation. To see why, all one has to do is depict the
firm at the competitive margin, where if it fails to maximize, it ceases to
exist. Corporate law therefore must facilitate the firm’s attempt to
maximize. As thus restated, the objective function operates as a parameter
in corporate legal theory—no assertion about law or policy that fails to
recognize and work with it registers in debates in the field.
But there’s still a problem. Competitive life and death at the margin
tends not to be a day-to-day concern in the real world. At the same time,
maximizing the value produced inside the firm implies externalization of
the costs it incurs to the outside. The simple theoretical move of cautioning
that maximization occurs net of externalities does not suffice to address
the problem, given real world competitive pressures and regulatory slack.
Corporate law accordingly cannot in theory devote itself to firm
maximization without also acknowledging some authority that mediates
between those inside the firm and those outside. Just where that mediating
authority should be located and how it should be structured is a point of
controversy.
Meanwhile, the maximand emerges more benign than at first
appearance. It does not and cannot foreclose questions and initiatives
respecting the corporation’s relations with outside society and corporate
law’s appropriate role in integrating firms within society, so long as the
proponent takes care to recognize and interrogate the firm’s economic
objective.
There is also a philosophical implication here: corporate legal theory
makes all discussants welfare consequentialists who keep their eyes on
productivity, whatever their economic, political, or ethical predispositions.
I am not myself a philosophical consequentialist, and a range of metaethical presuppositions certainly motivate corporate law discussants. But
evaluations always in the end center on economic results. And, as the
maximand implies, the determinative consequence above all other
consequences is economic success, usually measured in financial terms. It
is determinative because legitimacy for both the firm and the law that
governs it follows from success.
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Finally, note that I deliberately avoid a narrower formulation favored
by most in the field—that the firm and hence corporate law should
facilitate maximization of shareholder value. The shareholder
maximization norm follows from a particular conception of the optimal
incentive alignment within the firm, a conception contestable in theory.
Nor has it ever dictated the law’s terms, even as it has had its moments of
influence. So it’s a debate point, rather than a point of general agreement.
DEBATES
The objective in place, corporate legal theory articulates means to the
end, and at this point there no longer will be general agreement. Instead,
there are four categories of debate, each characterized by binary opposite
positions. Political, methodological, and doctrinal affinities vary from
debate to debate. Some debates are positive, some are normative, some are
both. You can be on the left side in one debate and on the right in another
without necessarily being inconsistent. But an organizational principle
does inform my presentation—first generation law and economics writers
gravitated to the right side of every one of my binaries.
Category I: The appropriate scope of regulation and reliance on private
ordering
 Public vs. private
 State concession vs. contract
 Mandatory vs. enabling
 Federal vs. state (US)
Category II: Modes of regulation and normative priorities
 Trust vs. contract
 Fairness vs. efficiency
 Substance vs. process
 Expectations vs. dynamic change
 State enforcement vs. reputational enforcement
Category III: The terms of the corporate agency relationship and the
allocation of authority within the firm
 Trust vs. agency
 Management discretion vs. shareholder choice
 Firm value vs. shareholder value

2019]

Collected Lectures and Talks

761

Category IV: The boundaries of the firm and responsibility to outsiders
 Outsiders (other constituents) vs. insiders (shareholders and
managers)
 Social welfare vs. corporate profit
 Public vs. private
CATEGORIES I AND II
Category I covers debates about the appropriate scope of regulation
and the degree of reliance accorded state authority, or alternatively, private
ordering, in organizing firms and solving problems. Four binaries describe
positions taken in these debates: public v. private; state concession v.
contract; mandatory v. enabling; and, in this country, federal v. state.
Category II covers debates about the objectives of regulation and
normative priorities. Here I have five binaries: trust v. contract; fairness v.
efficiency; substance v. process; protection of expectations v. economic
dynamism; and state enforcement v. reputational enforcement.
The two Categories overlap—the Category II binaries amount to
more particular expressions of perspectives motivating Category I debates.
But nine binaries seemed too many for any one category. I am thinking
about culling the number of binaries and collapsing the two categories into
one, but am not sure.
In any event, rather than breaking out these debates one by one, I’ll
tell you a story about the intellectual history of corporate legal theory over
the last seventy-five years.
The story begins in 1980, when I started teaching. I started my first
Corporations class with a line from a mentor, William L. Cary of the
Columbia law faculty. Said Cary, “Business should be conducted fairly,
honestly, and competently.” This sounds obvious, but a prescriptive
follow-up was impliedthat the law should make sure that this happens.
That in turn implicated the left side binaries in Categories I and II. As
Adolf BerleCary’s predecessor at Columbiahad asserted in 1932,
ownership and control had separated in large firms, creating a
responsibility vacuum, a vacuum that implicated the public interest.
Additional legal mandates were needed to solve the problem. Because
state law, which had been captured by management, would not provide
them, additional federal intervention was necessary. Fair conduct meant
modeling management duties along the lines of trust law, as Berle had
advocated. Investors expected such additional protection; that expectation
in turn justified the intervention, an intervention that would in the long run
lower the cost of equity capital. Thus had they taught me at Columbia Law.
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A year and a half later I was researching debt and equity in corporate
capital structures for my first article. I found myself at the Columbia
Business Library reading economics for the first time in my life. The
papers kept citing back to Jensen and Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure.2 Few
remember it now, but that famous paper had a lot to say about capital
structure. I started it from the beginning and came across a remarkable
sentence: “The firm is a legal fiction that serves as a nexus for a set of
contracting relations among individual factors of production.” It felt like a
boom around my head as I assimilated the point. That one sentence
introduced me to the very existence of the right side binaries, destabilizing
assumptions and opening new possibilities. The sentence said that
businesses should not be treated as institutions and, more importantly,
regulation had no productive role to play in their governance, which
should be left to the actors with stakes in the game. Contract meant
enabling state law without mandates. Diversified investors wanted all pies
maximized and didn’t worry about ex-post protection of their own
expectations respecting the slicing. So stop worrying about fairness. As to
competence, markets took care of adverse selection problems. As to
honesty, well, that was a problem, but maybe the common law of fraud
would suffice.
I thought I had made this great discovery. But I soon found out that
others were ahead of me on this curve. People like Ralph Winter at Yale
and Frank Easterbrook and Dan Fischel at Chicago had already started to
translate economic contract into legal theory. The rest of the corporate law
professoriate was beginning a decade-long process of trying to figure out
just what the sentence meant. That discussion proceeded against a
dramatic background—there was a widespread sense of national
competitive failure; the long era of confidence in regulation had ended; we
had hostile takeovers, leveraged restructurings, junk bonds and plant
closings; and a top to bottom reconstruction of corporate fiduciary law in
the Delaware courts.
The theoretical discussion of the time looks a little strange today. It
was a descriptive debate. Chicago was claiming that all of corporate law
really was a contract. For the other side, which included me, still the
faithful student of Berlian teachers, part of the answer was, well, no it
wasn’t. The contract description was inaccurate in material respects. The
Chicago response to that was, well, those objections weren’t economics,
and if it wasn’t economics, it didn’t count.

2. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
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That meant that the descriptive debate about the nature of the firm
was as much about the methodological mode of description as about the
firm itself. It was a one-sided affair. When Jensen and Meckling showed
up, most people, including me, had no idea what to do with an assertion
from an economic model. The model, in its self-contained and stylized
way, made powerful statements about how things worked. No one knew
anything about the microeconomics it was addressing. No one had any
experience with the process of taking a theoretical model, checking
assumptions, and critically asking about real-world predictive power. No
one had been told that partial-equilibrium models like that of Jensen and
Meckling are not taken to have normative traction within proper
economics. And we were being told we weren’t even qualified to ask
questions. If we had known any social science, it would have gone
differently.
This does not go to say that Chicago just held out Jensen and
Meckling as a sacred text and rested the case. It was translated very
skillfully, removed from an assumption-laden framework and generalized
on an informal basis. The story, told by Easterbrook and Fischel, had three
parts. Note that I stress the past tense.
The first part was a rebuttal of the mid-century institutional
description of corporate managers as empowered actors in the economy
and society, a description instantiated in corporate law in the Berle and
Means model of separation of ownership and control. The rebuttal was that
contract trumped management power because contracting actors in the
stock market could take the power away by tendering to a hostile offeror;
and a hostile offeror would show up whenever management did a bad job.
And, at the time, that was happening every day. The separation of
ownership and control was pronounced dead.
In the second part of the story, contract trumped sovereign power.
Corporate law was not the mandate of an empowered sovereign because
firms could choose their jurisdictions, with most firms going to Delaware.
Choice of jurisdiction turned the lawgiver’s relationship to the firm into a
matter of mutual consent. There was no delegation of authority to the firm,
no concession of power.
The third part of the story had to confront the fact that even Delaware
law had mandates, including fiduciary law. That was the tricky part: how
to make contract trump existing mandate. Chicago took a substance-overform approach and offered us the majoritarian default. Corporate law was
for the most part comprised of default rules that gave actors what they
would have contracted for had they thought about it. If they wanted
something else, they could contract out. Closure was thereby achieved. It
all seemed to work. But then a couple of things happened.
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The first thing that happened was academic. The claim that
everything was contract in substance if not in form never really worked
descriptively. Although most corporate rules are default rules—and had
been so since the late nineteenth century—there were several mandates in
the way—most importantly, fiduciary law. To make the contract story
work, there had to be a successful normative assault on that mandate: even
though fiduciary duties are what most shareholders want, shareholders
should be permitted to opt out.
The corporate law community focused carefully on that claim: the
question was whether opting out could operate satisfactorily in real world
public firms. And the consensus answer was no. The institutional
framework was ill-suited to contract because management had agenda
control, the shareholders had collective action problems, and information
asymmetries imbalanced the playing field. So the mandate was justified.
Once that question was decided, the closure was broken and the strong
form contractual description had nothing left to offer.
The second thing happened in state legislatures. The real-world
nexus of contracts only made sense if the competing states cooperated and
kept their hands off the hostile tender offer. Chicago was juggling several
balls in the air. It used the states as responsive contractual lawmakers, with
the story of competitive responsiveness serving to support a normative
presumption against federal intervention. At the same time, it tried to
persuade the states to do away with defensive barriers against hostile
offers. But, as often happens with regulatory competition stories, it turned
out that competition among the states did not by itself solve public choice
problems. The states gave management additional defenses, defecting
against the nexus of contracts. It was interest group politics as usual, and
it empowered the managers.
The dominos kept falling. Institutional shareholders woke up and
started complaining about management entrenchment. That brought back
the corporation of Adolf Berle and his 1932 co-author Gardiner Means and
their separation of ownership and control description, albeit without the
normative overlay of trust and fiduciary enforcement of decades earlier.
The return of separated ownership and control had devastating
implications for the nexus of contractsinstitutional activism is all about
surmounting collective action problems so as to import something like
arm’s length bargaining in the shareholder–manager relationship.
The contractarians struggled to keep the game going—it was argued
at first that with a little aggregation the collective action problem could be
surmounted. Maybe investment institutions could pool resources on a
spontaneous order basis and organize a national pool of activist director
candidates. Maybe, but it didn’t happen. Law and economics had taught
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us to look at incentives and the incentives worked otherwise. That meant
that the market couldn’t correct governance problems by itself, because
the structures were second best. Suddenly, everything in corporate law was
about surmounting, ending, solving the problem of separation of
ownership and control so as finally to put Berle and Means to sleep. For
some, the activist hedge funds are right now finally doing just that; but I
think it is as yet far, far from clear that the incentives are there.3
From there the discourse went global, with Americans looking to
large investment institutions and shareholders elsewhere for strategies for
overcoming shareholder collective action problems here, while people in
Europe and Asia looked to us for more flexible ways of designing
corporate law, and, more importantly, to our securities regulation systems.
While Americans wanted active shareholders holding large blocks of
stock, Europeans wanted their blockholdings to start dissolving into
deeper, more liquid securities markets like those in English speaking
countries. In the course of the discussion, the economists suddenly
discovered that law mattered, which meant the nexus of contracts mattered
not at all.
Even as all of that transpired, the caravan of economic theory moved
on, still modeling a contractual firm, but one whose contracts are
incomplete. Where Jensen and Meckling had started out asserting that we
should expect 100% contractual solutions to governance problems,
incomplete contracts theory describes huge gaps in firm governance
structures where the institution of contract is inadequate to solve problems,
gaps that are filled by control allocation mechanisms. And it is just at the
point of control allocation where American corporate law imposes one of
its four great mandatesboard agenda control over charter amendments
and mergers. This of course has the effect of vesting control in incumbent
management. And so long as corporate capital structures do not provide
foolproof control transfer mechanisms that remove ineffective managers,
the problem of separation of ownership and control remains very real.
The economics of incomplete contracts is an economics of power.
Now, it does not use that term; microeconomics expunges the concept of
power. But it nonetheless has evolved so as to confront power in its
treatment of corporations. We return again to the firm of Berle and Means,
with the contractarian model of corporate law, a moribund theory.
But that does not mean that the left side won these debates. The nexus
of contracts’ theoretical legacy turns out to have been more important than
the nexus itself. As I noted before, the debate also was about the

3. Had this lecture been given in 2019, I would change this point, and concurred with those who
deem the hedge funds to have solved the problem of separated ownership and control.
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methodological mode of description, and even as the strong form
contractual description failed, economic analysis, in particular the agency
model, did not. They remain. But, with power allocation back on the table,
the economic framework turns out to be much more capacious than
anybody thought twenty years ago. I work within it much more than I work
outside of it. When I want to point out that neoclassical agency
assumptions that tend to be taken for granted in corporate legal theory are
unsafe, my first recourse generally is financial economics. It nearly always
gives me just what I need. Where it does not, microeconomics as writ more
broadly fills the gap.
The economics also came with a powerful normative
implicationthere’s a widely accepted presumption against new
regulation. The contractarians won that point. I personally don’t share it,
but I can’t ignore it and have to take care to address it. But, at the same
time, the deregulatory movement of the 1980s has lost most of its force.
Some of the left side binaries retain their vitality in the securities law
context. But with state corporate law and corporate governance more
generally, they have lost ground. Trust, fairness, and substance are all still
there but don’t weigh nearly as heavily as they used to. Berle and Means
survive with the separation of ownership and control even as their other
pointthat corporate property is public propertywaxed in the midtwentieth century and then waned. That point is still there in the structure,
but outside of securities law, the political economic context does not favor
it.
Finally, I note that the law itself, as it pursued the objective of wealth
creation during the twentieth century, remained relatively impervious to
theoretical initiatives on both sides of these debates. Positions taken in
these discussions tend to follow from metapolitical preferences. The law
itself tends to be more practical. Yes, the state corporate law framework is
largely enabling, but it also rests on four ironclad mandates—fiduciary
duty, which protects the cost of equity capital; management investment
and financing discretion, which assures freedom of action; management
agenda control, which does the same thing; and shareholder election of the
board, which at least makes possible the removal of managers who don’t
achieve financial success, which, as noted, is the determinative
consequence of consequences.
Management keeps itself free of new regulation so long as it succeeds
financially. But the general presumption in its favor can yield in reaction
to failure. In this functional universe, neither of contract and individual
freedom nor protection of trust reposed are primary motivating values in
lawmaking.
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CATEGORY III
On to Category III. These debates go the terms of the corporate
agency relationship and the allocation of authority within the firm, matters
I’ve already been traversing in the story I just told. Here three binaries
suggest themselves: entity v. agency; management discretion v.
shareholder choice; and managerialism v. shareholder value.
This is where the action has been in corporate legal theory for the last
decade or so. Here we find two other erstwhile Georgetown colleagues,
Lynn Stout and Margaret Blair, making the arguments on the left side.
Steve Bainbridge of UCLA debates from the left in the first two binaries
and from the right in the third, while Lucian Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman,
Henry Hansmann, and the law and economics establishment debate from
the right in all three. I’ve done some work here too, unpacking the notion
of shareholder value with implications favoring the left side.
The history here is episodic. The governing law changed quickly and
emphatically in management’s favor in the late nineteenth century. The
right side reappeared and pushed back a bit after World War II, but given
the general assumption that ownership and control were separate, no one
thought much could be done. It took the takeover wars of the 1980s to
bring these topics to the fore. Those wars ended with the takeover blocked
by a combination of legislation and hostile case law, but with a new
interest group of institutional investors registering objections. During the
prosperous 1990s, the institutions tried various strategies to overcome
their collective action problems and get control of corporate legislative
agendas. The theoretical discussion deepened, with the anti-managerial
impulse that formerly registered in Category II from the left side redirected
here to the right to address the allocation of authority within the firm. But
victories were few and far between, as a rising stock market cured all ills.
That changed when the century turned and the market collapsed.
Enron fell, taking with it settled assumptions about the functioning of the
disclosure system. Sarbanes-Oxley followed, but only whetted the right
side’s appetite for reform. The issue concerns voting and agenda control
within the firm. And every time the discussion’s level of intensity seems
to drop, we get some new scandal. If we eventually do see reforms that
shift power from managers to shareholders, it will be management’s own
fault.
At a theoretical level, these debates don’t resolve. In fact, I would
argue that the lack of resolution amounts to a deep structure in state
corporate law. The doctrine itself triggers these debates by simultaneously
dispensing two organizational models—entity, which privileges
management empowerment, and agency, which suggests shareholder
centered controls on management discretion. Ambiguity crops up on both
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sides of my balance sheet-based points of agreement. On the asset side, we
need management freedom of action to invest long term, but also
shareholder power to intervene in the event of failure. On the liability side,
we need management discretion respecting financial decisions, but we also
need shareholder rights keyed to keeping down the cost of equity capital
and preserving market liquidity.
Here corporate law, when it articulates the terms of the agency, in
effect mediates ongoing disputes rather than settling on clear solutions.
We have mediation rather than solution because both sides of these debates
tell plausible stories about wealth impacts. The shareholder side points to
the negative effects of management entrenchment. And it’s a fair point.
But the management side has a fair response when it points to the shortterm focus of institutional shareholders. The shareholder side points to the
deadweight costs of management pocket-lining through excess pay and
manipulative accounting and nondisclosure. Fair enough, but enforcement
systems implicate their own costs and its far from clear that enhanced
shareholder input and agenda access will lead firms in a productive
direction.
At a theoretical level, the right side in one sense has the upper hand,
because the separation of ownership and control remains corporate law’s
unsolved structural problem and they at least confront it directly. But the
left has its own claim to theoretical primacy—if there’s a guiding political
metaprinciple here, it is caution, which of course works in favor of the
inherited legal context. We end up going back and forth, with apparent but
unverified welfare gains constantly ranging against apparent perverse
effects and incentive problems, and we as yet have no empirical means to
determine correct outcomes.
Pending the articulation of a verifiable, generally accepted template
that fills in the terms of the agency relationship, the debate will go on, with
the opinions of the day being highly sensitive to results in real world firms.
All other things equal, I used to be right side anti-managerialist here. But
I am gradually changing sides.
CATEGORY IV
I at long last reach Category IV.
These debates concern the boundaries of the firm and the firm’s
responsibility to outsiders. This is the territory where corporate social
responsibility intervenes from the left. Three binaries capture the matters
at stake: first, outsiders (other constituents) versus insiders (shareholders
and managers), and, second, social welfare versus corporate profit. The
third is public versus private, which I note takes us back to the first binary
in Category I to start the whole thing over.
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In this Category, corporate law makes an emphatic doctrinal
response that excludes outsiders, exposing them to injury. There follows a
constant flow of theoretical protest. Each generation takes up the matter
anew, but the protests somehow never make a dent in the practical
settlement. The protests are motivated by the notion that corporate law
should follow from and synchronize with norms prevailing in the wider
system of public and private lawthat it needs somehow to interpolate a
social welfare function. Take that notion seriously and corporate power
and legitimacy come up as concerns possibly co-equal with economics.
Unfortunately, our corporate law institution, viewed narrowly, has
no aspirations in this Category. It disavowed social legitimacy as a concern
in 1888 when New Jersey opened up the first charter shop, pitched to firms
wanting to get out from under state level antitrust regulation. Ever since,
legitimacy in corporate law has been defined by real world financial
success and failure.
This historical settlement is of course contestable. But the contestants
confront a serious problem. Corporate law’s purpose is to encourage
attempts to create wealth—to clear the field for play. How does one
interpolate into it a social welfare function with distributive and protective
directives, particularly in a world where encouragement of wealth creation
means clearing a field for maximization, whatever that is?
The question leads to two embedded objections to corporate social
responsibility initiatives. First, the doctrine’s bright-line firm boundary
and insistence on putting wealth creation first imports coherence to the
governance system. Second, outside regulation is the better solution to the
responsibility problem. It has to be there, if only to make the world safe
for the corporate law delegation. It thereby makes firms and corporate law
legitimate by indirection.
This inside/outside settlement leaves many unsatisfied. But it was
very much the settlement Adolf Berle envisioned a half century ago, and
if you will permit me one last historical story, it is worth looking at his
account.
Berle, who set out his trust model of internal corporate regulation in
the 1930s, went on to encase it in a wider political economy in his postwar writings.
In Berle’s view, markets didn’t work and a stable economy only
would follow from national economic planning. He thought that
corporations should be managed for their shareholders on a trust basis, but
that they also should come to a big regulatory table at which the state set
the social welfare function. That accomplished, it was the corporation’s
duty to cooperate. Now, the big regulatory table did not exist in fact, but
Berle perceived a political equilibrium that forced cooperation on
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corporate managers. On one side they faced a federal government ready to
slam down new regulation if they ceased cooperating. On the other side,
they faced a public ready to register political dissatisfaction if corporations
failed to serve its heir needs. Managers, caught between the two and
incented to stave off new regulation, played cooperatively in the context
of the inside/outside settlement. Berle modeled them as quasi-public
servants who worked with the state to enhance social welfare primarily by
providing the people with economic security. Berle integrated the
corporation in an all-encompassing political, social and economic theory
that held out closure.
But it all started to fall apart in his last years. Berle’s construct was
vulnerable to attack from the new microeconomic right because it was
based on a heroic assumption. Berle viewed the production function as
endogenous—he thought the technocrats would keep the machines
humming productively whatever the regulatory and governance structure.
That assumption was over time refuted by both agency theory and
economic experience. Incentives then came to the fore, and along with
them the push back against the regulatory state.
Berle’s construct also ran into problems on the left. Corporate social
responsibility as we know it today descends from the next generation of
progressives—actors who were not getting the new federal regulation they
desired when the New Deal settlement fell apart in the 1960s and 1970s.
In response, they sought to redesign the legal firm to incorporate a social
welfare directive therein. That was not Berle’s view—but then he never
had to confront the deregulatory turn. Looking back at his vision today,
one gets a sense of something lost.
The inside/outside settlement remains with us but now has different,
harder implications. We put up with it as a polity, despite the state’s
retreat, because we value the end of economic opportunity. By hypothesis,
our median voter accepts a system that aggressively divides us into
winners and losers because it identifies with the winners, or at least holds
out hopes for its children’s place in the winner’s circle.
The result is to place the burden of persuasion firmly on the
settlement’s critics. The corporate social responsibility side has never
managed to surmount the burden to produce an alternative model that
meets coherence objections and resonates in the context of our social
settlement. It has every reason to continue to try and should in any event
continue to criticizeit is important that the settlement’s proponents not
be permitted to delude themselves with Pareto optimality stories about the
system’s consequences.
Meanwhile, the social responsibility party has joined the corporate
governance movement, there to importune management to do good. This
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presupposes a zone of management discretion, and so, in one final ironic
turn, the progressive voice today sides with management power in the
Category III debates and views the shareholders as more likely to be
hostile than friendly.
Unfortunately, the strategy of precatory dialogue opens them to
criticism from the left. Importuning only results in management doing
things that it wants to do anyway and diverts political energy from the
more effective goal of new regulation. That’s a good point. But forced to
choose, I’d leave the social investment community, the NGOs and the
other corporate governance do-gooders on their present trajectory. We’ll
get a return to tight regulatory controls only in the wake of an economic
disaster. Present regulatory energy should be directed to making sure that
doesn’t happen.
CONCLUSION
Concluding, Berle is my story’s thesis and Chicago its antithesis.
Berle propounded a theory of the corporation that held out closure by
eradicating markets from the picture and substituting the state; Chicago’s
theory also held out closure, effected by eradicating the state and
describing everything as a market transaction. Closure is great, but both
moves denuded both theories of real-world robustness. But each
nonetheless held sway in turnBerle’s as the support for a left side
presumption favoring regulation in Categories I and II, a presumption that
held sway from the depth of the depression until 1980, the year I started
teaching, and Chicago’s as the support for the presumption against new
regulation that has prevailed ever since in Categories I and II. The original
shift to Berle occurred in the wake of a period of economic failure, so did
the 1980 shift to the right. A shift back presupposes a future failure.
Categories I and II went quiet after 1990 and the Category III debates
emerged from secondary to primary status. I view them as a draw and hope
the standoff endures, with the law mediating across the ambiguity in the
agency relationship. As to Category IV, the inside/outside settlement has
not changed in my time and shows no sign of doing so, even as I deem the
debates to be of utmost importance.
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II. CORPORATE LEGAL HISTORY
A. ADOLF BERLE: AMERICAN CORPORATIST
Penn Law Faculty Ad Hoc, February 16, 2008
Accompanying Article:
William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s
Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation,
34 J. CORP. L. 99 (2008)
INTRODUCTION
Two years ago I was minding my own business when I get a cold call
from Michael Wachter. He said straightaway that he wanted to write an
article with me about Adolf Berle. I said that I had already written an
article about Adolf Berle. He said he knew but that more needed to be said.
“Berle was a corporatist. He drafted the NIRA.” I said, “No he wasn’t. He
was a legal pluralist,” with a cite to a paper by Dalia Tsuk. “And he didn’t
draft the NIRA, he went back to New York after the inauguration in 1933.”
Michael told me he wanted me to look at a paper he had written about
corporatism and labor unions, then in draft. After I had done that, he called
again to explain that he wanted to take the paper’s description of
corporatism to Berle. And then he gave me the punch line. Corporate law’s
shareholder primacy camp, said Michael, looks to Berle for a theoretical
predecessor. They’re wrong. Said Michael, “Berle wasn’t a shareholder
guy.” I said, “Ok, but it’s more complicated. Berle talked out of both sides
of his mouth on the matter, leaving contradictory texts. There are unsolved
puzzles on the table about the meaning of Berle’s classic works.” It turned
out that we were both right.
The classic corporate law texts in question are Berle and Means, The
Modern Corporation and Private Property, published in 1932, along with
some articles, all of which appeared before the book was published—
Berle’s 1931 article, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, Merrick
Dodd’s 1932 response, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?,
and Berle’s 1932 rebuttal of Dodd.
There’s a generally accepted historical picture that puts Berle in the
position of great grandfather to today’s shareholder primacy advocates and
shows Dodd as the great grandfather of today’s corporate social
responsibility advocates. But also, there’s some noise on the screen. The
first stems from contradictions within Berle’s body of work. While most
see him as shareholder friendly, some CSR people have claimed their own
Berlian roots in The Modern Corporation’s last six pages. Meanwhile, I
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and a few others see Dodd as a run of the mine managerialist and not CSR.
Questions also arise due to changes of position in the later writings of both
Berle and Dodd. Dodd reversed his position in 1941, to be followed in
1954 by Berle’s concession that Dodd had been proven correct. You may
not remember, but you read about all this when you took Corporations.
With Michael’s description of corporatism on one side and the
unsolved puzzles regarding the meaning of Berle, Berle and Means, and
Dodd on the other side, we agreed to go ahead to see if we could solve all
the puzzles. I knew we had succeeded one day soon thereafter when I got
another call from Michael: “Dodd’s a corporatist too! They’re all a bunch
of corporatists!”
Our reading, then, marks both Berle and Dodd as corporatists,
working from Michael’s typology of twentieth century political economy
and its distinction among corporatism, pluralism, and communism. For the
sake of expedition, let’s put communism to one side and contrast
corporatism with pluralism. Pluralism, as we all know, looks to the
preferences of individuals in calculating welfare for government policy.
Outcomes are determined by competition for individual votes in a political
marketplace. Interest groups are out there but have no political status
beyond the aggregation of their members’ interests. Property rights rule.
Now let’s turn to corporatism, which accepts property rights too. But it
also enfranchises groups, emphasizing cooperative relationships among
them and between them and the state. Two principles dominate. First, there
is an objectively cognizable “public interest” articulated by the
government after consultation with the major groups. Second, once the
public interest is expressed, the groups are expected to adjust and support
it. Property rights yield at that point.
I’ve noticed that writers on twentieth century American political
thought tend to avoid the term corporatism, preferring various
alternatives—distinctions between America and Europe play a role in that,
but corporatism’s links to Hitler and Mussolini doubtless also figure in.
But corporatism wasn’t just European fascism. It also was Latin America
after World War II, and to some extent Europe as well; see the German
dual board. To a cognizable extent, it is China today. And it was also U.S.
politics in 1932.
We make two assertions: first, if you take this description of
corporatism to the classic Berle and Dodd texts and read them in historical
context, you can explain every line in them and solve all the puzzles.
Second, once you’ve done this there’s no basis for connecting Berle with
shareholder primacy and not much of a basis for connecting either Berle
or Dodd with CSR.
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But, making the case is tricky. As of 1932, there are only six pages
in Berle’s published work that support it, and those pages can be read as
CSR. And, as of that time, the rest of published Berle does admit of an
acontextual read as shareholder primacy.
We surmount the problem by following Berle over time, describing
an evolution in three phases: Early, Middle, and Late. Early Berle was
indeed a shareholder advocate and lasted until 1931. Middle Berle springs
into existence as a political actor in 1931–1932, and is a corporatist. But,
because the final six pages of Modern Corporation provide too thin a basis
for this claim, we establish it by reference to Berle’s political role as a
member of FDR’s Brains Trust. We conclude the proof with a look at Late
Berle, the post-war political economist.
FROM EARLY TO MIDDLE BERLE
We start with Berle in his downtown law office in the 1920s, writing
articles about growing management power and what to do about it. He
suggested several thingsself-organization by investment bankers,
monitoring by investment institutions, and stricter stock exchange rules.
There’s an intriguing resemblance to today’s contractarianism, but you
have to be careful with it. Berle was positioning himself as a progressive
reformer, and his positions are better analogized to the contemporary
industrial pluralism of John R. Commons. For present purposes there are
two key points: first, like Commons, Berle wrote off the courts as agents
of reform, and, second, Berle was not yet worrying about the corporation’s
role in the broader political economy, at least not in his law review articles.
Work on The Modern Corporation began in 1928, when Berle
engaged Means, a young institutional economist, who showed him that
200 corporations controlled one-third of the national wealth and predicted
that by 1950, 200 corporations would control 70% of the national wealth.
At that point Berle started to change.
He dropped his contractual strategy, adjusted his view of the courts,
and emerged with a trust model of corporate law. Most of The Modern
Corporation was devoted to its exposition. Berle took a piece of that part
of the unpublished book and ran it in Harvard Law Review in 1931, an
article that lays out the problem of management power and proposes
fiduciary duty as a means of addressing it. That brought Berle to the public
as a shareholder advocate making three fundamental points: one, managers
were trustees of the shareholders; two, managers should only exercise their
wide-ranging powers for the shareholders’ ratable benefit; and, three, the
judiciary should vigorously enforce the trust.
With that paper published, Middle Berle shows up in the chronology,
but yet not in academic print. This was Berle, the public intellectual, rather
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than Berle the corporate lawyer. Like many others at the time, he believed
that free market capitalism was inherently dysfunctional and had brought
the country to the brink of ruin. In early 1932, he joined FDR’s Brains
Trust where, together with his Columbia colleagues Ray Moley and
Rexford Tugwell, he made up the faction of campaign advisors that Ellis
Hawley later would term the “planners.” They advocated acceptance of
concentrated industry together with government economic planning and
fought against an opposing faction of Brandeisian liberals who favored
market competition, trust busting, and small business. That September,
FDR gave the planners the nod, putting out their views in his famous New
Individualism or Commonwealth Club speech, a speech written by Berle
(and his wife Beatrice).
The speech treated everyday management practice as a political
problem: ordinary citizens had a right to economic security, a right
infringed by corporate managers, the “princes of property.” To address the
problem, Berle pulled out his trust model, but substituted citizens for
shareholders as the beneficiary. Continued sufferance of management
power depended on the trust’s fulfillment: the princes had to assume
responsibility for the public good, end their internecine disputes, come
together as industrial groups, and cooperate toward a common end. Should
any group defect from cooperation, the government would intervene with
punishment. Thus coordinated, firms could adjust production to
consumption and distribute wealth more equitably. The chaotic
marketplace would be disciplined by “an economic constitutional order.”
This is fully formed Middle Berle expounding themes he continued
to develop for the rest of his life. We think the term corporatism aptly
describes the substance of both the speech and the NIRA, the statute that
attempted to realize its vision in public policy. In fact, Berle did return to
New York after FDR’s nomination and wasn’t one of the NIRA’s drafters,
but his fellow Brains Trusters were, and it certainly reflected his point of
view. The paper sets out its main terms, highlighting section 7a, which
accorded labor a place at the big new corporatist table. The paper also
describes the NIRA’s collapse, but that lay in the future.
THE TEXTS
So, where Early Berle addressed only corporate law issues, Middle
Berle articulated a national political economy. Both used the same trust
model with apparently inconsistent ends. We can bring them closer
together, if not merge them into a coherent whole, by reference to The
Modern Corporation, published in 1932.
The book sandwiches the shareholder trust model inside of opening
and concluding parts that address the broader implications of
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management’s social and economic power. Ownership and control had
separated, empowering managers. Classical economic assumptions about
owner control and responsibility no longer obtained. Standard
individualist defenses against government intervention could no longer be
countenanced. Instead, we needed to cross the public/private divide and
deem corporate property to be public property.
Now, if corporate property was public property a question needed to
be addressed: Was the corporation about social welfare, or as the book’s
trust model implied, about shareholder welfare? The book took up the
question in its last six pages, the only ones in which Middle Berle made
an appearance. There, Berle redeployed the trust model for the citizen
beneficiaries of the Commonwealth Club speech: since the shareholders
had given up responsibility for corporate property, other constituents
should join them as beneficiaries; passive shareholder property rights
would give way to a system of community obligations centered on
employee security and business stabilization. Management must develop
into a “purely neutral technocracy.”
Strong stuff indeed, but the book offered no further policy
instructions, corporatist or otherwise. Meanwhile, it set out two versions
of the trust model only to leave them hanging in mutual tension. We think
this unsatisfactory conclusion reflected rapid evolution of Berle’s views at
the end of the prepublication period.
So, there’s the book. Now assume it is early 1932 with Berle working
on the galleys.
Here Dodd enters the picture in the Harvard Law Review’s May 1932
issue, slamming Berle’s 1931 shareholder trust article from the left. Said
Dodd, the view that corporations exist for their shareholders makes no
sense in the present crisisthey should instead act as social institutions,
providing economic security for employees. He assured the reader that
managers would undertake this trust in a responsible way, citing
conservative business leaders like Owen Young and Gerald Swope of
General Electric.
Read out of context, this models a constituency-based firm under
management control not much different from today’s Blair-Stout team
production model. But it had a more specific meaning at the time. In May
1932, many expected some kind of corporatist reform from a soon-to-beelected Democratic Administration. But, two competing visions of what
that might look like were in circulation. One came from managers and their
alliesEllis Hawley terms this group the “business commonwealth.” It
wanted a delegation of authority to management to run the economy free
of product market competition. Young and Swope had clear cut political
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profiles as this position’s advocates. Dodd, by working them into his text,
aligned himself with the business commonwealth.
Interestingly, Young and Swope did not stand for the proposition that
corporations should share with constituents. Instead, they viewed
employee security as part of a new labor relations model that would
ultimately yield production efficiencies. But the model, initiated at GE in
the 1920s, had not proved competitive under depression conditions—
Young and Swope went into politics looking for government policies that
would backstop their business plan.
The opposing corporatist model came from academics like Berle—
the planners. They opposed an open delegation to management and wanted
strict government oversight of the planning process. And, unlike the
managers, they wanted labor brought to the negotiating table.
Berle accordingly must have gotten quite a jolt when Dodd took him
to public task for having left labor out of the corporate law picture in the
1931 article. Dodd attacked the shareholder trust from the left, even as
Berle in fact stood well to Dodd’s left. How to respond? Well, the book
wasn’t out yet. So why not answer with a preview of the Commonwealth
Club speech? That doesn’t seem to have been an option—Berle was inside
the campaign and FDR hadn’t yet opted to go with the planners. Moreover,
it’s one thing to lay out a policy proposal in a speech; doing so in a law
review is quite another.
So, Berle’s response, published in the Harvard Law Review’s next
issue,4 avoided any mention of ultimate policy goals and concentrated on
the infirmities of the business commonwealth model. Why empower
managers when unbridled management power was the problem? Controls
were needed, and trust duties to shareholders were the only ones available,
at least at present. And, when the time finally came to address the problem
in a serious way, lawyers like Berle would be better equipped than
managers. This is roughly the move Berle makes in the book—he tells the
reader something new is coming without saying what he expects it to be,
only laying groundwork.
Berle’s response thus addresses only the situation a few months
before the 1932 election and accordingly doesn’t stand for shareholder
primacy. Indeed, it puts shareholders in their place, according them
legitimacy only as passive recipients of wealth created, because as
recipients they represented to some extent the welfare of the general
public. Decades later, he would add that full legitimacy for the shareholder
interest would only come when wealth was so widely distributed that the

4. One can infer that Berle’s response was completed before the May 1932 issue was published.
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shareholder interest in fact proxied for the public interest. The shareholder
primacy gloss really came from Dodd.
Dodd returned in 1941 to do an about face, dropping business
commonwealth corporatism and returning corporate law to its narrow,
private, profit-seeking box. With the economic crisis past, he returned to
normalcy. Citing Berle with approval, he argued that corporate law’s
purpose was to protect the shareholders from empowered managers, who
now could not be trusted. Happily, the situation was under control because
the new federal securities laws contained management. Observers today
may disagree with that last point. But, otherwise, Dodd’s 1941 reversal is
only text under discussion that admits an easy transfer to today’s context.
LATE BERLE
Late Berle fired the debate’s last shot in 1954, making a famous
concession—Dodd had been proven right over time; managers could be
trusted after all.
But this no more meant what it seems to say any more than Berle’s
1932 response meant what it seems to say. Berle only admitted that later
events had gone Dodd’s way; he did not concede to having been wrong at
the time of publication in 1932. Comes the question, what had changed in
subsequent history to justify the adjustment? For Berle, everything had
changed in 100 days in 1933, when a new American Economic Republic
had been founded. Two conditions rendered corporate power benign in the
new republic—first, government management of the economy from an
unchallenged position of higher authority and, second, a solid political
consensus in support. Absent those conditions, there is no basis for
inferring from Berle an endorsement of management in a primary role as
an economic and social allocator.
Late Berle thought that the post-war regulatory state had in substance
accomplished the objectives of the NIRA and formal corporatism. He
assumed that the state could and did accurately articulate the social welfare
function, guiding and pushing the markets to the right result with the
cooperative engagement of interested parties. He described a benign
equipoise amongst strong organizations, an equipoise constrained by a
wider public consensus that empowered the central government in the role
of welfare maximizer. And he remained suspicious of competing interest
groups—you can call him many things, but pluralist in today’s sense is not
one of them.
Corporate managers emerged as quasi-public servants, but not in the
way advocated by Dodd in 1932. For Late Berle, managers, whether they
liked it or not, were caught between the regulatory state and the public
consensus. Failure to satisfy the public meant new regulation; avoidance
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of new regulation meant satisfying the public. As a practical matter, then,
managers could not avoid public duties. Shareholders, in contrast,
remained what they had been in 1932—passive collectors of dividends
with no productive role to play in the political economy.
COUNTERFACTUALS
Now let’s fast forward to today. We have shareholder primacy, a
counter managerialist view that does not necessarily reject shareholder
value as the ultimate end but defends management discretion and
corporate social responsibility, and its ultimate objective to insert social
welfare enhancement into the corporation’s set of legal instructions.
Who has what claim on Dodd or Berle?
Dodd in 1932 as CSR? Not if you accept our substantive link to
Swope and Young, who were corporate maximizers peddling a new model
of labor relations. Moreover, Dodd in 1941 pulled corporate law back from
the wider political economy to reinsert it in its small box of statutes and
case law. He’s best remembered as a managerialist.
Berle as shareholder primacy? Not after 1931. The corporatism of
Middle and Late Berle followed from assumptions antithetical to
shareholder primacy, rendering any normative connections to today’s
discussants incidental and tenuous.
The best you can do for shareholder primacy is focus on Berle’s
descriptive contribution—the separation of ownership and control—which
remains the problem shareholder primacy wants to solve. But today’s
discussion proceeds in a private, property rights context. Making a
connection means ignoring Berle’s normative perspective, and for Berle,
the whole point of the separation diagnosis was normative. It meant that
property rights did not assure responsible operation and depicted managers
as an illegitimate aristocracy—they were “princes of property,” rather than
the “neutral technocrats” Berle wanted because they made public welfare
decisions without being publicly accountable. Including shareholders into
the decision-making process (assuming there was a meaningful way to do
so) wouldn’t solve the problem.
Indeed, as between shareholder primacy and management discretion,
we can more easily imagine Berle choosing the managers from a fallback
position. Any movement to empower shareholders would make him
suspicious. Today’s debate poses a choice between governance
interruptions by market intermediaries and governance from within the
corporate institution. Given the choice, much in Berle signals that he
would put his anti-managerial suspicions to one side to privilege internal
control. He prized stability above-all and mistrusted markets as deployers
of capital.
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How about Berle as CSR? It’s a stronger claim, but it too fails in the
end. Berle envisioned and sanctioned CSR only within a corporatist
framework. His post-war consensus story specified that the public
demanded CSR only at “reasonable” levels. Today’s CSR descends from
progressives in the 1960s and 1970s who were not getting the new
regulation they wanted and no longer saw the post-New Deal regulatory
state as a responsive agency. This led to a corporate law push to insert
social welfare maximization into the legal model. There’s no authority for
that in Berle, who envisioned the legal entity going to the corporatist table
for social welfare instructions. Indeed, Berle readily can be imagined
making the standard objection to today’s CSR: so far as concerns corporate
pursuit of social goals, outside regulation works better than an open-ended
internal social welfare instruction because it makes for a more coherent
governance system and enhances political legitimacy.
CLOSE
So, Berle answered the question “for whom is the corporation
managed” with a political economy that integrated a theory of corporate
law within a theory of social welfare maximization. Today’s shareholder
primacy more supplants than succeeds him. We have shareholder primacy
precisely because corporatism lost out to pluralism and markets. Berle’s
legacy is that he and Means identified the separation of ownership and
control that remains corporate law’s core problem, a problem now seen
from a completely different normative perspective. Corporate legal theory
must confront it and hold out a cure. Shareholder primacy does that and so
takes over as the favored policy position, but only within the small
corporate law box.
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B. THE MODERN CORPORATION’S LAST CHAPTER
Berle I, November 7, 2009
Accompanying Article:
William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Tracking Berle’s Footsteps:
The Trail of The Modern Corporation’s Last Chapter, 33 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 849 (2010)
INTRODUCTION
Those game enough to work through all 300 pages of The Modern
Corporation and Private Property in a search for the origins of, or insights
about today’s corporate law topics will discover two lines of thought that
coexist in tension. One line, set out in Books II and III, resonates
comfortably with today’s shareholder-centered corporate legal theory.
Here the book teaches that even as ownership and control had separated,
managers are trustees for their shareholders and may only exercise their
wide-ranging powers for the shareholders’ benefit. The other line of
thought emerges in Books I and IV, where The Modern Corporation
encases this shareholder trust model in discussions of corporate power and
social welfare, discussions that resonate today with those who advocate
corporate social responsibility. Here Berle crossed the public–private line
to recharacterize corporate property as public property, and assert that
separated ownership and control implies public responsibilities. Berle
carries this private to public line of thought to a logical conclusion of sorts
in the book’s last chapter, Book IV, Part IV, six pages entitled The New
Concept of the Corporation. Here the shareholder interest, the focal point
of most of the book, wholly gives way to community obligations and
managers become “purely neutral technocrats” pursuing social welfare
maximization.
A couple of years ago, we published a paper that explained the
book’s seeming contradictions by reference to the context in which it was
written. The book had a long gestation, spanning the late 1920s, the Crash,
and the early years of the Great Depression, a time when Berle joined
many others in reordering his political views. He began as a friend of the
shareholders during the boom years and ended up, during the depths of the
Depression, as an advocate of corporate advancement of national social
welfare policies. Different parts of the book capture Berle at different
points in the timeline. The last chapter gives us Berle as he addresses
debates over the appropriate policy response to the economic crisis,
debates still underway upon book’s publication in 1932. Many looked to
FDR not only to win the election, but to follow the lead of many European
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leaders of the time and adopt corporatism as the political economy of the
United States. Berle, who joined FDR’s inner circle during the 1932
campaign, was a leading advocate of a corporatist approach. Our earlier
paper highlights the conceptual overlap between the last chapter and the
Commonwealth Club speech that Berle (and his wife Beatrice) wrote for
FDR. The speech, the most radical of the 1932 campaign, presaged the
economic program of the New Deal, in particular the corporatist National
Industrial Recovery Act enacted in June 1933.
Our paper for this conference returns to the last chapter to take a new
look at it and trace its later footsteps. Our inquiry has two phases. We first
examine Berle’s later writing on political economy to see the footsteps
change direction, but only slightly, as Berle modified his corporatism to
suit the post-war political economy. We then look at the world after Berle,
with its retreating regulatory state and turn to market controls. We find
traces of the last chapter even here, as legal compliance per se emerges as
the margin at which society confronts empowered managers.
THE LAST CHAPTER
First, to the last chapter itself. It builds on the point that those who
have power in our society inevitably come into conflict with the populace
because the power’s exercise impacts the public interest. The chapter
predicts that the impacted population will want to redirect the power’s
exercise for its own general benefit. The prediction does not, however,
imply a particular policy prescription. Particular outcomes of this conflict,
said Berle, will vary across different political economies and over time.
He does suggest three possible alternative courses for corporate
power in the United States in 1932. First, we could leave management
unregulated, but only if we wanted corporate plundering. Second, we
could hew to the book’s shareholder trust model. But the last chapter turns
on the shareholders, dismissing them out of hand as “inactive and
irresponsible.” So we get the third alternative. We could start anew,
rethinking the corporation for the community’s benefit. Well, how,
exactly? The book does not tell us. It was up to the community to put
forward its demands with “clarity” and force.
Thus, do we see The Modern Corporation doing what Berle
manifestly thought to be its job—to clear the field of private property
rights so that the new regulatory state could get on with it. But the last
chapter does give us a brief, very brief, suggestion as to what that new
regulation might look like, and this follows the corporatist template.
Corporatism? Yes, corporatism. Corporatism wasn’t just European
fascism. It also was Latin America after World War II, and to some extent
Europe as well (see the German dual board). To some extent it is China
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today. And it was also U.S. politics in 1932. You can place corporatism
with pluralism and communism as one of the twentieth century’s three
great -isms. Putting communism to one side and looking closer to home,
let us start with pluralism. This looks to the preferences of individuals in
calculating welfare for government policy. Outcomes are determined by
competition for individual votes in a political marketplace. Interest groups
are out there but have no political status beyond the aggregation of their
members’ interests. Property rights rule. Now let us compare corporatism,
which accepts property rights too. But it also enfranchises groups,
emphasizing cooperative relationships among them and between them and
the state. Two principles dominate. First, there is an objectively cognizable
“public interest” articulated by the government after consultation with the
major groups. Second, once the public interest is expressed, the groups are
expected to adjust and support it. Property rights yield at that point.
And that’s what the last chapter tells us: corporate property rights
will yield once a system of community obligations has been worked out.
Here’s the payoff quote:
Should the corporate leaders . . . set forth a program comprising fair
wages, security to employees, reasonable service to their public, and
stabilization of business, all of which will divert a portion of the
profits from the owners of passive property, and should the
community generally accept such a scheme as a logical and human
solution of industrial difficulties, the interests of passive property
owners would have to give way.

Managers would emerge as “purely neutral” technocrats making allocative
decisions across groups in society “on the basis of public policy rather than
private cupidity,” possibly becoming more powerful than government
itself.
With this vision of empowered manager-technocrats, the last chapter
finally goes for broke. But the flourish needs to be read carefully. Berle’s
managers become empowered only if they successfully redirect their
resources to social welfare enhancement. And their power is only that of
technocrats, experts who realize an instruction delivered by outside
political forces. The vision presupposes a source of policy instructions
vested in a higher power still, a role to be filled by the national government
that articulates the public interest. And, because an empowered central
government is a basic assumption, there is nothing in the last chapter for a
modern proponent of corporate social responsibility in a deregulatory
state.
But then there isn’t much in The Modern Corporation for modern
proponents of shareholder primacy either. Berle retains a reputation as a
shareholder guy because of The Modern Corporation’s other line of
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thought, centered on a shareholder trust model. Berle forcefully advanced
that line of thought in 1932 as an alternative to management empowerment
in a famous back and forth with E. Merrick Dodd. But, as the last chapter
shows, Berle saw the trust model as an either/or alternative to a regime of
management piracy, a choice posed under the pre-New Deal regulatory
status quo. Given that status quo, and absent a big-stick state, Berle went
with the shareholder trust as the least dangerous alternative. Given a statecontrolled economy, Berle saw things very differently, with the public
displacing the shareholders as trust beneficiaries and the directors owing
their primary allegiance to the national interest as articulated by the
corporatist state.
Finally, we can distill all of this situation specificity from the last
chapter to find three points that still speak to us directly today. First,
demands for corporate social responsiveness are inevitable. Second, the
political and social particulars will vary with the context. And, third,
public demands, in order to register, will need to be stated clearly and
forcefully.
POST-WAR BERLE
The last chapter’s grand vision soon achieved real world
manifestation in the NIRA. But the NIRA quickly fell apart. It looked to
cooperative alliances that never coalesced, and, absent cooperation, its
economic plan foundered on internal contradictions. Berle’s grand vision
disappeared along with it. Berle accepted the result.
Ironically, Berle also came to accept Merrick Dodd’s benign view of
corporate managers. He and Dodd went back and forth several times. Berle
fired the last shot in 1954, making a famous concession—Dodd had been
proven right over time; managers could be trusted after all. Those who
mistake Berle for a shareholder primacy advocate have been puzzling over
the concession to Dodd ever since.
But Berle was only admitting that later events had gone Dodd’s way;
he did not concede to having been wrong at the time of publication in the
Harvard Law Review in 1932. Comes the question: What had changed in
subsequent history to justify the adjustment? For Berle, everything had
changed in 100 days in 1933, when a new American Economic Republic
had been founded.
Before 1933, the economy and the polity had been separated, with
the economy left to go its automatic way. But the “open market” could not
prevent periodically catastrophic rises or falls in prices. There needed to
be a planned equation of supply to demand, and the transition from the
destructive regime of autonomous market controls to the superior system
of state planning had occurred in 1933.
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Two conditions rendered corporate power benign in the new
republicfirst, government management of the economy from an
unchallenged position of higher authority and, second, a solid political
consensus in support. Absent those conditions, there is no basis for
inferring from Berle an endorsement of management in a primary role as
an economic and social allocator.
Berle thought that the regulatory system that emerged had
accomplished the objectives of the NIRA and formal corporatism. He
described a strong regulatory state that operated under a pragmatic
political settlement toward an end point in accord with corporatist
precepts. He thought there was no practical alternative: absent strong
central economic planning, capitalism would only return to the crisis of
1932. Fortunately, the state could and did accurately articulate the social
welfare function, guiding and pushing the markets to the right result.
This presupposed the cooperative engagement of interested parties.
Berle described a benign equipoise amongst strong organizations, an
equipoise constrained by a wider public consensus that empowered the
central government in the role of welfare maximizer. Post-war interest
group pluralism never registered with Berle. It made him suspicious
because it assumed good results from competition in pursuit of selfinterested goals and failure to cooperate.
Meanwhile, management power had been tamed within the benign
equipoise. The concentration of productive functions in the hands of a few
was a positive development if it provided the means to realize a planned
economy sensitive to the interests of the community as a whole. In the
American Economic Republic managers emerged as quasi-public
servants. Whether they liked it or not, they were caught between the
regulatory state and the public consensus. Failure to satisfy the public
meant new regulation; avoidance of new regulation meant satisfying the
public. As a practical matter then, managers could not avoid public duties.
Shareholders, in contrast, remained what they had been in 1932—
passive collectors of dividends with no productive role to play in the
political economy. Corporate law, meanwhile, should not be a primary
mode of regulation—Berle approved of post-war extensions of the
protection of the business judgment rule. Management, now tamed by the
big stick state, should not be constrained by the state corporate law
apparatus. Nor did capital market constraints matter either. Corporations
got new equity capital by retaining earnings and only rarely went to Wall
Street to sell stock. The markets served only to provide liquidity to passive
property holders, there was no disciplinary value added. The shareholders,
earlier thrown up against Dodd as a countervailing interest, dropped out of
the governance picture. Federal bureaucrats now did the law enforcement.
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THE LAST CHAPTER POST-BERLE
The framework of corporate legal theory changed abruptly after
Berle’s death in 1971. The precipitating economic context featured
stagflation, a failing stock market, the retreat of organized labor, and a
perception of national competitive decline in new global markets.
Together these problematized the productive and financial performance of
corporate managers. Management power again became a problem.
The last chapter tells us that demands for corporate social
responsiveness are inevitable and that political and social particulars will
vary with the context. And so they have. Berle had viewed the production
function as an exogenous variable—he thought the industrial production
machine could bring forth limitless wealth so long as the planners
mediated supply and demand. Now productivity was the question and
corporate social responsiveness came to be seen in terms of optimal
economic results. The problem of management power was reframed as a
problem of management incentives. Shareholder value maximization
came to be seen as a proxy for optimal economic results, situating the
shareholder interest at the economic margin as the search for an optimal
corporate incentive structure commenced. The searchers favored market
decisions over regulatory mandates.
If management incentives are a problem, then the inherited legal
model of the corporation could not be dismissed as antique but serviceable,
as Berle had done. It needed to be revived. And so corporate governance
was born. If structural barriers prevented shareholders from controlling
managers, then the structure of the board of directors needed revision to
make it an effective monitor of management performance. The corporate
governance system now supplements the independent board with an everexpanding list of best practices. Together, these ever more constrain
management power.
But what of the big-stick state, and the last chapter’s vision of
demands emanating from the general public, the demands that needed to
be stated clearly and forcefully? Berle’s public demanded economic
stability and job security. Once the economy was regulated and stabilized,
management power dropped out as a frontline political problem. Berle did
not expect the problem to reemerge, at least absent another economic
crisis.
But an economic crisis did follow, and it proved Berle right. The
legitimacy of management power depends on economic performance.
Economic failure denudes management of legitimacy, and triggers clear
and forceful public demands. It happened in the 1930s. It happened again
in the 1970s, again after Enron, and it is happening now. Scandals
crystallized the demands in the earlier cases, and so we got the Foreign
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Corrupt Practices Act and Sarbanes-Oxley. As befits new regulation in a
deregulatory era, neither much implicated the economic substance of
corporate management even as both constrained management power.
SOX taught us an additional lesson. It was enacted by a frightened
Congress, and so marked the emergence of the shareholder class as an
independent force in the political landscape. Now, Berle thought that the
shareholder interest could proxy for the public interest only if shareholding
was proportionately distributed across the population. There’s much to be
said for Berle’s point, and we certainly have not reached that point of
identity. Even so, the politicians now model the median voter as a 401(k)
holder. The federal securities laws’ truth-telling mandates assume greater
importance as a result.
And there’s a second reason for the focus on truth-telling. In Berle’s
American Economic Republic, the regulator set the price. Today the
market does that, and now that economic discipline of managers is a
primary policy goal, the stock market itself assumes a leading regulatory
role. It does its job better if information asymmetries are minimized,
further enhancing the importance of truth-telling mandates.
What follows is an ongoing mediation between corporate power,
now manifested in the insiders’ informational superiority, and the outside
economy, now protected by disclosure rules. As the last chapter predicts,
this mediating process has traversed the public-private divide repeatedly.
Is the public enforcement apparatus insufficient for the job? No problem,
we’ll delegate to the plaintiff’s bar. And if the enforcing lawyers’ rents
have to be funded out of the shareholders’ residual claim, so what? Didn’t
Berle tell us that corporate property is public property?
If the combined armies of public and private enforcers do not assure
us of compliance, we’ll go inside the corporation and force it help out.
When I look at compliance systems, I tend to see the mandates and costs;
the big stick state in raw form; the public pounding the private. But there’s
something else going on. A compliance officer is a cop, a private sector
cop pursuing a public goal. It’s there to make sure the empowered actors
inside the corporation cooperate with the public’s clearly stated-demands,
and so in sense wields delegated public authority. More than a trace of The
Modern Corporation’s last chapter survives as these arrangements
proliferate. We continue to harness corporations to serve public purposes,
and the differences lie less in the means than the ends.
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C. THE MODERN CORPORATION’S MISSING CHAPTER:
GARDINER MEANS AND THE ADMINISTERED PRICE
Berle X, June 17, 2018
Accompanying Article:
William W. Bratton, The Modern Corporation and Private Property
Revisited: Gardiner Means and the Administered Price, 42 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 591 (2018)
INTRODUCTION
This story begins at the 1982 Hoover Institute Conference on The
Modern Corporation and Private Property (MCPP). Many of you will
have read some or all of the conference papers, published in the Journal
of Law and Economics in 1983. For the unacquainted, it was a gathering
of the Chicago tribe ostensibly to reconsider and reassess MCPP on its
fiftieth anniversary, but in fact to bury it once and for all as a source of
learning in law, economics, and policy formulation. You don’t actually
have to read the papers to access their bottom-line points: first, contrary to
Berle and Means, free markets and corporate contracting work together to
constrain management moral hazard; and second, while ownership and
control are indeed separate, no structural infirmity follows.
It was a star-studded event, with papers from Demsetz, Fama and
Jensen, and Stigler, plus a long comment from Oliver Williamson. The
Demsetz and Fama-Jensen papers bear careful reinspection, by the way,
but let’s put that to one side.
My interest today lies in a paper and a comment delivered at the
conference by the surviving co-author, the octogenarian Gardiner Means.
I found both the paper and the comment somewhat mystifying when I first
read them back in the 1980s. You see, everybody else at the conference
addressed microeconomics and governance, talking past Means; Means in
turn talked past them, going on about product pricing, repeating old points
in a hostile environment populated by a new and different generation just
now really hitting its stride. I came away wondering whether he should
have turned down the invitation. His stuff looked shopworn and irrelevant
in a highly creative and innovative environment. They would have been
ready to hold him up to ridicule and it looked like he’d played right into
their hands.
That read lingered in the memory. So when Chuck asked me to return
to Berle and Means for this year’s historically oriented conference, I told
him that I’d go back to Means at the 1982 event. I suspected I’d end up
focusing more on the conference than on Means—maybe a comment on
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the Demsetz and Fama-Jensen papers. But I instead found myself using
Means’s 1982 contributions as signposts pointing to an unexplored access
route to the gestation of MCPP. The two texts show us how to reconstruct
Means’s perspective on MCPP, and thereby enhance our understanding of
the corporatist rhetoric in its Books I and IV. You know, the stuff about
the corporate profit stream no longer being private property, the need for
a convincing system of community obligations, and the vision of corporate
managers as purely neutral technocrats.
PALO ALTO, 1982
Let’s go back to Palo Alto in 1982. Two of the papers launched direct
attacks on MCPP. That is, they didn’t just pronounce the book irrelevant
given a Chicago view of the world and instead sought to show that it had
been descriptively inaccurate as of the date of publication. The more
interesting of the two came from George Stigler and Claire Friedland.
They took Means’s breakdown of the 200 largest corporations into
different control categories and regressed 1920s and 1930s data about
management salaries and corporate profits. If the book was right,
corporations with separated ownership and control should pay more to
their managers and earn less for their shareholders. But nothing
statistically significant popped up, arguably falsifying the book. This was
bravura stuff in 1982.
The less interesting comment came from a Hoover fellow named
Robert Hessen, who accused Berle and Means of ignoring numerous
instances of separated ownership and control in the law of property and of
business organizations—separation of ownership and control, he said, was
nothing special. It was the classic substandard hometown paper, albeit the
work of a hometown scholar at the top of his game. As it was also a direct
attack, Means got the comment.
Means shrugged the paper off, dismissing it as irrelevant and thereby
skewering it, simultaneously impliedly dismissing Stigler and Friedland.
To make the case for irrelevance, Means told us where he himself
had been coming from back in 1932. You can’t, he said, understand MCPP
if you focus exclusively on separation of ownership and control, which
was what Hessen and Stigler had been doing. The book never said that big
corporations can’t produce efficiently. It never said they somehow fall
outside of the private property system. The book instead addressed the
question whether public policies formulated in a world of small producers
still made sense when giant firms with dispersed owners did a big chunk
of the producing. The point in the book that really mattered was the
projection of deepening concentration. So, he said, to understand MCPP,
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you should consult pages 45 and 46, which come at the end of Book I,
Chapter III.
Let us do so. Pages 45 and 46 set out a list of five implications of
Chapter III’s statistical showings.
Point 1. We need to study the behavior of large rather than small
producing units. Fine.
Point 2. The nature of competition has changed and now duopoly
matters more than the behavior of small competitors. OK, but mysterious,
because the duopoly is neither defined nor described, and not otherwise
discussed in the chapter.
Point 3. An increasing amount of corporate production is for use
rather than sale and therefore the profit motive no longer drives decisionmaking in producing companies. This seems like an important point, for if
the profit motive no longer drives corporate decision-making, then a lot of
inherited theoretical and policy assumptions about corporate production
need reformulation. But what did a trend in make or buy decision-making
at vertically integrated producers have to with the profit motive itself?
There are two points here and they don’t link.
Point 4. The nature of capital has changed; it is now comprised more
of going concern value than tangible asset value. Sure. That’s what value
creation is all about. But what did this have to do with increasing
concentration and the absent profit motive?
Point 5. Blind market forces no longer control the economy;
economic power is now concentrated in a small number of hands, making
corporations social institutions. This is the same radical stuff you get again
at the end of the Book. But what is it about concentration that makes
corporations social institutions? Why doesn’t the social bearing just lead
straight to Thurman Arnold and the trust busting of the second Roosevelt
Administration and the post-war period?
So, Means tells us that pages 45 and 46 are for him the heart of the
book. But one comes away less than fully enlightened after encountering
the pages. Here again, as in Book IV, Chapter IV, MCPP makes vague,
radical gestures without explaining itself.
NEW YORK, 1927–1933
For explication we have to learn something about Means. Steady,
serious, unflappable, iconoclastic, individualistic; an outdoorsman and an
outsider. Loving husband to Caroline Ware, who was herself an American
original—an academic historian at Vassar in an era when few women got
appointments and later a New Dealer right along with Gardiner, making
pioneering contributions in the field of consumer protection. Means and

2019]

Collected Lectures and Talks

791

Ware are immensely likable. Significantly, Means never held an academic
appointment.
He was Berle’s contemporary—they were born within a year of one
another and became acquainted during World War I at officers’ candidate
school in Plattsburg, New York. After the war, Means did relief work in
Turkey, where he got a close-hand look at a primitive village producing
and trading economy. He had a formative insight: where this was the
classical economy described by Adam Smith, producer pricing in the
industrial economy at home followed from a different process.
Back home in the 1920s, Means started a company that manufactured
upscale blankets, and simultaneously went to Harvard Business School,
graduating in 1927. He reenrolled for an economics Ph.D. that same year,
simultaneously signing on with Berle to do the statistical work on the grant
project that became MCPP. Beatrice Berle and Caroline Ware, who had
been good friends since Vassar, brokered the engagement. Means
thereafter worked out of Berle’s office in Kent Hall for a number of years.
Like Berle, he joined the FDR campaign in 1932. Unlike Berle, he took a
job in Washington in 1933, beginning what would become a series of
federal jobs as Henry Wallace’s economist in residence at the Agriculture
Department.
The statistical chapters in Book I of MCPP went on to comprise the
lion’s share of Means’s Harvard dissertation. He submitted in 1933, after
the book’s publication. The dissertation, called The Corporate Revolution,
also had a concluding theoretical part that explored the implications of the
statistics for microeconomic theory, a discussion not included in MCPP.
Means got his Ph.D. in 1933, but only for the statistical chapters. The
committee rejected the theoretical part, resulting in its deletion from the
approved version. The dissertation’s theoretical chapter survives in draft
amongst the Means papers at the FDR library.
My Berle X paper characterizes it as MCPP’s missing chapter. I
know, I know, this looks like the standard law review ploy of finding that
something is missing just so you can fill the resulting gap and justify the
paper. But this time it’s really true. The five points on pages 45 and 46
derive from the theoretical part of the dissertation. Had the thesis chapter
been included as Book I Chapter IV of MCPP, the points on pages 45 and
46 and the cryptic normative assertions in the final chapter would have
made perfect sense.
THE MISSING CHAPTER
So let’s go to the theoretical part of the dissertation. Its basic
assertion is that the classical Smithian picture of a competitive, selfcorrecting, disciplining free-market economy no longer sufficed to explain
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what was going on. It poses a supplemental explanation in the form of
Means’s theory of the administered price, a theory he would continue to
elaborate for the rest of his career, up to and including the article he
contributed to the 1982 Hoover symposium.
There are four more particular points.
First point. As regarding many products, markets no longer set the
price; prices were administered by managers. Supply and demand curves
were no longer descriptive; a lot of prices were inflexible. Product markets
ceased to equate supply and demand, except by coincidence. Not that
supply and demand were impervious to one another—there would be a
long-run tendency for the discrepancy to decrease, but an absolute
discrepancy would persist.
The upshot was that a drop in demand did not necessarily trigger a
fall in price. A rational manager might instead maintain the price and cut
production, laying off labor. The choice was made within a zone of
administrative discretion.
Means’s statistical showing of increasing industry concentration
comes to bear at this point: the more concentrated the industry and the less
intense the competition, the more administered the price, and the greater
the impact of management decisions on the performance of the wider
economy. The duopoly mentioned in the book is defined: in one part of
the economy, agriculture for example, the market set the prices in the
classic Smithian way; in the other part, the prices were administered.
All of this explained the Great Depression, at least impliedly:
Administered prices meant instability for the economy as a whole, because
demand drops did not assuredly mean price drops, the price drops that
were supposed to have increased the value of money, to have stimulated
demand, and thereby to have restored full employment.
Second point. Many of the amounts that make up the cost of goods
sold (COGS) are indeterminate and do not follow from the production
process. This is an accounting point that bolsters the picture of
administered prices. Said Means, as overhead comes to comprise more and
more of the cost of goods sold, COGS comes to reflect the economics of
the firm as a whole and not the economics bound up in the production of
a particular product. A producer thus will not react to a fall in demand on
a product-by-product basis but will make decisions that make sense for the
firm as a whole.
Third point. The process of saving and investment is now dualistic,
with a corporate segment and an individual segment. Corporations
invested in products—stuff that produces goods and services; individuals,
in contrast, invested in corporate securities. Thus were the economy’s
savings being invested in two different markets in which prices could
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diverge, even as the value came from the same capital and production
function. Distortions could follow. For example, given a negative shock,
individuals would draw down on their savings. Stock prices would fall,
causing the savings accumulation to shrink simultaneously. The savings
retrenchment would thus not result in increased demand for goods.
Meanwhile, individual shareholders had no access to the assets in which
their capital had been invested—those were under the control of the
managers. It followed that managers rather than savers were making the
economy’s most important savings decisions. It also seemed that we had
a second explanation for the persistence of the Great Depression.
Fourth point. The profit motive no longer explains production
activity. This point also shows up on MCPP pages 45 and 46, albeit
without explication. In the thesis it’s backed up by points one to three. It
goes on to lead to a very interesting inquiry into the identification of the
appropriate residual interest holder of the corporation. Some in those days
argued for the shareholders, but others argued for the managers as residual
holders on incentive grounds—they were the ones doing the producing
after all—so if you wanted to maximize, you needed to give them the
upside. It followed that all the shareholders were entitled to was a
reasonable return sufficient to induce the raising of additional equity
capital or otherwise keep them contented enough to vote in management’s
favor at the annual meeting.
Means, having laid out this economic analysis, then declined to
follow it and ended the thesis more or less where he and Berle had ended
the book. The economic logic, said Means, only made sense on the
classical side of the duopoly. On the corporate side, where the profit
motive was no longer the engine driving the train, it made no sense to do
incentive analysis in hopes that discipline somehow would follow.
In the end Means made no attempt to answer the question posed. He
simply stated that a new answer needed to be derived and that the
administered price would be central to the process of derivation. But of
course he thereby said a lot: if the residual interest holder was neither the
equity nor management, it had to be society as a whole.
But what more particularly did that imply? Not Thurman Arnold.
With the dissertation’s theory part, we finally get an idea of the regulatorto-be’s marching orders. The neutral technocrat needed to figure out how
to administer the price in the interest of the economy as a whole rather
than in the exclusive interest of the producing entity.
MCPP would have made a lot more sense if this stuff had been
included. So why didn’t that happen? Caution maybe—an editorial
decision to keep it simple if vague and not invite attack at a theoretical
level. There was also the small matter of a conflict with what Berle was
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saying in a Harvard Law Review debate with E. Merrick Dodd. Or maybe
Means figured the stuff wasn’t yet ready for publication. Truth to tell, the
theoretical part of the thesis is, um, pretty sketchy. Means would spend a
career filling in the missing details and updating as economic events
unfolded.
WASHINGTON, 1933–1988
Means stayed in government until 1943. But his period of great
influence came early, during the first Roosevelt Administration when the
planners ran the policy show under the NIRA. Interestingly, Means and
the other leading planner-economists, Rexford Tugwell and Mordechai
Ezekiel, didn’t like the way the NIRA managed prices because it left too
much power with the managers. They wanted a more balanced set of
constituent inputs and a setup that put the administrators in charge.
They nonetheless lost their influence when the NIRA went down, for,
in the second Roosevelt Administration no one was interested in bringing
back an even more invasive iteration of the NIRA. Means and his friends
were displaced by the Neo-Keynesian Alvin Hansen, who had a theory of
secular stagnation and prescribed the less bitter medicine of government
stimulus of investment.
Hansen would get his own comeuppance in turn, when post-war
Keynesians dropped secular stagnation, reintegrated with orthodox
economics, and contented themselves with recommending short-run fine
tuning pursuant to a mechanistic formula.
But Hansen’s fall didn’t bring Means back. He left government in
1943 and went into the think tanks. He stayed there until 1959, out in the
theoretical and policy wilderness. Always a multitasker, he started a
business raising zoysia grass, and kept it up successfully until 1963, when
he was 67.
Unlike Means, Berle made major adjustments as circumstances
changed and so emerged after the war with his academic reputation
enhanced by new work. He told a happy story that suited the country’s
mood. The big-stick state that emerged from the New Deal had brought
corporations under control, making them publicly responsive without
having to socialize them. If the corporations wanted to avoid new
command and control regulation they had to satisfy the public. They
behaved cooperatively as a result, leading to a satisfactory politicaleconomic balance.
Interestingly, when Berle talked economics in his post-war writing,
the storyline was right out of Means. Prices didn’t result from supply and
demand; management had discretion to set the level of production;
instability resulted, necessitating planned equation of supply to demand.
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How, given that the government wasn’t actually doing this planning, could
Berle mouth Means’s party line and still whistle the happy tune? For Berle,
private planning in the industrial oligopolies would do; he didn’t need a
public administrator, now that managers really were neutral technocrats.
But Berle was in for a reversal, albeit a posthumous one for the most
part. Political and economic reversals after his death in 1971 put an end to
happy story conditions. He is accordingly remembered for MCPP and his
corporate law work rather than for the post-war political economy that
made up a big part of his output.
Means, in contrast, made a comeback as the economy deteriorated in
the 1970s. He had, after all, always been the guy you needed to talk to
when things really got dysfunctional. He had taken a step back in from the
wilderness when inflation went to the policy stove’s front burner in the
1960s. They started wanting his testimony at congressional committee
hearings. The stagflation of the 1970s went on to rehabilitate him
completely, even as it brought down the post-war Keynesians, who had no
way to explain it. Means did have a theory, a theory he first put out—get
ready—in his preface to the 1967 edition of MCPP.
He elaborated further on his theory of stagflation in his 1982 Hoover
symposium contribution. It was as if the Ph.D. thesis was getting a new
section to account for recent developments. Most of the basic assumptions
were unchanged—the administered price, the individual corporation’s
incentive to maintain profits in the wake of a demand drop, and the
duopolistic economy are all still there. It’s just that instead of leaving the
price where it is when demand drops, the managers find various reasons
to raise it. We had passed a tipping point, said Means, at which the
administered side of the duopoly had come sufficiently to dominate the
economy as to cause more prices to go up than to decline when demand
dropped.
Ironically, the economic conditions that made possible Means’s latein-life victory lap had finally dissipated even as he wrote the symposium
paper. No one knew it at the time, but inflation was going to the back
burner for the indefinite future and the Reagan expansion was only just
beginning. But I doubt anyone in the audience at Hoover was paying much
attention to Means in any event. They were celebrating their own return
from the wilderness, a wilderness to which people like Berle and Means
had consigned their neoclassical forebears back in 1932.
But there were twists and turns ahead for the neoclassicists as well.
They must have left Palo Alto thinking that they had succeeded in burying
the dysfunctional Berle and Means corporation once and for all, replacing
it with a vision of free-market correction and discipline. We now know, of
course, that the separation of ownership and control came back as the
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problem corporate law needed to solve with the eclipse of the hostile
takeover after 1989. That comeback, as Michael Wachter and I have
shown, had much less to do with what MCPP actually says than with what
people have come to believe that it says by reading it together with the
Berle–Dodd debate. The late-twentieth and early-twenty-first century
assault on the Berle and Means corporation was about wielding
shareholder power to solve the problem of separation of ownership control
so that the market success story told at Hoover in 1982 finally could be
realized in fact. As with Berle and Means in 1932, there was a regulatory
program, but a program directed only to dislodging embedded roadblocks
in the road to market efficiency, rather than program following from the
assumption that there was no such thing as market efficiency.
The recent arrival of activist hedge funds has upended the late
twentieth century story in turn. It seems that those barriers weren’t so
embedded after all, and that the market correction story told at Hoover has
more vitality than we thought. It’s just that the correction, rather than
occurring instantly like it does in a microeconomic model, can take a
couple of decades. Meanwhile, the Berle and Means corporation has
finally been eclipsed, at least for now.
This long story has a theme. The protagonist is the economy, the
performance of which consistently upends both theorists who ask for too
much in the way of successful coordination from its free market side, and
theorists who go too far in dismissing its coordinative capabilities.
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D. THE SEPARATION OF CORPORATE LAW AND SOCIAL WELFARE
2016 Washington and Lee University Laura D. Glass Law Review
Symposium in Honor of the Scholarship of Lyman Johnson and
David Millon, October 26, 2016
Accompanying Article:
William W. Bratton, The Separation of Corporate Law and Social
Welfare, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767 (2017)
When I sat down to think about what I was going to talk about this
morning, I took out and reread two of David and Lyman’s papers from the
late 1980s, Missing the Point About State Takeover Statutes5 and
Misreading the Williams Act.6 Both papers are still fresh, and everything
David and Lyman say in them is still true. But I didn’t get today’s panel
into focus until I thought back to a conference David and Lyman organized
here, with the Law Review, in the fall of 1993, at which Chancellor
William T. Allen gave the keynote. There was evident friction between the
substance of Chancellor Allen’s remarks and the thrust of the rest of the
conference. One might have expected more consonance between the
conference’s themes and the author of the Time-Warner opinion and an
article run in the Cardozo Law Review around the same time. But there
wasn’t, and there were reasons for that.
I took that memory as my start point. I’m going to look at the
fundamental changes that occurred in those years, the changes that
generated those frictions, comparing the vision of the corporation and of
the role it played in society that prevailed during the immediate post-war
period with the very different vision we have today, and trace the path we
took from there to here.
As is usual with me, I’ll view the corporate past through the eyes of
Adolf Berle, who, in his post-war writings, described an American
Economic Republic—a sort of latter-day constitutional settlement directed
to production and employment. It prevailed until around 1970, and
centered on a broad consensus about the role of corporations in society.
Berle thought that corporate power, which he had problematized in a
famous book published in 1932, had been rendered benign in his new
republic. Two factors were responsible: first, government management of
the economy from an unchallenged position of higher authority and,
second, a solid supporting political consensus supporting the status quo.
5. Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Missing the Point About State Takeover Statutes, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 846 (1989).
6. Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1862 (1989).
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The public consensus in turn depended on corporate performance—price
stability, jobs, and benefits.
Berle described a benign equipoise amongst strong organizations, an
equipoise constrained by a wider public consensus that empowered the
central government in the role of welfare maximizer—he saw a state that
guided and pushed markets to the right result with the cooperative
engagement of interested parties. Managers were caught inside a web of
countervailing powers and had no way to get out of control. The strands
in the web were product market price competition, labor unions, trade
associations, public opinion, management’s own sense of responsibility,
and most importantly, government regulation.
The managers emerged as quasi-public servants. Whether they liked
it or not, they were caught between the regulatory state and the public
consensus. Failure to satisfy the public meant new regulation; avoidance
of new regulation meant satisfying the public. So public duties could not,
as a practical matter, be avoided, and managers emerged playing a role as
economic and social allocators, actively assuming public functions. In the
1950s, while other countries were instituting national health systems and
generous state pension schemes for senior citizens, in the United States the
corporations took on the great part of the welfare burden. This was, in
part, an accident of history—pensions and medical benefits found their
way into a high-profile settlement between General Motors and its unions
in 1948, a settlement that was copied across the industrial landscape and
modified over time to labor’s advantage as industries went from settlement
to settlement.
It was, not coincidentally, the golden age of American management.
Commentators in those days described a new economy that had evolved
past Adam Smith’s atomistic free market strivers so that forward motion
came from innovative technocrats in management suites. The shareholders
sort of dropped out of the picture. Berle explained why. All they did was
passively collect dividends and then consume or save. As such, they
played no productive role in the economy. Well, what about stock market
controls? No longer important. Corporations now did equity financing
with retained earnings or borrowed. The function of the stock market was
to hold out liquidity for the benefit of the rich, good-for-nothing
grandchildren of the entrepreneurs who had founded the great companies.
Monitoring? Government authorities now monitored the markets, thank
you. Finally, shareholder voting was a meaningless ritual.
As rich consumers, the shareholders did play a role in social welfare
enhancement as providers. As such, they were entitled to society’s thanks,
but not its political solicitude. The shareholder interest would emerge as a
legitimate force in society, said Berle, only when shareholder wealth was

2019]

Collected Lectures and Talks

799

so widely distributed as to benefit every American family. Only in such a
distributive utopia could the shareholder interest serve as a proxy for social
welfare and thus hold out political economic salience.
Finally, there wasn’t much in the way of discussion of corporate
social responsibility. Regulation and ancillary government pressure took
care of externalities. The economy was growing, the constituents were
content, and managers were seen as under control. Compliance wasn’t
much of a problem either, because managers proceeded decorously when
dealing with the government.
Conflicts did simmer under the surface. They became manifest
during the 1970s and played themselves out during the 1980s. This was
the era during which corporate social responsibility and constituent rights
came to the forefront of corporate policy debates, CSR in the 1970s and
constituencies in the 1980s. Simultaneously, shareholder value
maximization rose to prominence to pose a countervailing vision of the
corporation’s place in society. A resolution followed: the shareholders
won. Social responsibility would not be imposed on companies and
constituents would get no rights, and, indeed, would see their positions
deteriorate considerably.
The economic background was unstable during the early part of this
period—the economic bill for the Vietnam War came due in 1972 and
1973, when the stock market collapsed and the economy went into a severe
recession aggravated by the Mid-East oil crisis. The stock market didn’t
really recover until August of 1982—a whole decade in which there was
no money to be made long in stocks even as inflation rose steeply. It was
called stagflation and it undermined the economic assumptions of the
managerial golden age. The appearance of international competition in
manufactured goods added to the stock of chronic problems. We were no
longer a closed continental economy in which domestic corporations
competed only against one another. People started to ask questions about
how well managers were doing their jobs.
The conceptual framework surrounding corporations changed
substantially as a result. First, corporate governance was invented. I date
this with the appearance of Melvin Eisenberg’s book The Structure of the
Corporation in 1976, but Eisenberg was crystallizing ideas that had been
circulating for a decade. We would ask the board for monitoring, not
management, a function that presupposed independence and a committee
structure keyed to monitoring functions. All of a sudden there was
something that could be done about corporations. The term “corporate
governance” came into circulation, with best practices as the focus of the
new mode of discussion.
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Two years earlier, in 1974, Jensen and Meckling had published their
famous paper, Agency Costs and the Theory of the Firm, which coined
another new term and for the first time brought microeconomic analysis to
the study of interior corporate arrangements, confirming the suggestion
that corporate governance mattered for productivity. But there’s also a
critical point of distinction: while Eisenberg stands for the invention of
corporate governance and the need for governance reform, Jensen and
Meckling are the theoretical start point for the assumptions that the
purpose of the corporation is shareholder value maximization and that
market forces by themselves could discipline managers effectively—a
complete reversal of the assumptions that underlay the American
Economic Republic.
At the same time, the old New Deal political coalition that created
and maintained the strong regulatory state fell apart. Managers, formerly
cooperative in the face of overwhelming state power, defected, and started
to play a hostile game against regulatory initiatives. Simply, they were no
longer afraid of non-compliance. Deregulation also started in the 1970s,
and picked up speed after 1980. Interestingly, it meant removal of an
existing regime only in a handful of industries. For the most part,
deregulation meant not repeal but inaction—we just left things the way
they were, even as corporate risk taking and externalization pursued new
paths. Such initiatives as did occur tended to be self-regulatory,
bespeaking a remarkable reliance on the newly-created thing called
corporate governance.
The political left did not disappear quietly. Progressives, who in the
1970s still considered themselves the country’s natural ruling group,
became manifestly frustrated—they were dissatisfied with the level of new
regulation, and outraged by corporate non-cooperation, even as they
despaired of marshalling political backing for new initiatives. The
American corporate social responsibility movement arose as a result, and
its policy entrepreneurs looked to governance institutions for reform
platforms. It didn’t lead to much.
But, for a time, managers felt threatened. Anti-corporate sentiment
was gaining more and more political salience—partly as an expression of
frustration by the left and partly because of a growing sense that American
companies were performing badly, even as a new political economic
equilibrium was taking a regressive turn. A new outlet appeared to channel
and partially appease this negative sentiment—not taxation, not
redistribution, not a stable environment for working families, but
compliance with law. Thus did the foreign bribes scandal result in the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1978, which, much like New Deal
initiatives, leaned on the corporation to get with the public program. But
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whereas before the objective was cooperative participation in a national
effort to enhance social welfare, now we had a narrower objective: to the
extent we do have regulation, comply with it.
Meanwhile, the frightened managers turned to the same focal point
as did everyone else—corporate governance—and tried to capture it,
voluntarily embracing best practices to stave off more invasive initiatives.
They succeeded to an extent, but not enough to stem a growing assault on
their prerogatives. The basic picture was changing: instead of seeing
managers as effective technocrats, we once again saw excess management
empowerment, now mixed with both greed and incompetence, to leave us
with out-of-control agency costs that were said to be choking the economy.
In the 1980s, the locus of conflict shifted from the public sphere to
corporations themselves. The markets, suppressed in the course of the
New Deal settlement, came back to retake the forward role in corporate
governance, a position that has been steadily solidifying ever since.
Market control and shareholder value maximization operate in tandem.
They are the same thing.
Numerous factors combined to effect the change. Reagan came in,
and the left was marginalized. Labor unions markedly declined in
influence. Antitrust policies that inhibited same-industry mergers were
abandoned. Competition from abroad intensified. As the junk bond
became available, ideas about acceptable levels of leverage changed
markedly so that high leverage became a means to facilitate corporate
control transfers. The prime targets were the most extreme product of postwar managerialism, conglomerate structures, which had come to be seen
as dysfunctional, because they fostered suboptimal reinvestment of cash
flows.
We all know the result. At its end point, thinking about corporations
had shifted fundamentally. Maximization of shareholder value came in,
management became an incentive incompatible cost center, and a longstanding but vague association with social welfare dropped out.
There was a lot of carnage as the adjustment was made. A couple of
generations of corporate employees, who had justifiably expected that
their companies held out careers, lost their jobs. Billions of dollars of
wealth shifted as their human capital investments were sacrificed in order
to enhance shareholder value. Unsurprisingly, constituent concerns
displaced social responsibility concerns at the forefront of progressive
critique of the operation of corporate law, with David and Lyman at the
forefront, but fighting a rearguard action. There was even a law reform
movement—a succession of bills were introduced in Washington to
ameliorate the dislocation experienced by the subject employees. None
were enacted and the initiative faded away during the 1990s. Henceforth,
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the corporate law case for the employees’ interests would be tied to the
case for management empowerment vis-a-vis shareholders, and
subordinated thereto—the message of Blair and Stout.
The job losses didn’t stop with the restructurings of the 1980s.
America’s large corporations have been steadily lightening their payrolls
ever since. Manufacture is outsourced wherever possible, usually abroad.
It’s no wonder that during the last twenty years the focus of corporate
social responsibility inquiry has shifted to low-wage, dangerous
workplaces abroad, because that’s where stuff gets made. The employers
are for the most part contractors and subcontractors. So, unacceptable
situations in foreign workshops get fixed only when a company—like
Nike—gets called out publicly regarding its suppliers’ practices and cleans
up its supply chain in order to protect its brand from bad publicity.
The change is pervasive. The great corporate successes of the present
age, Apple and Google, employ thirty- or forty-thousand people each,
where back in the 1950s and 1960s, the big, successful companies
employed hundreds and hundreds of thousands. The employment numbers
fall off drastically at other successful tech companies.
Simply, big corporations have lost their position as the focal point of
the lives of most Americans. In the golden age, they were the places where
talented people made careers. Restructuring put an end to that. Now,
instead of careers, we have jobs. And it’s looking like jobs are
disappearing as well—there’s a shift away from jobs and employers to
tasks and piece-work contracts. In the golden age, big corporations
handled the accumulation of retirement savings. That stopped too, as
employers shifted from defined benefit pension plans to defined
contribution plans. In the golden age, big corporations took care of medical
benefits for most Americans. But that burden eventually ripened into a
competitive disadvantage as regards companies in countries that chose to
put government welfare schemes in place instead. Hence, Obamacare.
I recall sitting around during the 1990s waiting to see a trade-off
account of the takeover and leveraged restructuring era that seriously
posed the question whether the destruction of human capital along with
the ancillary costs of debt due to over-leverage might have outweighed the
shareholder benefits. Nothing like that emerged. Instead, we got
overleverage as a cost-beneficial external shock that redirected the
management’s incentives in the right direction.
American society has been adjusting ever since to increased
instability, decreased opportunity, and widening inequality. Such is the
prestige of markets, that few perceive this to be a problem. And,
management, which tried and failed to capture the newly important
governance system, was itself captured in turn. During the golden age
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managers took it out as salary under what today would look like egalitarian
pay structures. Now they take it out in equity compensation arrangements
that tie their fortunes to the stock price. For all their complaining, they got
with the program, and did well.
But wait, cannot we pose a positive counterbalance due to the
widening of the shareholder base due to the proliferation of pension fund
savings? Spokespeople for institutional intermediaries keep telling us we
should be congratulated because 50% of American families now hold
shares. Actually it’s closer to 40% and the most of the outward spread
occurred during the 1980s. It tailed off thereafter and even at times
receded. We ended up with the top 1% of households by wealth owning
38% of the stock, and the top 5% owning 69%. The bottom 80% owns just
9%. Simply, there is occasion for egalitarian applause. Shareholder value
does not proxy for social welfare.
The scope of active corporate legal theory has narrowed as corporate
law and social welfare have become separated. Today’s is a small-scale
policy discussion about the balance of power between shareholders and
managers in which most participants obsess on excess, embedded agency
costs and model shareholders as a permanently disadvantaged group with
an outstanding, unmet regulatory entitlement. It is a picture that resonates
less and less, for the central trend since 1990 has been progressive agency
cost reduction at the instance of market forces—just what Jensen and
Meckling predicted. With the benefit of hindsight, it’s now clear that the
shareholders decisively won their battle with management between 1985
and 1990, and did so without a significant regulatory assist.
Corporate law is going to stay with this narrow status quo absent
some future negative external shock. Of course, we did have one of those
in 2008, but not enough of one to change anything, just a blip. But what
about unproductive short-termism—don’t we have to do something about
that? I don’t see any evidence from practice to back up the claim of a
systematic crimp on productivity. Can’t shareholder power have perverse
effects? You bet. But negative effects will appear company by company.
The same will go for excess agency costs. Agency costs aren’t embedded
and have been substantially reduced, speaking systematically. Any
residual problems will show up company by company.
If anything, corporate legal theory is going to get smaller still. The
days of a separation of ownership and control as an over-arching political
economic problem that corporate law needs to solve are over. If
shareholder empowerment is here to stay and will not turn out to have
systematic perverse effects—big ifs, but that’s what I am predicting—
shareholder–management relations will fall from back from the policy
margin to become a field in which decision-making is customarily left to
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the business judgments of parties with direct stakes. Ours will become a
field in which the basic assumption is that private ordering confronts the
problems and effects any changes. From a policy perspective, corporate
law is going to look more and more like the rest of private law, as a field
in which parties capable of self-protection bargain over outcomes. I am
not forgetting about the externalities inflicted between there and here. But
we made up our collective mind to ignore them by 1990. Corporate law
follows from the national social settlement, and not vice versa. If you want
to change it, change the settlement.
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III. CORPORATE LEGAL THEORY
A. THE CASE AGAINST SHAREHOLDER EMPOWERMENT
University of Pennsylvania Law School Institute for Law & Economics
Corporate Roundtable, December 11, 2009
Accompanying Article:
William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against
Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653 (2010)
INTRODUCTION
This paper’s point, that shareholder empowerment forces managers
to manage to the market price and that perverse effects follow, is not new.
There’s a line of financial economic models to this effect that goes back
to the late 1980s. Michael has made the point in two papers on hostile
tender offers. I have made the point in passing in several papers addressed
to issues arising in the post-Enron regulatory environment. But the point
has never registered in our field as paradigmatic proposition. Our ambition
is to make that happen.
Here’s the lay of the land. The dominant view in corporate law is that
management power presents a problem that needs to be solved. The view
was originally framed by Berle and Means in terms of property and
accountability—corporations wielded significant economic power
because they owned the means of production. But their ownership, vested
in the shareholders, had separated from the power to control the resources,
which had befallen on the managers. It followed that we had power
without accountability. In the collective corporate law memory, Berle and
Means then invoke the shareholder interest as a countervailing power. And
thus do we continue to talk about the Berle and Means corporation as the
problem that corporate law needs to solve.
But now the theoretical framework is economic contract rather than
legal property, and the problem is stated in terms of principal–agent
relations. The shareholders are the principals and the managers are the
agents. Agency costs are excessive because the legal structure of the
corporation perversely fails to accord the shareholder-principals the
authority to which principals ordinarily are entitled. You get the same
bottom line as with Berle and Means—the corporate law system reverses
a natural and appropriate order of things, whether due to capture,
corruption, or sheer bad luck due to path dependence. The theoretical
burden of proof lies on those who defend the system.
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Michael and I took our first crack at these paradigmatic certainties in
a paper on Adolf Berle. We there showed that corporate law’s collective
memory clings to an erroneous reading of its own canonical texts, and,
even as Berle did focus on management power, the shareholder interest
played no role in his political economy. Today’s shareholder
empowerment advocates, who want the markets to control management
power, invoke a grandfather figure who thought that markets always fail
and that the economy should be managed by central planners.
We were right and everybody knew it, but it didn’t really matter
because it was just history. Hence, this paper, which, rather than seeking
to deprive the shareholder proponents of the paradigm they claim as an
antecedent, seeks to deprive them of the paradigm on which they draw
presently, or least to compromise their position within it.
Shareholder empowerment advocates work within the Jensen and
Meckling agency cost paradigm, claiming that management agency costs
are excessive, and that shareholder empowerment will reduce them. It
follows that corporate law should be reformed to empower the
shareholders (or, depending on the particular issue, to disempower the
managers), and that the burden of proof falls on those who disagree.
Although not everybody subscribes to every item on their law reform
agenda, it is as a general proposition reflective of the thinking in our field.
The shareholder proponents have a long reform agenda that’s
designed to jumpstart shareholder exercise of the corporate franchise.
Heretofore, collective action problems have inhibited shareholder use of
the power to elect and remove directors. The reformers accordingly would
level the playing field between managers and shareholder contestants and
subsidize selected shareholder interventions. They also would open doors
to direct shareholder intervention into business policy making, albeit on
an opt-in basis. In so doing, they would disrupt an allocation of authority
that has stood for more than a century.
Even so, to object is to take the minority view, and fight from the
rearguard.
Our goal here is to reverse the burden of proof to the normal position
where it falls to the side advocating law reform.
The paper pursues five means to the end:
1. Clear the field of the conceptual inheritance of Berle and Means.
2. Make transparent the theoretical and empirical assumptions that
motivate the case for shareholder empowerment.
3. Show that management agency costs are not as salient as
shareholder advocates claim.
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4. Show that shareholder empowerment would implicate
significant agency costs of its own.
5. Decouple the financial crisis from the case for the shareholders
and couple it with the case against.
1. CLEAR THE FIELD OF THE CONCEPTUAL INHERITANCE
OF BERLE AND MEANS.
Berle and Means cast the shareholders in the owner role, and if
shareholders are in substance the “owners,” then they naturally succeed to
the position of principal when corporate legal relationships are restated in
terms of the economics of agency. Moreover, if today’s shareholder power
advocates legitimately can claim to be Berle’s successors, their theoretical
primacy is much bolstered: management power has been corporate law’s
unsolved problem for three quarters of a century and they’re the ones who
finally are trying to do something about it.
We say, put the rhetoric aside and ask whether the separation of
ownership and control in fact is a problem. Our answer is no, by reference
to a paper by Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen published in a 1983 issue
of the Journal of Law and Economics on the occasion of The Modern
Corporation and Private Property’s fiftieth anniversary. The paper was
devoted to the task of rebutting any regulatory policy presumptions
deriving from the separation of ownership and control.
Fama and Jensen restated the separation of ownership and control as
a rational allocation of management functions. Decision rights go inside
the firm. The managers initiate and implement. The board, which must be
independent, monitors them, and retains “ultimate control” over them. The
shareholders take the residual claim and elect the board but otherwise have
no business policy inputs for the simple reason that they lack the
qualifications.
For those who insist that the matter be framed in terms of a property
allocation, we extrapolate one from Fama and Jensen. In our restatement,
ownership and control are no longer separated. Instead, ownership is
divided and redistributed across the three groups of actors. This happened
as a matter of functional necessity as companies evolved in history.
At this point, the paper has only joined the issue. Putting Berle and
Means to one side only returns us to today’s corporate legal theory and the
agency model of the firm it poses as a challenge to the prevailing legal
model of the corporation.
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2. MAKE TRANSPARENT THE THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL
ASSUMPTIONS THAT MOTIVATE THE CASE FOR
SHAREHOLDER EMPOWERMENT.

Why “make transparent”? If you go out and look for a clear statement
of the analytic steps that lead to shareholder empowerment as a policy
recommendation, you will be disappointed. We looked, but did not find.
If you ask a shareholder empowerment advocate whether managing to the
market price is a good thing, I would predict an equivocal answer followed
by a change of emphasis: shareholder power, you will be told, reduces
agency costs. The paper fills in the missing theoretical background to show
the direct connection between the two.
We are told that the shareholder–manager relation should be
conceived in agency terms, with ultimate control in the shareholders rather
than with the board, as Fama and Jensen had it. Incentives are the reason:
where managers are conflicted and self-serving, shareholders come forth
with a pure financial incentive to maximize value. It follows that
management empowerment implies agency costs, and that agency costs
would be reduced if we cleared a way for shareholder inputs.
Well, fine. But what about the fact that dispersed shareholders labor
under information asymmetries and lack expertise respecting the
production function? This is where the market price comes in to solve all
problems. It holds out an objective and accurate measure of the purely
motivated shareholder maximand; manage to it and you get a high-quality
instruction. There follows a unitary instruction for business policy:
manage to maximize the present market price of the stock. We’ve looked
closely at focal point presentations of the shareholder primacy position,
and we can’t find any other there.
Subpoint: Avoid conflation with other work taking the same policy
position.
Here I should note a subsidiary purpose. If this were a room full of
corporate law academics I could situate this paper just by saying that we
are pursuing the same bottom line as Steve Bainbridge. And I then would
have to clear away a lot of theoretical detritus. Bainbridge sees this as a
markets and hierarchies question, charging that any departure from what
he calls director primacy and we call the prevailing legal model would lead
to managerial chaos. As to this point, we agree with the other side. Chaos
would not result because management would do everything it could to
avert the possibility of interventions by the newly empowered
shareholders. Threat diffusion in turn means doing exactly what the
shareholder advocates want—managing to the market. The problem would
be adverse selection, not incoherence.
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3. SHOW THAT MANAGEMENT AGENCY COSTS ARE NOT AS SALIENT AS
SHAREHOLDER ADVOCATES CLAIM.
Here we accuse the shareholder side of losing touch with its own
paradigmatic roots. It poses an agency cost win-win: empower the
shareholders and reduce the costs, with no acknowledgment that so doing
might trigger new countervailing costs. The cost picture they pose dates
from the 1980s takeover era, and is posed as a static constant. For
countervailing authority we go to an unexpected source. The agency cost
urtext, Jensen and Meckling, which predicts that actors will address costs
as they arise over time, with managers bonding their fidelity to their
investors and investors monitoring their investments. And, when agency
costs remain unaddressed, it is because their removal is too costly.
We look at the post-takeover history, describing it as a dynamic
process of adjustment both inside corporations and outside in the
marketplace. We cite a number of factors. Managers emerged from the
1980s sensitized to the benefits of shareholder value maximization. At the
same time, the board of directors emerged as a more robust monitoring
institution. Together they used equity compensation plans to redirect
management incentives. Merger volume reached new records, with
friendly rather than hostile deals as the means of moving assets to higher
valuing mergers. We can identify regulation that followed from these
changes, but cannot find any significant regulatory causes.
Discipline, a factor supposedly lacking in the wake of antitakeover
regulation, made a remarkable return to the front lines when the private
equity buyout reemerged in the mid-1990s. This is a business model
pursuant to which managers looking for big payoffs voluntarily put
themselves under the control of penny-pinching market intermediaries.
On the side of the fence, activist hedge funds emerged to show that
the shareholder collective action problem is not as preclusive as everyone
assumed. The hedge fund activists have brought back hostility, but on a
new platform independent of control transfer. Interestingly, they pursue
financial items at the top of the shareholder proponents’ agency cost
agenda—increased leverage, payouts of excess cash, premium asset sales,
and cost cutting. They have entered boardrooms in large numbers, all
without any change in the prevailing legal model. The difference lies on
the shareholder side, in the incentive alignment within which these
particular institutions hold their shares.
Finally, just recently, prior to the collapse of 2008, the corporate cash
payout pattern underwent a notable shift. As Figure 1 shows, share
repurchases, a central shareholder agenda item, took off like a rocket, with
total average annual corporate payouts reaching 6.1% of market cap.
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Figure 1: Payouts, 1987–2008

So where the shareholder advocates depict a governance system that
chronically leaves a ton of money on the table, we depict dynamic
adaptation toward the end of removing the money. And with Jensen and
Meckling, we caution that agency costs should not be expected to be
reduced to zero even so. It follows that the fact that an agency can be
identified does not by itself justify regulatory intervention. Win-wins
should not be assumed. Given a residual agency cost, an independent costbenefit case must be made for reduction through structural change.
4. SHOW THAT SHAREHOLDER EMPOWERMENT WOULD IMPLICATE
SIGNIFICANT AGENCY COSTS OF ITS OWN.
The cost-benefit question presented here does not admit of a
definitive empirical answer. But the question can be better framed than it
has heretofore. All we have seen are the purported benefits. We counter
with some costs.
The agency cost problem arises because managers use their superior
information for their own advantage. The shareholders want to address the
costs by giving the shareholders sufficient power to impress their
preferences, as manifested in market price signals, on the managers. So
the question is this: What content does the market price have to teach?
Sketching out an answer requires us to traverse that well-known
territory occupied by the efficient capital market hypothesis and the capital
asset pricing model. Our sketch makes four points.
First, if markets were strong form efficient, and reflected all
information public and private, the shareholders would have a pretty good
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case. But the ECMH makes only a more modest prediction that prices will
follow a random walk and no trading strategy based on public information
can outperform the market. It makes no prediction that the market price
will be right even as it implies that insiders with material nonpublic
information can make systematic profits trading in their own stock. Its
implications for corporate governance are modest accordingly.
Second, the case for shareholder empowerment is stronger or weaker
depending on the information on the table. With hostile takeovers, it is
quite strong, because takeovers pose a relatively simple governance
question in an information enriched environment. But as you move away
from an offer on the table for the whole thing to going concern business
decisions, the meaning of a market price signal becomes less and less clear
and information asymmetries present more of a problem. Prices look less
like objective reports on particular value outcomes than inputs for
informed interpretation.
Third, information asymmetries are real and are not going to go
away. Full disclosure is not cost-beneficial, period. Degrees of information
asymmetry vary from company to company and from time to time. We
cite a variety of literatures from financial economics that show decisions
being skewed as managers seek to take advantage of overvalued stock and
sacrifice good projects for fear of undervaluation.
Finally, we assay a line of pricing economics that has come out of
the academic woods in the wake of the 1990s tech bubble. This is called
heterogeneous expectations and it posits that rational shareholders can bid
up a stock above what they see as its fundamental value, to take advantage
of an option to sell it to buyers applying a more optimistic valuation. We
take some leading models and inquire into their implications for the legal
model of the corporation. Two points emerge: First, a duty to maximize
the stock price can lead to decisions that sacrifice long-term value. Second,
if you want to incent managers to maximize long-term value, you need to
lock them into their shareholdings for the long-term. It follows that
shareholder governance inputs may not be incentive compatible on a
matter like executive compensation.
5. DECOUPLE THE FINANCIAL CRISIS FROM THE CASE FOR THE
SHAREHOLDERS AND COUPLE IT WITH THE CASE AGAINST.
The proponents are arguing that shareholder empowerment reforms
make sense right now because trust needs to be restored in the wake of the
financial crisis. At first glance, this resonates. The managers of a number
of large financials got us into a mess as they pursued high-return
investment strategies without appreciating concomitant risks. The collapse
and bailout amount to a significant externality imposed on the rest of the
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economy. If the managers are responsible, then disempowerment
initiatives seem to make sense as a regulatory response. Thus have agenda
items like say on pay and shareholder board nominations picked up
political traction over the last year.
But this is also wrong-headed. The trust talk serves to deflect
attention from the shareholder empowerment’s economic substance. It’s a
market control move very much in the deregulatory mainstream of last
three decades or so. As such, it makes for an odd response to a market
failure. Indeed, once you view the financial companies through the lens of
the shareholders, managing to the market emerges to take a place in the
chain of causation.
Figure 2: S&P 500/S&P 500 Banks, 2000–2009

Figure 2 depicts the S&P 500 and the S&P 500 banks from 2000 to
2009. You see quickly that the banks were a segment much favored by the
stock market, which loved the spreads yielded by the combination of real
estate lending (by no means all of it subprime) funded by short term
borrowing in the repo and commercial paper markets.
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Figure 3: Sectoral Variation

Figure 3 depicts Countrywide Financial, Citibank, and JP Morgan
Chase, traced against the S&P 500 banks. Countrywide, a pure mortgage
and securitization play, is the clear favorite. Morgan Chase, which pursued
a more conservative strategy and even stayed out of CMO securitization,
is the dog. Yet now it’s one of a small number of paragons.
Our point is simple. Just as the managers responsible for the
strategies saw the returns but failed to appreciate the risks, so did the
market. Here’s the question: Would increased shareholder power have
moderated the banks’ risky practices? The answer is no. It could even have
made things worse.
In our view, then, the financial crisis has sharply negative
implications for the shareholder agenda, implications manifested in
discussions on the flashpoint topic of executive pay. The need to uncouple
manager incentives from short term market pressures all of the sudden is
a widely held conventional wisdom. When Lucian Bebchuk takes this a
step further and puts out a draft that suggests that incentive pay for
financial company executives should track a mix of common stock,
preferred stock, and bonds, seismic shifts are occurring in thinking about
risk, return, and incentives. That purely incented shareholder and its
magically curative properties retreats further and further back in the rearview mirror.
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CONCLUSION
We don’t think that market price signals are intrinsically unreliable.
It is all a matter of degree. And that’s our point. Market prices need to be
interpreted by an agent exercising sound business judgment, and we think
an independent board of directors is well-suited to the function.
Meanwhile, we have no ideological objections to shareholder
empowerment. We just think the costs and benefits don’t line up in its
favor, and we look forward to the day when a robust cost-benefit case is
articulated. We’re very curious to see what it looks like.
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B. SHAREHOLDERS AND SOCIAL WELFARE
Berle IV, June 15, 2011
Accompanying Article:
William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholders and Social
Welfare, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 489 (2013)
INTRODUCTION
This paper began at Berle III. I got hot and bothered about something
somebody said about shareholder democracy and social improvement and
so muttered something about shareholders being rich and somebody
needing to put that point in a paper. Richard Marins was sitting behind me
and shot me a note to the effect that you could find all you needed in the
work of Edward N. Wolff of the NYU economics department. I looked up
Wolff on the spot and saw that to be the case.
Later I also saw that the data were already out there in places where
people in corporate governance ought to be able to find it—–Poterba and
Samwick in Brookings 1995 and Paddy Ireland in Modern Law Review
2005. Even so, the point somehow just doesn’t seem to sink in. So I
decided that it was worth laying out the data one more time, using the 2007
Federal Reserve Survey of Consumer Finances, which was the most recent
source until last Monday, when the 2010 survey finally was released.
The question was how to contextualize yet another exposition of this
data. The answer was to put a series of questions: Do shareholders play a
role in social welfare enhancement? If so, how? If not, why not? More
generally, when and why do the more particular characteristics of
shareholders matter, particularly their socio-economic characteristics, and
if they don’t matter why not? Once the questions were posed, it was soon
apparent that some of the answers lay in work I’d already done with
Michael Wachter and that other answers lay in work that Michael and I
had talked about but never had gotten around to doing. One thing led to
another, and this paper is the result. It collects different answers to the
questions and tries to sort them out.
MANAGERIALISM
For a start point, we go back to what they said about this back in the
1950s and 60sthe golden age of American management. Commentators
in those days described a new economy that had evolved past Adam
Smith’s atomistic free-market strivers so that forward motion came from
innovative technocrats in management suites. Management power, which
Berle and Means had problematized back in 1932, no longer seemed
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anything to worry about. Managers were caught inside a web of
countervailing powers and had no way to get out of control. The strands
in the web were product market price competition, labor unions, trade
associations, public opinion, management’s own sense of responsibility,
and most importantly, government regulation.
The shareholders sort of dropped out of the picture. Adolf Berle
explained why. All they did was passively collect dividends. They as a
result played no productive role in the economy. Well, what about stock
market controls? No longer important. Corporations are now financed with
retained earnings. The function of the stock market was to hold out
liquidity for the benefit of the rich, good for nothing grandchildren of the
entrepreneurs who had founded the great companies. Monitoring?
Government authorities now monitored the markets, thank you. The
shareholder voting was a meaningless ritual.
The shareholders only economic function was consumption. They
also played a role in social welfare enhancement as providers. They
supported their families, they supported social welfare programs as
taxpayers, and they supported charities as donors. As such they were
entitled to society’s thanks, but not its political solicitude. Full justification
for the shareholder interest could follow only when shareholder wealth
was so widely distributed as to benefit every American family. Only in
such a distributive utopia could the shareholder interest serve as a proxy
for societal interest and thus hold out political economic salience.
In sum, the socio-economic status of shareholders mattered a lot
during the managerlialist era. But, as they already were wealthy and their
needs were well-satisfied, they had no claim to the attention of a
benevolent sovereign preoccupied with maximizing social welfare.
SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY
By 1980, managerialism was dead. Jensen and Meckling displaced
Berle and Means as academic gods, and the view of shareholders was
reversed.
This is a familiar story. So familiar that we decided it was worth
retelling from theoretical square one, step by step.
Square one is the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics,
which begins with a general equilibrium view of the economy and assumes
away externalities to pose that a competitive economy maximizes wealth.
The normative kicker is that everything that can be done to make the
economy more competitive should be done so that it reaches a pareto
optimal production possibility frontier, the point of economic efficiency.
Once we reach the frontier, it’s time for the second fundamental
theorem, which holds that given an efficient economy, preferences for
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redistribution can be dealt with through lump sum taxes and transfers,
provided that the transfers do nothing to impair the incentives that got us
to the efficient frontier in the first place. We are talking social welfare only
at this point.
Of course, it’s very likely that taxes and transfers will impair
productive incentives, which in turn implies that we never get around to
doing any redistributing. At this point, the theory of the second best comes
to the rescue, posing that taxes and transfers can make us better off net of
their costs by satisfying preferences for social welfare enhancing
outcomes, even though production lies short of the efficient frontier.
The next step extends the first fundamental theorem to corporate
production. This is surprisingly easy to do: A system of corporate
governance is ex ante efficient if it generates the highest possible payoff
for all the parties involved, shareholders, creditors, employees, clients, tax
authorities, and other third parties that may be affected by the corporation's
actions.
The extension is completely uncontroversial, even though it holds
out cakes and ale for corporate constituents. To get to shareholder primacy,
you have to take two further assumption-laden steps.
The first step comes from Jensen and Meckling. They posited that if
we model the firm as a nexus of complete contracts among all parties
involved except for the contract between a firm and its shareholders, which
we model as incomplete, then maximization of shareholder value is
tantamount to the economically efficient result. This assertion is literally
trueif everybody other than one incomplete contract holder has a
complete maximizing contract, then everybody other than the one
incomplete contract claimant is already maxed out, and maximizing for
the remaining claimant is economically efficient by definition.
Note that the theoretical door remains open to proponents of
constituency interests to make efficiency arguments from the point of
contractual incompleteness and that this creates a problem for shareholder
primacy, whose proponents have to show that other constituent
incompleteness does not disable their case. The proponents address the
burden with three familiar points: first, relatively speaking, shareholders
are more vulnerable; second, decision-making costs should be minimized
and a multi-constituent model imports incoherence, adding to decisionmaking costs; and third, the shareholder interest is the residual interest and
thus provides a superior management reference point.
At the bottom line, the shareholders matter and the managerialist
result is reversed.
There are three more things to note. First, agency costs are assumed
away in this analysis. All it does is insert shareholder value maximization
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as the firm’s objective function. Second, the reversal of the managerialist
result is multi-sided—not only does the shareholder interest now matter
for productivity, at the same time the socio-economic status of individual
shareholders becomes irrelevant, where before it mattered a lot. Third, all
we are talking about here is economic efficiency—reaching the production
possibility frontier. Social welfare is not implicated.
How can that be? Social welfare would be implicated if we followed
Arrow and Debreu and constructed a general equilibrium model of the
economy depicting a Pereto optimal outcome. But, when you are working
in partial equilibrium mode, as were Jensen and Meckling, such claims
cannot be made.
But can’t you say that managing to maximize shareholder value
proxies for social welfare? Many do. Indeed, many avoid inserting the
“proxy” qualification and say that shareholder value maximization and
social welfare are same thing. It’s theoretically incorrect either way. Why
then do people do this? In our view they are jockeying into position for the
follow-up discussion about the political economic implications of all of
this. The “social welfare” characterization imports legitimacy to
deregulatory claims. Indeed, when the economic efficiency as social
welfare assertion goes unchallenged, redistributive discussion is
pretermitted altogether.
We proceed to Phase II of the shareholder primacy discussion. Recall
that the shareholder objective function gets established on the assumption
that there are no agency costs.
Relax the no agency cost assumption and you go from shareholder
value maximization as a goal to shareholder empowerment as a law reform
agenda. At this point in the paper, we repeat points we made in an antishareholder empowerment paper we published a couple of years ago.7 I
won’t belabor them this morning. Suffice it to say that shareholder
empowerment proponents make three moves: first, they assume that
agency costs are out of control; second, in their more particular
characterization of the shareholder interest, they try very hard to stick with
the most purely incented real world shareholders—the fully diversified
variety and the market price setters; and, third, even as they talk
governance, what people really want to see realized is market control,
which in this context comes down to an instruction to manage to maximize
the stock price.
We argue that the stock price isn’t always reliable due to, inter alia,
information asymmetries and market dysfunctions. We also argue that it’s

7. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment,
158 U. PA. L. REV. 653 (2010).
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not at all clear that agency costs are out of control. Jensen and Meckling,
the theoretical godfathers of all of this, predict that actors in free markets
make adjustments to reduce agency costs, so as to keep them under
control. We argue that that’s exactly what has happened since the takeover
was choked off twenty-five years ago. In today’s paper, we make a further
observation: three distinct sets of real world shareholders perform a critical
function in agency cost reduction: private equity firms, activist hedge
funds, and managers themselves. What distinguishes these shareholders is
that they actually know something about the business and so are positioned
to initiate productivity improvements. None of them have the pure
financial incentives idealized in shareholder primacy theory. Put this point
together with our reference back to Jensen and Meckling and you learn
that agency cost reduction is not a free lunch; you have to pay people to
do it.
Finally, neither of social welfare or the socio-economic status of
shareholders has any bearing on either shareholder primacy theory or our
critique of it. This is strictly an efficiency discussion.
THE SHAREHOLDER CLASS
That gets us to the shareholder class, which is the political economic
instantiation of the shareholder primate of economic theory. It is claimed
that the downward diffusion of shareholding makes the shareholders
salient as an interest group. This is presented as a cause for celebration.
Why? It’s all a little vague, but I take the introduction of the shareholder
class as an invitation to refer back to the managerialist era and find that
the shareholders’ socio-economic status is relevant once again. Of course,
it is relevant to the opposite effect. A half century ago, reference to socioeconomic status precluded the shareholders from attaining the status of a
favored group in public policy; now, with diffusion, socio-economic status
is a qualification. Shareholders democratize. Shareholders legitimize. And
management is what it always was, a bunch of nasty old oligarchs holding
on to privileges illegitimately acquired.
So, what does and does not work here? It is certainly true that the
shareholder interest has political resonance in the US where it didn’t two
decades ago. Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank make it clear that the
Congress sees shareholders as a species of median voter and happily caters
to their interests.
But is it true that shareholding has diffused?
The Investment Company Institute and the Securities Industry
Association produced a big study to this effect in 2005. It showed that over
one-half of households own stock, up from one-fifth in 1983. It then did
its best to put on a populist gloss—a “typical” household owned $65,000
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worth of stock; only 56% of the stockholders had graduated from college,
and the age median was only fifty-one years. Unfortunately, three years
later in a follow-up effort, they found that stock-owning households had
gone down to 45%—the era of 401(k) proliferation was over and people
were otherwise exiting the market. According to the 2010 Fed figures, the
exit continues.
Figure 1: Households with Stockholdings, 1989–2007

Figure 1 provides a cross-check employing the 2007 Fed numbers,
which shows that the industry’s household numbers were accurate but
could use some unpacking. If you ask for a stake in excess of $10,000, for
example, the household figure drops from 45% to 25% and to 22% if you
ask for more than $25,000. In other words, the industry’s $65,000 typical
shareholder is bogus.
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Figure 2: Concentration of Stock Holdings by Wealth Class, 2007

So who owns the stock? Well, looking at Figure 2, the top 1% by
wealth own 38% of it, and the top 5% own 69%. The bottom 80% owns
just 9%. Downward diffusion, yes, but limited in depth.
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Figure 3: Stock Ownership of the Top 10%, 1989–2007

Interestingly, as Figure 3 shows, most of the downward movement
occurred during the 1980s, when the share of the top 10% dropped from
89% to 81%. It has been up and down since then, with the top 10% holding
the same 81% in 2007 that it held in 1989.
If we stopped here with our survey of US wealth distribution, the
profile would be that of a third-world country. Happily, the picture flattens
out when we compare assets to income. The top 10% holds 83% of nonhome wealth and benefits from a lesser 73% of overall net worth, but
draws only 47% of total income. It’s an intuitive picture. Outside of the
top group, most Americans get by on salary. The home is the primary asset
and people borrow to get hold of one.
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Figure 4:Wealth Composition by Wealth Class, 2007

Figure 4 offers another look, breaking out the wealth composition of
the top 1%, the next 19%, and following with the next 60%. Stocks and
bonds, the dark blue, wane from left to right, while the home, the purple,
waxes. The biggest item for the wealthy is own business equity plus other
unincorporated business equity, which I assume includes hedge and
private equity funds.
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Figure 5: Wealth by Type and Age Group, 2007

So, the typical or modal shareholder is rich. Figure 5 shows that the
modal shareholder is also old. Stocks and bonds make up 13% of the
wealth of the 45- to 54-year age group and 26% of the wealth of the over
75s. Note that of all the asset classes, its only stocks and bonds that loom
progressively larger as the years accumulate.
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Figure 6: Median Income and Wealth by Race ($000s), 2007

Figure 6 shows that the modal shareholder is also white. This is
hardly a surprise, but the degree of the drop off for African Americans and
Latinx as regards asset wealth does impart a bit of a jolt. For the minorities,
the salary plus home equity pattern is close to an absolute. These are
medians, but the means aren’t much different.
There’s one thing missing from the Fed picturedefined benefit
pension plans. There’s a reason. The Fed is measuring ownership and
pension plan beneficiaries aren’t beneficial owners of plan assets.
Ironically, it’s corporate stockholders (and state and municipal citizens)
who take that position. So this source of wealth shows up only as income
in the Fed surveys, mixed together with social security checks. We get no
sense of the distributive pattern.
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Figure 7: Top 1.5% Earners as a % of Total Income Reported, 2009

Figure 8: Top 8% Earners as a % of Total Income Reported, 2009
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So we turn to IRS data to get a comparative handle on this income—
distributions from pensions and IRAs as compared to wage income,
dividend and interest income and yields from small business. Figure 7
breaks out this data and it does break the pattern. The top 1.5% of
taxpayers by gross income draw only 2% of this income source and the
top 8% only 13%. As we move away from retirement income to other
sources, the rich take an increasingly large share, peaking at 81% of
proceeds from sales of capital assets. But there are limits to wealth
diffusion even here. If you slice the tax data using $100,000 total income
as the dividing line between rich and poor, 64% of pension income is
above the line and only 36% below.
CONCLUSION
We are trying very hard to be fair, but cannot escape the conclusion
that shareholders are rich, old, and white. What then is the import of a
shareholder class?
The shareholder class is shareholder primacy stepping outside of the
box of economic efficiency to look for a favored place in the wider
political economy. That the step is being taken at all confirms that Berle’s
point about the dispersion of shareholdings still has meaning, otherwise
the shareholder proponents would not be bothering to rebut it.
Also, given the separation of ownership and control, it remains true
that corporate politics involves a many against a few. But the longer you
look, the harder it is to see a popular uprising against an oligarchy. This is
not have nots against haves. Moreover, the many may not be all that many,
once we include shareholding institutions and governance intermediaries
in the picture. Do that and corporate politics is a scene of conflict between
two rich, self-interested groups, each acting as agents of the same set of
rich shareholder principals. As between the two, it is not clear which is the
more “oligarchic.”
Finally, how does management disempowerment enhance social
welfare? There’s nothing particularly redistributive about it. So, if we can
believe the claims of advocates of shareholder primacy, its impact is only
to expand the size of the economic pie. But, so far as we are concerned,
that claim is debatable. Is there some other legitimating effect that follows
from shareholder control? There’s an oft-posed analogy between
shareholder voting and voting in a democratic state, but it would have to
be a state with property-based weighted voting. So we don’t see much
there, either.
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IV. CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAW
A. THE EQUILIBRIUM CONTENT OF CORPORATE FEDERALISM
UCLA-Sloan Research Program on Business Organizations, Conference
on the Means and Ends of Corporations, January 29, 2005
Accompanying Article:
William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of
Corporate Federalism, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619 (2006) (Annual
Symposium), reprinted in 48 CORPORATE PRACTICE
COMMENTATOR 855 (2007)
INTRODUCTION
In this paper, Joe McCahery and I bring five points to the corporate
federalism discussion. First, federal intervention into internal affairs is
inevitable because Delaware follows an evolutionarily stable strategy that
constrains its ability to respond to shocks that create national political
demands. Second, national lawmakers pursue a cooperative strategy when
intervening, structuring federal corporate law so as to leave the rent-driven
state law equilibrium undisturbed. Third, these days the cooperative
federal strategy responds to political demands focused on shareholder
value. Fourth, although the state equilibrium is second best when
evaluated in a microeconomic framework, the negative result has no
bearing on the federalism. Fifth, the threat of disabling federal intervention
has sunk into the deep constitutional structure, leaving Delaware safe in
the present context.
THE STATE EQUILIBRIUM
History provides the means to these five ends. More particularly, the
paper uses basic concepts of evolutionary game theory to explicate
corporate federalism’s development over time. Two equilibriums emerge:
a rent driven equilibrium in the states complemented by a political
equilibrium at the national level.
The state equilibrium originated in 1888 when New Jersey turned
corporate lawmaking into a strategic game of rent-seeking from managers
looking for a responsive legal framework. Innovating, New Jersey
provided an enabling corporate code that vests agenda control over
governance matters in management. When New Jersey abandoned its
competitive strategy for exogenous political reasons in 1913, Delaware,
which already had copied the strategy, captured the rents. Delaware has
stuck with the strategy ever since, inviting the designation “evolutionarily
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stable.” Delaware’s agents play to protect its rents, approaching the mode
of rational maximizers. They update and learn on an ongoing basis,
adjusting their lawmaking strategies as they face new situations. But they
never stray far from the original formula. So stable is the strategy that
corporate law’s basic, enabling outline changed little during the twentieth
century.
How legitimate is the system? Well, the possibility of
reincorporation out of the state assures a high degree of political
accountability. But accountability goes not to voters, but to the firms’
managers and shareholders, who react not as citizens but as economic
interest holders. Paradoxically, Delaware corporate law also reflects the
preferences of an unusually wide spectrum of voters due to the fiscal
impact; any corporate law policy that suits the customers also suits them.
This complete concord between Delaware’s firms and its voters cordons
off corporate law from conventional political influences and concomitant
regulatory volatility. Such a stable political settlement could never be
reached at the federal level, where broad political coalitions could contest
it.
Many, of course, tell us that the state equilibrium does not measure
up as first best when analogized to an efficient product market, instead
amounting to a bundle of suboptimal distortions. This second-best
description is manifestly accurate. But we don’t see any negative
implications for Delaware’s legitimacy. For one thing, it’s not clear to us
that a first-best market for law could exist in the first place. Law rarely
works as product in the real world because lawmakers lack entrepreneurial
incentives. For us this is politics, not economics. It suffices that the system
is: (1) consensual, (2) responsive, and (3) monitored at the national level.
FEDERAL QUESTIONS
Now to that third factor—national monitoring. The stable state
equilibrium holds out a possibility of externalities. The dominant
chartering state becomes a national lawmaker, potentially impacting the
economic interests of actors nationwide, actors who may be badly
represented or entirely unrepresented in its lawmaking process and as to
whom it is unaccountable. Such an arrangement is politically tolerable
only given the possibility of preemption by the national government. Since
the chartering state gets its power to impose its law externally from the
federal constitution, it also makes structural sense that disadvantaged
groups and broad public interest coalitions get a right to contest the state
result by making a political appeal to Congress.
Since 1934, these federal contests over state results have been
mediated and channeled by the internal affairs norm. This being only a
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coordinating norm, rather than a constitutional mandate, its application is
contestable. There follows the central, ongoing issue in corporate
federalism: the weight to be accorded the presumption favoring state
regulation of internal affairs.
THE FEDERAL EQUILIBRIUM
And national lawmakers have progressively, albeit episodically,
entered into internal affairs since 1934. These interventions are historically
contingent, occurring when political demands are registered nationally.
Even so, the federalism has evolved toward an equilibrium balance,
because the makers of national corporate law—which include the stock
exchanges in addition to Congress, the SEC, and the federal courts—have
played an evolutionarily stable strategy of their own. We derive this
equilibrium description from a political economy of national incursions
into internal affairs since 1934, a discussion that contrasts federal
initiatives that failed, federal chartering and federal protection of hostile
takeovers, with initiatives that succeeded, like the Williams Act, the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(SOX).
Where the state equilibrium stems from an exchange of a product for
rents, the federal equilibrium is political. Where the state equilibrium is
self-enforcing, federal actors have a range of strategies at their disposal
and a zone of discretion. They could play uncooperatively, intervening so
as to terminate the rents and the state equilibrium. They also could be
wholly cooperative, leaving internal affairs to the states. Strategies
actually chosen depend on political norms and pressures. Despite this
unstable aspect, four patterns can be discerned in the history, patterns
suggesting the evolution of a stable, cooperative strategy.
1. The first pattern concerns political substance: Initiatives
implicating sharp ideological partisanship do not find their way into
federal mandates.
The failed initiatives came from proponents of two paradigms who
long competed in trying to capture and transform the federalism. First in
time came a trust paradigm espoused by progressives who called charter
competition a race to the bottom and counseled that no internal affairs
presumption should constrain federal intervention. A market paradigm
over time emerged in opposition. Its picture of market success reversed
the race to the bottom to a race to the top and implied an irrebuttable
presumption favoring the states.
Neither paradigm ever motivated (or constrained) national
interventions. Federal chartering, at the top of the executive branch’s
legislative agenda in 1910, gradually sank into political obscurity over the
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course of the century. Proponents of the market paradigm similarly lacked
necessary political muscle when the time came for federal protection of
the hostile takeover in the 1980s. Both paradigms, whatever their
substantive merits, have been the projects of narrow networks of academic
and policy elites. Neither ever resounded strongly enough, either with the
median voter or, with partisan agenda setters, to override interest group
opposition and determine results.
But a third policy approach, on the table since the 1930s, does carry
descriptive weight. We call it the “governance agenda.” Its proponents
seek to reduce agency costs of management for the shareholders’ benefit
and avoid mention of unrelated notions of the public interest. Congress
and the stock exchange both draw on this agenda when intervening to
adjust state equilibrium results.
2. The second pattern concerns political demands and subject matter.
Both the FCPA and SOX responded to broad-based political
demands for management accountability, demands so strong as to
surmount partisan ideological divisions in Congress. Only rarely does the
public make such demands. But well-publicized corruption and
noncompliance bring about the exceptional case. Stock market reverses
also figure in.
Interventions tend to address topics, legal compliance most
prominently, as to which unilateral action by Delaware would be
inadequate fully to satisfy the political demands. This follows in part from
the federal structure: national demands create a need for parallel action
across all fifty states, something the states can’t do quickly. It also follows
from the properties of the state equilibrium. The stable state strategy
privileges fidelity to the management interest. A shift by Delaware toward
hard-wired accountability and enforcement or mandated governance
processes would be viewed as defection. Such a shift would disrupt the
equilibrium, reducing Delaware’s rents. The equilibrium thus disables
Delaware from preemptively anticipating federal interventions.
3. The third pattern concerns the relative influence of shareholders
and managers: The shareholder voice tends to register more loudly at the
federal level.
We hear the shareholder voice most clearly with the FCPA and SOX,
cases where political demands flow against management and the feds
respond to avoid finding themselves on the wrong side of median voter
preferences. Significantly, with SOX we see that median voter demands
have moved away from early- and mid-twentieth century populist
concerns like corporate bigness and labor relations. Now, with a rising
shareholder class, national political demands tend to be driven by
shareholder value. Today’s populist agenda concerns compliance with
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laws designed to assure accurate market prices. Delaware’s vulnerability
to attack diminishes accordingly.
Compare the Williams Act, the National Securities Markets
Improvements Act of 1996, and the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998, cases where federal action responds to the same
sort of management influence activity that determines results in the states.
As in the states, such management political operations tend to succeed
against the backdrop of strong stock markets. But then all federal
interventions are stock market sensitive.
Here, in contrast with FCPA and SOX, elective politics have no
direct bearing. The median voter has no knowledge of the subject matter
and hence no opinion. In addition, even as management gets more or less
what it wants, the SEC hardwires a shareholder voice into the political
process. This skews the federal agenda to weight the shareholder interest
more heavily than it is or could be weighted under the stable state
equilibrium.
4. The fourth pattern concerns state-federal impact.
Not only have the feds never made full use of their constitutional
preemptive authority, they have never disrupted the state equilibrium,
which has remained stable even as the feds have crossed the internal affairs
line on repeated occasions.
FCPA and SOX traverse internal affairs mostly to strengthen
compliance with law, and the law in question is mostly federal. The feds
enter state territory to maintain the integrity of their own system, and their
system remains directed to the national securities marketplace. Nor does
the legislation affect either the state settlement’s basic terms or Delaware’s
rent flows. Viewed from an economic perspective, then, it substantially
respects the state system, permitting us to describe the federal strategy as
cooperative from Delaware’s point of view. SOX targets management, not
Delaware; the issue is not federalism, but costs and benefits at the national
level.
In our view, non-disruption of the state equilibrium lies at the core
of the federalism, a view that contrasts with a prevailing subject matterbased conception.
DELAWARE
Finally, to Delaware, and the strategy adjustments it made in the
wake of the federal incorporation threat of the 1970s and the takeover wars
of the 1980s, both of which destabilized the state equilibrium.
The Delaware courts took charge, defusing external threats by taking
corporate fiduciary law more seriously, reinventing it so as to make
fiduciary review compatible with the management’s preference for self-
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regulation. To look only at the case holdings is to see an unstable body of
law. To look at the cases in the wider equilibrium context is to see a stable
strategy. The Delaware courts learned to articulate fiduciary standards
with vigor but not to apply them directly, avoiding the levy of substantial
money judgments on customers or the permanent injunction of big money
deals. I predict that they stick to the strategy.8
For Delaware, the market share of which has continued to grow, the
only remaining point of disruptive friction lies in the incompatible
demands posed by the hostile takeover. But takeovers no longer cause
serious instability. Things did seem serious in the 1980s, when Delaware,
after due consideration, responded to conflicting demands by sticking with
the stable strategy and staring down the federal government. It made the
right political choice. The 1980s federal preemptive threat lacked political
credibility and would not have disrupted the state equilibrium in any event.
CONCLUSION
We emerge with a good cop/bad cop description of the federalism.
Delaware is the good cop. It arbitrates between shareholder and
management interests, maintains a dialogue with those it regulates, never
chills risk-taking, only polices when forced, and even then puts on the kid
gloves. The feds are the bad cop. They mandate to make sure that firms
tell the truth about themselves, deploying a significant enforcement
apparatus, imposing fines, money judgments, and even sending people to
jail.
The good cop/bad cop routine follows from the federal structure.
When financial crises and compliance breakdowns coincide, national
political demands arise concerning the conduct of corporate business.
Charter competition inhibits policing, disabling Delaware from
responding. The job of confronting external shocks goes to actors at the
national level by default. Although this leaves Delaware structurally
vulnerable, federal responses, viewed historically, have been
progressively less threatening.

8. I was wrong about this. Demands stemming from plaintiffs’ lawyers caused a shift in the
strategy in this century.
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B. BANKERS AND CHANCELLORS
University of Pennsylvania Law School Institute for Law & Economics
Corporate Roundtable, December 13, 2013
Accompanying Article:
Willliam W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Bankers and Chancellors,
93 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2014)
THE CASES
This is a paper about what happens when conflicts of interest on the
part of sell-side investment banker-advisors prove salient in the context of
Revlon review in the Delaware Chancery Court. Four cases are under
discussion, cases that, once juxtaposed, yield a prologue, an Act I, an Act
II, and an epilogue.
The prologue is Toys “R” Us, a garden variety Revlon case about a
private equity buyout decided in 2005. Then Vice-Chancellor Strine
sustained the deal but took the occasion to comment on stapled financing,
which is the provision of debt financing to the private equity buyers by the
selling board’s banker-advisor, here Credit Suisse First Boston. On the
facts of the case, the selling board acceded to its banker’s participation in
the lender group only after the execution and delivery of the merger
agreement, so the conflict implicated no Revlon violation. But the judge
did enter a note of disquiet, a double-sided communication with just a hint
of a threat. On the one hand, even as the staple lacked any causal impact
on the terms of sale, it created an appearance of impropriety, so maybe it
would have been better if the board had refused to accommodate its banker
in the first place. On the other hand, said the court, it had no business
policing appearances of impropriety lacking an impact on the selling
process.
The first act is Vice-Chancellor Laster’s 2011 decision in the Del
Monte case, also about a staple. Here the selling board’s banker-advisor,
Barclays, got the board to consent to its participation in buy-side financing
at a much earlier stage in the buyout process, with the selling board
managing the conflict by resorting to the practice palliative that had
emerged in the wake of Toys “R” Us—engagement of a second,
unconflicted banker. But Barclays remained out front during the deal’s go
shop phase despite the conflict and a bid by a competing bank to replace
it. Finally, according to the facts as stated in the opinion, there was a
sequence of conflict-related failures by Barclays to disclose acts taken in
order to get the sale process going, plus a violation of a no-teaming
provision in a confidentiality agreement.
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Vice-Chancellor Laster found that a Revlon case had a reasonable
probability of success. His opinion moved in two directions. First, the
banker conflict, taken together with the deception of the board, tainted the
sale process. Second, opportunity costs followed. The board, upon
permitting a team buyout, might and should have extracted givebacks from
the buyers. Likewise, with its banker. Upon permitting the staple, the
board should have gotten a pro for the quid instead of contenting itself
with engagement of a second banker at additional cost to the shareholders.
A twenty-day injunction against the shareholder vote followed, but
the merger eventually closed at the agreed price, with the litigation
thereafter settling for $89 million.
Act II is Chancellor Strine’s 2012 decision of the El Paso case. El
Paso’s board, advised by Goldman Sachs, had been looking into a spinoff
of a large division, a process interrupted by a merger proposal from Kinder
Morgan, a proposal backed up by a threat of a hostile tender offer. This
created a problem for Goldman, which owned 19% of Kinder Morgan and
had two representatives on its board. The El Paso board promptly brought
in Morgan Stanley to advise on the merger proposal, but left Goldman in
place as advisor on the spin off alternative. A no-shop merger agreement
with Kinder Morgan eventually followed without solicitation of other bids
at any stage.
The court once again found a reasonable probability of success under
Revlon, even as it refused an injunction against an apparently
advantageous deal. The plot gets complicated at this point. The El Paso
board had left its CEO, Doug Foshee, out front in the negotiations, and
Foshee, as soon as the ink was dry on the merger agreement and without
any disclosure to his board, had suggested to Kinder Morgan an ex post
buyout of an El Paso division by a group led by himself. That by itself
might have supported a finding for the plaintiffs.
But Goldman also found its way into the Revlon mix. More
particularly, before being shunted away from the merger, it had advocated
placation of Kinder Morgan, and, as it exited, it had managed to protect its
exclusive engagement to advise on the spinoff and to secure a $20 million
consolation prize payout if the board went for the merger. The court
thought that this set up skewed incentives in a merger’s favor—Morgan
Stanley got paid only if the merger closed while Goldman had a payday
either way. Meanwhile, Morgan Stanley’s engagement being limited to the
merger alternative, there was no possibility of Goldman being second
guessed on its spinoff valuations, which took a downward trajectory over
time. There was also a minor matter of a failure to disclose a holding of
$340,000 worth of Kinder Morgan stock by the Goldman banker advising
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on the spinoff. The merger closed and the litigation eventually settled for
$110 million.
As the curtain came down on each of the two acts, there was
smattering of applause from the audience in the business press and the
blogs. But it was mostly jeers. Bi-polar jeers. For many, the cases
amounted to ineffectual slaps on intermediary wristsshaming where
shaming wasn’t enough. For others, it was a Chancery Court out of control,
catering to plaintiffs’ lawyers and interpolating fiduciary principles where
they have no place. Since then, Del Monte and El Paso have come to be
seen as game-changers, ushering in a new regime of hypersensitivity to
banker conflicts, choking off stapled financing, and contributing to the rise
of unconflicted boutique merger advisory firms.
BACKGROUND
We got a sense of all the brouhaha here at ILE the year before last,
when Michael and Chancellor Strine convened a Chancery Court program
on banker conflicts. There was more than a little tension in the room. One
of the panelists was Robert Kindler of Morgan Stanley, who has a line he
likes to use when discussing banker conflicts: “We are all totally
conflicted—get used to it.”
And a great line it is. But Michael and I came away wondering
exactly what it’s supposed to mean. This paper followed—a sort of
investigation of and meditation on Mr. Kindler’s assertion. The paper
seeks to answer several questions. Do bankers and clients enter into a
fiduciary relationship? If they do, why should banker conflicts be tolerated
in a world where nobody would proceed with a sale process with the same
law firm sitting on both sides of the table? If bankers to are not fiduciaries,
why should their conflicts have a disabling effect on good faith, diligent
actions taken by independent sell-side directors? Aren’t Del Monte and El
Paso, with their taints and appearances of impropriety, imposing an
antique norm of fiduciary abnegation—the old punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive—in a modern context where it has no place?
We answer that this is, indeed, modern contractual territory. Bankers
operate in a vigorous reputational market and contract out of fiduciary duty
to the limit of the law with their clients’ informed consent. But, at the same
time, taking bankers out of the traditional fiduciary frame and remodeling
them as arm’s length counterparties transforms their posture under Revlon,
which is more about getting the best deal for the shareholders at arm’s
length than it is about traditional fiduciary self-abnegation. Del Monte and
El Paso stand for the proposition that selling boards should treat banker
conflicts in a contractual rather than a fiduciary framework. The cases take
us to a new evolutionary plateau on which it’s not enough to consent to
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the conflict and then sit back and passively trust that the fiduciary then
deals with you in the best of faith. The client board should instead treat its
conflicted banker as an arm’s length counterparty, assuming selfinterested motivation and using contract to protect itself and its
shareholders.
THE CONFLICTS
Now, back to Robert Kindler and his positive assertion. Are all the
bankers in fact totally conflicted? Well, no. That’s an exaggeration. But
conflicts are indeed pervasive and potentially skew the bankers’ incentives
as they play a critical role in getting the best price for sell-side
shareholders. It all depends. Some bankers avoid conflicts. But many do
not, and, as we see on the facts of these cases, some even seek them out.
There are three sources of conflict. First, advisors are repeat players
and their services have a strong relational aspect. So an advisor, ever
thinking about the next deal, could cater to the interests of actors at the
seller, actors at the buyer, or, alternatively, a third party like a lender to the
buyer.
Second, there’s the standard, performance-based fee arrangement,
which gives the advisor an all-or-nothing interest in closing any deal, a
conflict particularly likely to skew incentives when a risky but more
valuable alternative shows up. A fixed fee would eliminate the problem,
and a variable contingent fee would ameliorate it. But, for the most part
that’s not how things are done. And, assuming that the bankers are
indifferent to the form of payment so long as the yield over time averages
out to the same place, the preference for performance fees would appear
to stem from the clients.
Third, there are conflicts stemming from multiple service provision,
which arise whenever an intermediary’s maximization through the sale of
one service implies subpar performance of a second service. Stapled
financing is the prime example: an advisory bank that participates in the
buyer’s lending group stands to make a bigger fee as a lender than it does
as an advisor. Thus situated on both sides of the table, it might, for
example, be inclined to favor a buyout over a strategic merger. And, in a
bidding war, it might be better off with a lower bid accompanied by a
smaller, more valuable loan.
ECONOMIC AND LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
Lawyers see red flags on all of these fact patterns. But economists
counsel caution. For them, per se avoidance due to the taint of a conflict
and an appearance of impropriety presumptively amounts to overkill.
After all, rational actors can be expected to deal with conflicts in their
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contracts ex ante. The services buyer discounts the price until the
engagement is an advantageous net of the conflict. The conflicted services
seller seeks to build a reputation for effective service provision despite its
conflicts, thereby minimizing the pricing discount. So even as the conflict
skews incentives, the provider doesn’t necessarily give in to temptation.
There also will be market pressure to minimize conflicts. But the conflicts
do not necessarily reduce to zero even so—to the extent that the conflicts’
value exceeds the costs bound up in the price discounting and lost
business, the service provider can be expected to continue to seek them
out.
Advisory industry structure reflects the predictions implicit in this
micro account. To get a picture of it, we took the firms listed in
Mergerstat’s annual merger advisory top 50 from 1996 to 2012, totaled the
deal value for which each firm was annually responsible, and divided the
firms into four categories: first, investment bank subsidiaries of
commercial banks and other large financials; second, large, full-service
independent investment banks (irrespective of their 2008 recategorization
as bank holding companies); third, boutique advisory firms; and fourth,
advisors not falling into the first three categories, principally private equity
and auditing firms.
Annual Merger Advisory Market Share, 1996-2012
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The exercise yielded a dynamic evolutionary picture. The share of
large independent banks declines over time as commercial banks acquire
them in a deregulated environment. This enhances the potential for
conflicts as it ushers in, inter alia, stapled financing. Meanwhile, as if in
response, boutique firms, which are less likely to be conflicted due to
multiple service provision and aggressively posture themselves as such,
steadily gain at the expense of big banks of either category, going from
3% in 1996 to 16% in 2012. The players in this game compete amongst
themselves intensely, poaching from one another not only clients but star
bankers, and conflict avoidance is also a point of competition.
There is less evidence of competition over the scope of the advisor’s
duty. But it’s certainly a negotiated point. Engagement letters specifically
detail the bank’s duties, restrict the class of parties to which it owes duties,
and indemnify for anything but willful misconduct, gross negligence, or
bad faith. Advisory clients, meanwhile, are not exactly unsophisticated
players.
Significantly, the basic legal framework easily accommodates this
economic picture. The advisory engagement is, of course, an agency, and
agents owe fiduciary duties to their principals, including a duty not to act
as an adverse party. But the legal bar lifts given principal consent to a
conflict on full disclosure, subject to backstop review of the conflicted
agent’s conduct for good faith and fair dealing. Given contracting out,
questions about character of the residuum of fiduciary constraint go to the
meaning of “good faith and fair dealing.” If the question as to what this
means came up in Delaware, we project that the culpability-based
corporate law standard would come to bear, leaving us in roughly the same
place where we started out with the standard engagement letter’s
indemnity cut off at willful misconduct, gross negligence, or bad faith.
To complete our picture of effective, arm’s length contracting, we
compare the lawyers who sit at the same negotiating table. Their rules
work similarly, albeit more strictly. A transactional lawyer, like a banker,
can be conflicted based on full disclosure and client consent, provided the
lawyer can reasonably believe that competent and diligent representation
still can be provided. If not, the client’s consent is ineffective. Corporate
representation is the archetypical case for consensual, conflicted
representation. Yet we don’t see it in fact because lawyers voluntarily
avoid conflicts, constrained not by a legal bar but by a practice norm.
Summing up, the difference between lawyers and bankers lies less in
law than in economics—their respective reputational markets vary greatly
in sensitivity to conflicts.
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Finally, we note that there’s a long line of Delaware cases that
sanction banker conflicts based on client consent and full disclosure, both
to the board and the shareholders in the proxy statement. At the same time,
Delaware law holds that the banker owes its duty only to the engaging
board, not the shareholders. It can be brought in as a defendant only as an
aider and abettor of a board breach.
HARD LOOKS
Does it follow from all of this that Del Monte and El Paso disrupt an
established, well-functioning, arm’s length equilibrium between bankers
and clients by imposing out-of-place fiduciary norms? We don’t think so,
even as we readily concede that the appearances are otherwise.
The prevailing body of law on banker conflicts has an important
limitation. It is almost entirely addressed to banker fairness opinions, and
fairness opinions don’t matter very much, serving primarily a defensive
function. Now, maybe fairness opinions should say more, and therefore
matter more, and be subject to a different, more professionalized legal
regime. Maybe. But that is not the question here.
Rather, the question is whether banker conflicts can and should have
salient status in the context of Revlon review, where the stakes implicated
by a conflict are much higher than in a fairness opinion case. Toys “R”
Us, Del Monte, and El Paso represent a break with the past in confronting
this question in a serious way for the first time since Mills. v. MacMillan.
When they answer yes, they apply longstanding principles without altering
them in any way. The break with the past lies in the very act of application.
But is that application overly aggressive? Let’s take another look.
Chancellor Strine’s Toys’ “R” Us dictum castigated for an appearance of
impropriety even as it cautioned that appearances are not actionable of
themselves. To get a violation, you have to show a negative causal
influence on the board’s sale process. This requirement accords well with
the economic analysis.
The emerging question is whether Del Monte and El Paso conform
to the requirement already laid down in Toys “R” Us and ground their
Revlon violations not on taints but on consequences. If it’s taint, then these
cases border on best practices rule-making. But we think that there were
consequences, albeit of the counterfactual, might-have-been variety.
In Del Monte, the banker’s concealment disabled the board from
getting a clear picture of competitive alternatives, a problem confounded
when the conflicted banker was left to run the go-shop. Moreover, the
board’s apparent interest in maintaining its relationship with the banker
disabled it from extracting a giveback in exchange for its consent to a
staple.
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In our reading, the court here takes the arm’s length economic and
legal relational framework it has been handed and works out its logical
implications in the context of Revlon review. If the banker can go into
arm’s length mode and self-deal, then the sell-side board should be
prepared to do likewise when the banker asks for concessions, and not just
tack an added transaction cost in the form of a second banker. The message
is simple: there should be less trust and reliance and more oversight and
protective use of contract in the form of reps and warranties, binding
promises, and considerations. An instruction like this isn’t necessary in a
traditional fiduciary context.
El Paso is a bit harder, because there is no significant deception and
no clear-cut moment for a banker quid pro quo in exchange for a client
concession. Indeed, if you look at the sale context and write off the spinoff
as a dead letter, it’s hard to see any harm at all. On the other hand, this
wasn’t just a case of a second fee on the lending side. The conflict was
razor sharp—we ballpark Goldman’s stake in the success of the Kinder
Morgan merger at $200 million. If you then assume that the parties were
not just going through the motions on the spinoff and that Goldman’s
inputs mattered, we think there’s an adequate counterfactual basis for
ruling the process infirm.
The resulting practice message is still severe. Multiple conflicts have
negative synergies. Proactivity plus consent are not necessarily enough.
Be trusting and you could stumble into a violation. And, when you take
contract seriously, there comes a point when you should stop trusting
entirely, cut off the relationship, and walk away.
We think this is quite consistent with the economic analysis of
banker-client relationships, particularly given that the immediate objective
is short-term shareholder value maximization. But a pushback argument
can still be posed: Isn’t the Chancery Court here pulverizing arm’s length
contracts and dismissing the controlling influence of a reputational
market? Yes, but to make contract inviolate in this context is to shut down
Revlon scrutiny altogether, and there’s no easy way to cabin off bankerclient contracts from the others in the sale cluster. Moreover, fact
development in the context of Revlon litigation opens up black boxes,
enriching the reputation market’s informational base. Finally, Delaware
incorporation is itself a function of choices made by economic actors. The
Delaware Chancery itself operates in a market in which it has a reputation
to protect.
ROBUSTNESS CHECK
We come away with the view that the scrutiny in these cases is
structurally inescapable and that the scope for criticism goes only to

842

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 42:755

matters of degree. The Chancery Court here “gets used” to banker
conflicts, albeit not in the accepting way suggested by Robert Kindler.
But we’re still worried about claims of ex post uncertainty and calls
for guidance. So, just to be safe, we subject our conclusion to a robustness
test in the form of a thought experiment posing two alternative, more rulesbased regimes.
We first try out per se prohibition of banker conflicts by analogy to
the law governing auditor-client relationships. This would elevate
boutiques over full service banks, at a potential cost to a client wanting
either full service or, in the right case, access to the best-informed banker.
A prohibition, carried to a logical conclusion, also would lead to
constraints on fee arrangements. Adding up the opportunity costs, we
don’t think this makes a whole lot of sense. So we try a narrower per se
approach that would target and prohibit staples. This is cleaner and less
disruptive, but it’s still very easy to identify opportunity costs. The status
quo of leaving the matter to the management of the sell-side board and its
capable counsel under an open-ended standard emerges as manifestly
more attractive.
We go on to try this from the other side, proposing that full disclosure
to the selling board and its shareholders plus engagement of a second
banker should merit safe harbor treatment. Here the problem is that the
harbor isn’t really very safe, for the Revlon door isn’t shut. One is only
attempting to close off one line of inquiry within a wider set, and then only
after establishing that the disclosure had been full. There also would be
questions about the cut-off point. Does one have to inquire into the
division of labor between the conflicted banker and the second banker,
looking to make sure that any incentive skew is minimized? Presumably
yes. And even if one succeeds in cutting off a complaint based on taint
alone, what happens with a convincing showing of consequences? We
don’t see how a Chancellor could look away.
We close with a question. Why, if the possibility for close scrutiny
of banker conflicts lay inherent in the Revlon structure all along, did it take
so long for intervention to occur? Perhaps the delay was just an accident
of history—no case happened to come along. Alternatively, maybe the
contracting pattern and relationships changed over time, with cognizable
conflicts only showing up recently, amidst the stress of a severe recession.
Or maybe the Chancery Court recently became more sensitive to banker
incentive problems, perhaps influenced by widespread skepticism about
practices at big banks triggered by the financial crisis. Or maybe a bit of
all three.

2019]

Collected Lectures and Talks

843

C. THE SOTHEBY’S CASE AND THE FUTURE OF THE POISON PILL
Conference, The Corporate Contract in Changing Times: Is the Law
Keeping Up? Berkeley Law School, April 14, 2016
Accompanying Chapter:
William W. Bratton, Hedge Fund Activism, Poison Pills, and the
Jurisprudence of Threat, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING
TIMES: IS THE LAW KEEPING UP? (William Savitt, Steven Davidoff
Solomon & Randall Thomas eds., forthcoming 2019)
INTRODUCTION
There is but a single high-profile case in which twentieth century
antitakeover law has come to bear on a management defense against a
twenty-first century activist challenge—the Delaware Court of Chancery’s
decision in Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht,9 better known as “the Sotheby’s
case.” So, when Steve Davidoff told me that Delaware law was on the
agenda for this conference collection, I didn’t hesitate to offer a chapter
that reflects on Sotheby’s. Full disclosure: I worked with some Morris
Nichols lawyers during the discovery phase and came away with a sense
that there was a problem of fit between Unocal jurisprudence and activist
fact patterns, in particular with the operative threats.
THE CASE
Now, quickly, to the facts. The board of directors of a target
corporation, Sotheby’s, lobbed a poison pill in the path of one of the more
aggressive hedge funds, Third Point LLC, and its sharp-elbowed chief,
Daniel Loeb. The pill had a “low threshold” feature, capping a hostile
challenger’s block at 10% of outstanding shares rather at the traditional
20%. It thereby disabled Third Point from enhancing its vote total in a
short-slate proxy contest through additional purchases of target shares.
The Chancery Court nonetheless sustained the pill under Unocal v. Mesa
Petroleum Co.10 The decision implicated an important policy question:
whether a twentieth century doctrine keyed to hostile takeovers and
control transfers appropriately can be brought to bear in a twenty-first
century governance context in which the challenger eschews control
transfer and instead makes aggressive use of the shareholder franchise.
Sotheby’s pill had a one-year duration and displayed some careful
drafting—the 10% trigger applied only to 13-D filers and there was a built9. No. 9469-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014).
10. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
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in waiver for an all cash, all shares offer. The Board’s decision to
promulgate was tested as at two points in time: first, as of initial adoption
pre-proxy contest, and then later in the midst of the campaign, the second
look occasioned by Third Point’s formal request to the Sotheby’s board
for a waiver of the pill. The opinion on denial of the requested injunction
is a straightforward application of law already on the table. Moran, Stahl,
and Yucaipa together had shunted Blasius scrutiny off to one side on this
fact pattern, remitting the matter to Unocal. And, under Unocal, preclusion
and coercion were already off of the table where, as here, the shareholders
were going to get to decide at all events. It came down to a Unocal
reasonableness inquiry.
The principal justificatory threat is creeping control, which can
obtain even in the case of a short-slate challenger asking only for changes
in the business plan. Conveniently for defense, the case law facilitates the
building of a creeping control profile that can be attached to a hedge fund
activist. Given past control acquisitions or past unequal shareholder
outcomes, the activist is tainted and the pill passes. Alternatively, any
loose talk about a possible sale of the target also suffices. Third Point and
Loeb fit the profile to a “T”—Marco Becht et al. identify in their paper the
five hedge funds most likely to cause a merger and Third Point is right up
there. The Sotheby’s board’s initial adoption thus turned out to be easily
justified.
The case was closer as regarded the mid-contest revocation request—
there was deposition evidence from a director who said that all the board
had been worrying about at that time was the vote count, and the risk of
losing a proxy contest points to a forbidden entrenchment motivation. But
VC Parsons sustained by reference to a second, weaker threat—negative
control, the power to block. He also mentioned a third, still weaker threat
in passing—disproportionate influence, a factor invoked in the cases on a
secondary basis.
PRIORS
There’s the case. I came to it with three priors.
First, activist intervention has arrived and thrived without any
facilitating change in state corporate law and without causing the law to
change in any significant respect. I think the law’s gotten it right. It seems
to me that in order to justify a preclusive change, the reform proponent
ought to be required to show that activism causes systematic damage, and
I have seen no such showing.
Second, with Gillan and Starks, I’d say that activism doesn’t
implicate control transfer. That historic 20% number was a nice one—a
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focal point accepted not only in the law but the economics. Why not just
leave it there?
Third, to the extent there’s a short-termism problem, it’s company
specific. We should be wary of generalized characterizations.
HOLLOW THREATS
Now to the implications of the case and its trio of Unocal threats,
creeping control, negative control, and disproportionate influence.
First question: Do activists actually tend to acquire control, creeping
or outright?
Answer, no. As to lead activists, here are the figures from the studies.
Brav Jiang Partnoy and Thomas find at the 95th percentile an average
19.8% at initial filing and a max of 25%. Gantchev’s findings for the 95th
are 16% at filing and 18% at the max.
But what about wolf packs? Becht et al, most of whose observations
are from the US, find a success rate of 44% for a standalone challenge and
78% for a disclosed wolf pack. But the average wolf isn’t all that big at
14% against 8.3% for a standalone. Further, only 11.8% of Becht’s targets
faced a disclosed wolf pack while 88.2% faced a standalone activist. But
what about those invisible wolves who keep their blocks under the 5%
reporting threshold? Wong has an interesting study of what I’m calling
inferred wolf packs, keyed to an analysis of stock turnover on the day the
lead passes the 5% threshold. But her inferred wolf packs have only a 6%
higher rate of success.
Conclusion: the wolf pack menace is overdone; they generally don’t
hold out a control threat.
So let’s dial it down a notch and forget about a control threat, and
just ask for a campaign that pushes the target into a merger. Here are the
figures. They have a way of increasing with the date of the study. The most
recent comes from Boyson, Gantchev, and Shivdasani, who cover bids
from 2000 to 2012, and come in at 24%, with the activist as the bidder in
3.4% and offering the lowest premium.
Where then is the threat? Technically, creeping control is a threat
because the creeper, first, takes control, and then realizes on it either by
selling the block at a premium or holding onto it and running the company.
That’s not what’s going on. The company gets sold and everybody shares
the premium. And if that 3.4% slice of activist bids is a problem, Revlon
is there to take care of it. The victims, if any, are those who sell to the
activist during the pre-13-D filing blackout period, and they would appear
to be noise trading institutions making liquidity trades. Given
diversification, what they lose in one campaign on a sell they pick back up
in another on a hold.
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The second threat is negative control, but that really doesn’t fit hedge
fund activism either—the activists are in it to introduce affirmative
change, and given the ownership numbers, they don’t have unilateral
blocking power and are helpless without the support of other shareholders.
So we fall back on disproportionate influence, the secondary, backup
threat. Here the fit is good. Disproportionate influence is what activism is
all about. Let’s use it to sustain an extreme 5% trigger pill in the ordinary
case. The disproportionate influence serves to bring about mergers, asset
sales, borrowing, dividends, buybacks and cost cutting along with an
enduring boost in the stock price. To turn this into a threat, we go back to
the Unocal of the 1980s and the substantive coercion threat—the threat to
management’s business plan held out by a premium hostile bid. We restate
the threat in the present activist context, to wit, the changes brought by the
hedge fund may hurt the shareholders by snookering them into to taking a
present premium rather than the greater long-term value held out by the
incumbent’s business plan.
This sounds easy, but it implicates a long conceptual extension.
Unocal evolved on the theory that the bidder stayed by a poison pill backed
by a substantive coercion threat could then be remitted to the shareholder
franchise. The bidder, rather than closing on the tender offer immediately
would have to divert to a proxy context to replace the incumbent target
board with nominees who would redeem the pill. The justification for the
delay and added expense was process superiority—the annual meeting
held out a less coercive venue for group decision-making than did
uncoordinated transactions in the market. When we update to today’s
scenario, we get a difficult result, for now the locus of coercion is not the
stock market but that self-same annual meeting. This extension implicitly
disavows the soundness of shareholder business judgments registered in
connection with director elections.
To make this work, then, we have to spin a theory that casts structural
doubt on shareholder votes that directly impact the business plan. Here’s
my thought as to how to do it. One describes the situation as a majorityminority shareholder conflict of interest. You could run this two ways.
First, a long-term shareholder minority is being disadvantaged at the hands
of a short-term shareholder majority, which majority, due the parochial,
skewed interests of agents of institutional intermediaries, prefers a lowvalue, short-term revision of the business plan to a superior long-term
value strategy. In the alterative, a short-termist minority is exploiting a
long-termist majority. You get from here to there by disregarding the
activist’s shareholdings on the ground of its interest in the outcome of the
vote. It all has a pleasing, conventional sound. But it still breaks the
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inherited conceptual framework, which allows self-interest to motivate
shareholder voting absent board control.
But I think that this or something like it is in the air. Take a look at
VC Laster’s statement of the conceptual framework in In re Trados Inc.
Shareholder Litigation,11 a case that has nothing to do with activism:
A Delaware corporation, by default, has a perpetual existence. Equity
capital, by default, is permanent capital. In terms of the standard of
conduct, the duty of loyalty therefore mandates that directors
maximize the value of the corporation over the long-term for the
benefit of the providers of equity capital, as warranted for an entity
with perpetual life in which the residual claimants have locked in
their investment. When deciding whether to pursue a strategic
alternative that would end or fundamentally alter the stockholders
ongoing investment in the corporation, the loyalty-based standard of
conduct requires that the alternative yield value exceeding what the
corporation otherwise would generate for stockholders over the longterm. Value, of course, does not just mean cash. It could mean an
ownership interest in an entity, a package of other securities, or some
combination, with or without cash, that will deliver greater value over
the anticipated investment horizon. The duty to act for the ultimate
benefit of stockholders does not require that directors fulfill the
wishes of a particular subset of the stockholder base.
. . . Stockholders may have idiosyncratic reasons for preferring
decisions that misallocate capital. Directors must exercise their
independent fiduciary judgment; they need not cater to stockholder
whim.12

TOWARD A USEFUL PILL
Does any of this matter? Standing pills—pills actually in place as
opposed to lying inchoate in blank check stock provision—are
disappearing. The number is down from 35% of public companies in 2005
to 12.7% in 2015. Given the 10-day filing window for a 13-D report of a
5% stock block accumulation, a hedge fund can get its block in place
before target management gets a shot at putting a pill in place, at least so
long as the activist keeps his or her mouth shut. And, as Bebchuk, Brav,
Jiang, and Jackson point out, given the stock turnover, even with a oneday filing window, most of the damage will have been done already.
So, in order to be hedge fund ready, a potential target needs a
standing pill with a 5% trigger, a trigger low enough to invite invalidation
for preclusion under Unocal. Coffee and Palia have mooted such a pill,
11. 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013).
12. Id. at 3738.
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adding bells and whistles designed to minimize the threat of invalidation—
the pill kicks only if the activist fails to file under 13-D in a day of going
over 5%, thereby offering a private ordering solution to problem held out
by 13-D’s ancient 10-day filing window.
Still, if you want the pill to crimp block formation it’s going to have
to be a standing, plain vanilla, 5% pill. Having gotten to this bottom line,
I want to reverse my own prior and suggest that this pill might not be a
bad thing. This is simply because in the present context almost no one
would dare adopt it. A management putting out such a pill would have a
lot of explaining to do. Let’s posit an explanation demonstrating the
company’s unsuitability for activist targeting. That is, assume that
management can accurately and persuasively describe an investment
policy and relational commitments that would be irrevocably injured by
ministrations from the standard activist playbook. A set-to with ISS and
Glass Lewis no doubt would follow, however well-put the explanation. I
think the resulting dialogue could be beneficial—a learning experience for
the institutional investor community. Spinning the scenario out a bit, the
pill could emerge as a lever facilitating a productive sorting of companies
among those well-suited and ill-suited to activist discipline. It gives
activist opponents what they haven’t gotten from the SEC—an activist
baffler that deters purchases above 5%. And, it would be a superior means
to the end because it would be a product of private ordering and would
operate company by company.
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D. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FRAUD ON THE MARKET
NYU Penn Conference on Law and Finance, February 25, 2011
Accompanying Article:
William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of
Fraud on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69 (2011)
BACKGROUND
A while back, Michael Wachter and I set to work on a securities fraud
project that didn’t work out. As we traveled down that road, and after
reading papers by Jennifer Arlen, Jill Fisch, Steve Choi, Merritt Fox,
Adam Pritchard, and others, we noticed something that grabbed our
attention. The fraud on the market subset of 10b-5 actions has slowly but
surely been losing its academic backing.
What’s the fraud on the market subset? Well, first, put aside insider
trading cases, which look toward a disgorgement of ill-gotten gains. Put
aside also a new issue case where a company lies about itself when
marketing new shares to take advantage of a market price above
fundamental value. There are ill-gotten gains to be disgorged here too.
This leaves the rest of 10b-5, most of the cases, where a company is
charged with telling untruths that cause its stock price to diverge from
fundamental value but is not itself trading in the stock. Here the losses lie
entirely with the class of holders who, say, bought and paid too much
during the period when the stock price was inflated, with the matching
gains sitting in the pockets of selling shareholders who got out in time.
JUSTIFICATIONS AND CRITIQUES
There are two traditional justifications for private lawsuits on this
fact pattern. First, by analogy to the common law of fraud, the lawsuit
returns out-of-pocket losses to the buyers who paid too much,
compensating them. Second, by forcing the damages payment, it deters
fraud.
There’s a literature that begins with a paper Jennifer and Bill Carney
published twenty years ago that takes both theories apart and stomps them
into the ground. The key to the critical analysis is enterprise liability. Fraud
on the market actions always name as defendant one or more corporate
agents responsible for the fraud and then add the corporate issuer itself as
a defendant on a principal-agent theory. All but a handful of the cases
settle, with the corporation usually picking up the tab for the entire group
of defendants. It is the path of least resistance for both sides at the
settlement table.
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But it also upsets the basic policy calculations. As to compensation,
the inflated purchase price goes into the pocket of a selling shareholder
who committed no fraud and isn’t a defendant. The corporation,
derivatively liable for the acts of its agents, pays the settlement.
So wait, who is paying what to whom?
That depends on what kind of shareholder you are. The majority are
diversified portfolio investors. For them, what comes in one pocket as outof-pocket damages over time goes out the other when another portfolio
company pays a claim. It’s a zero-sum game net until you get to litigation
costs, at which point the returns go negative.
If you are a noise trader, you invested based on no information. If
you are under diversified, you could have damages. But do you have a
policy case for reliance on market price integrity? Arguably not. Now
compare a noise investor who gets compensated when the trend turns due
to a material misstatement, with a noise investor left to bear her own
losses. All other things equal, it’s the latter investor who is more likely to
get out of noise trading, a desirable result. So it’s not clear what function
compensation has to play.
If you are an under-diversified long-term investor in the defendant
companyyou pay, nothing comes back in the other pocket, so you lose.
Fraud on the market litigation turns out to be a defensible positive
sum game for only one subset of shareholdersinformation
tradersfundamental value investors who do research and rely on
published reports. These folks will have net out-of-pocket losses due to
reliance on market integrity. There also may be research costs incurred to
avoid victimizationa dead weight loss due to the threat of fraud. So
compensation could serve a function. But this is only a subset, and
unfortunately, settlement proceeds are shared amongst the shareholders as
a group, and on average return less than five cents on the dollar as regards
to larger companies. So, if you lost one dollar, the lawsuit returns you three
or four cents. This is at best chump change for the one subset that can make
a case for compensation.
As to deterrence, fraud on the market does deter fraud to some extent,
if only because the suits are expensive, disruptive, and drive down the
stock price. But if you are really serious about deterrence, you direct the
action against the individual perpetrators. Unfortunately, that doesn’t work
with the economics of class action litigation because switching from the
corporation to the officers removes the deep pocket from the settlement
table.
Gradually, just about everyone who does securities has come to
accept this critique, even those who take strong pro-enforcement positions.
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It is now a conventional wisdom, although that point has only begun to be
acknowledged.
The policy discussion emerges in an awkward posture. Ever since the
Supreme Court ushered in fraud on the market class actions by sustaining
a presumption of reliance on the accuracy of the market price in the 1988
case Basic v. Levinson, Congress and the same Supreme Court have
labored to contain them. But they remain as economically and
institutionally salient as ever. Put that together with a policy conclusion
that fraud on the market makes no sense, and then you would think that
the next step would be to abolish itmore particularly, to pull the
presumption. Doing so would mean inserting an actual reliance
requirement. But a small minority are willing to go that faractually, it’s
a minority of one made up of Adam Pritchard. The rest stick with fraud on
the market on a backstop basis: “Well, it doesn’t make any sense, but it’s
the best enforcement tool we’re going to get.”
OUR INTERVENTION: RELIANCE FOR PRIVATE LITIGANTS AND STEPPED
UP SEC ENFORCEMENT
This is our point of intervention. Something has gotten stuck here.
We’re highlighting the sticking points and mapping what we think is the
most plausible route to a better outcome. We think this would be, first, for
private litigants, an actual reliance requirement tailored to circumstances
of investors who research companies. We look to the SEC, rather than
Congress or the courts, to make this changeit is the institution most
responsible for the unsatisfactory state of affairs and best equipped to fix
things.
Now, because an actual reliance requirement would diminish the
flow of private litigation, we also look to a compensating step up in public
enforcement capability. The SEC, which also tends to settle with the
enterprise, needs enough funding to get out of the enterprise liability trap
itself and direct its enforcement actions to culpable, unindemnified
individuals.
BARRIERS TO REFORM
We address three barriers standing between here and there.
First, there’s a new justification of fraud on the market that’s gaining
currency in the wake of the failure of the original justificationsthat fraud
on the market litigation enhances the operation of the corporate
governance system. Second, we turn to politics and explain why private
securities litigation enjoys protection. Third, we inquire into the facts
supporting the backstop justificationinadequate public enforcement
resources.
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First, fraud on the market as corporate governance. Note that the
original compensation justification doesn’t work because of pocket
shiftingshareholders paying shareholders. Shift to governance as a
framework and the fact that the shareholders pay is no big dealthe
shareholders pay for everything in corporate governance and in theory are
happy to do so long as the agency cost reductive effect exceeds the
expenditure. So, what’s the agency cost reductive effect here? Well,
effective shareholder monitoring requires transparency. Fraud on the
market litigation is a piece of the larger transparency enforcement
apparatus. Therefore, it’s justified.
At this point, stop and ask yourself: What informational value-added
is occasioned by class action litigation? Not much, in our view.
But that’s not the central claim anyway. As we understand it, the
governance justification closely ties fraud at the market to the mandatory
disclosure system. That is, to get rid of fraud on the market is also to get
rid of mandatory disclosure. Do that and you really do have a transparency
problem. And there are fraud-on-the-market opponents who advocate
relocating disclosure rule-making regime to the private sector. But we see
no unbreakable tie between the twoyou can have and enforce mandatory
disclosure system without private fraud on the market lawsuits.
Once you detach mandatory disclosure from fraud on the market, the
governance argument takes you back to the deterrence argumentfraud
means opacity and private litigation deters fraud. Unfortunately, viewed
as a deterrent, fraud on the market comes up short.
Can the class action be reshaped to have a greater deterrent impact?
That would be tricky. To do that, you have to switch to individual fines or
some other theory of individually imposed damages. Two potential
adverse consequences are projected from such a move. On the one hand,
maybe recoveries would be so small that the private plaintiffs would lose
their enforcement incentive. On the other hand, you could jack up the fines
to keep the private plaintiffs in the game but at the risk of an over-deterrent
resultcrushing fines might deter executive recruitment and corporate
risk-taking.
There are proposals on the table that aim to navigate between the two
adverse results. Merritt Fox has one. But we wonder whether, once you
get to this point, it might be better to stop trying to tweak the incentives of
class action attorneys and rely on a public administrative intelligence to
set penalties at the right level.
There’s one other line of argument in the fraud on the market as
governance category: fraud on the market actions proxy for litigation
under the state law duty of care, addressing management defalcations in
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the operation of the business, and giving shareholders a platform on which
to intervene, bypassing the board of directors.
This doesn’t work well either. Fraud on the market doesn’t result in
managers directly being held accountable for failure. Its consequences do
not follow from the judgment of the shareholders as a group, as occurs
when the franchise is exercised. It causes the stock price to go down. And
those who make the decisions, lawyers, pension funds serving as
representative plaintiffs, and federal judges, are, from a corporate
governance point of view, largely unaccountable.
There is something to the point that fraud on the market overlaps the
territory covered by the state law duty of care. But we think the
comparison has devastating implications for fraud on the market. The state
law care duty became subject to an opt out possibility a quarter century
ago, and by now most companies have opted out with their shareholders’
approval. Fraud on the market, like the rest of securities law, is mandatory.
A NATIONAL REFERENDUM
So we propose an opt out. Not just an exit door to be opened company
by company, but a national referendum. The SEC would promulgate a rule
pursuant to which the stockholders of every public company would decide
whether they do or do not want their company to be subject to fraud on the
market litigation under the Basic v. Levinson presumption of reliance. The
votes would be taken at an annual meeting two years later, so that the
institutional investor community would get plenty of time to think over the
policy implications. Any company that opted out would be able to opt back
in any time, prospectively. I don’t know how this would turn out. If the
shareholders decided that they want to pay for this litigation, fine; it’s their
money. I make just one predictionthe more time they get to think about
it, the larger the no vote.
POLITICS
Now to politics. Political vulnerability does not necessarily follow
from the fact that a legal institution makes no policy sense. Indeed,
Congress took a look at eliminating fraud on the market in the run up to
the 1995 PSLRA and decided to go for smaller scale reforms after Arthur
Levitt came over and gave it a lecture. The business lobby has a follow-up
list of reforms ready to go in the right political climate. If the past is any
guide, the right climate means an expanding economy and a bull market.
So fraud on the market is safe for now.
Better than safe, actually. The PSLRA diminished the strike suit
problem and brought in institutional investors as lead shareholders,
making class actions more respectable. A pay to play problem has resulted,
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as plaintiffs’ lawyers allegedly donate to politicians in states where they
have attachments at the public employee pension fund. But even that
doesn’t matter very much.
Fraud on the market suits are politically legitimate despite a little
corruption around the edges, because managers are empowered actors in
the society and the economy and private antifraud litigation holds out a
means with which to challenge business decisions gone wrong. It lets
social upstarts go after top dogs, and such performances are valued. Its
promise to enforce the law against fraudsters strengthens the case,
especially if they are avaricious plutocrats.
Meanwhile, the shareholders have emerged as a politically salient
interest group. Decades ago, no one thought of the shareholder as a proxy
for the median voter. Things are different in the ownership society. Invoke
the shareholder interest in compensation for out of pocket losses, and you
can get results in the right Congress. That a different mode of enforcement
might more effectively challenge management decisions, bring fraudsters
to account, or protect the shareholder interest, makes fraud on the market
contestable (burden of proof on contestant) without denuding it of political
legitimacy.
It follows that fraud on the market opponents must surmount a high
political barrier. We can only aspire to chip away at it. Our target is the
fallback defense of fraud on the market defenders: Even if this tort makes
no policy sense, we have to live with it because it has some deterrent value
and public enforcement resources are inadequate. That latter point has
been repeated over and over like a mantra since the Supreme Court first
implied a private right of action under § 14 of the 1934 Act back in 1964.
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT RESOURCES
We decided to take a look and see if anything has changed in 45
years, and it has. The agency’s budget was $13.9 million back in 1964. In
2009, it was almost $1 billionthe increase factor, adjusted for inflation
is a multiple of 10.2.
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SEC Budgets Adjusted for Inflation

The slide shows the budgets across time in 2009 dollars. There are
three upward bumps: first in the late 1970s after the foreign payments
scandal; second in the early 1990s after Drexel and the S&L crisis and
some enabling legislation, and third, after Enron. The Enron bump is by
far the biggestthe implication is that there’s a break in the historical
pattern that justifies a new look at old assumptions. And note another
point: fraud on the market defenders assert that public enforcement is
politically vulnerablerely on it and you may wake up with no
enforcement at all in a Republican administration. Well, there have been
Republican administrations that refused to increase the SEC budget, but
none have tried to gut it.
That drama is being reenacted this year. Mary Schapiro wants a 15%
post-Dodd-Frank increase, and is having trouble with Congressional
Republicans and austerity politics. Barney Frank’s talking as if cuts are on
the table, but that’s not the case.
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SEC Resources to Equity Market Capitalization

Here’s the budget indexed against equity market capitalization,
which gives a dramatic picture of the post-Enron bump. But there’s also a
problemthe personnel line doesn’t levitate like the other two. Indeed,
personnel numbers have been fingered as the agency’s Achilles heel.
SEC Resources to Publicly Traded Stocks
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So here’s a different picturethe inflation adjusted SEC budget
indexed against personnel numbers and numbers of publicly traded stocks.
Personnel roughly triple over the decades, with the line of increase roughly
tracking the increase in the number of stock issues. The budget outstrips
both, but hey, they’re presumably paying more to get better people.
SEC Resources to Enforcement Activity

Now for a productivity view, the real budget indexed against the
number of enforcement actions filed and numbers of personnel. Here the
SEC starts to look good.
Penalties and Disgorgements Ordered
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It also looks good here. This shows amounts of fines and
disgorgements ordered in SEC enforcement actions since 1981, when the
SEC started reporting these figures. We go from $30 million in 1981 to
$2.3 billion in 2009. Caveat: prior to 2008, the reported numbers come
from judicial orders and are not amounts actually paid. Collection rates are
a problem at SEC, stemming largely from the fact that a lot of defendants
get into fraud as they grapple with financial distress, emerging as
judgment-proof defendants. Private plaintiffs, in contrast, find targets with
ability to pay.
So, overall, today’s SEC is real, where it arguably once wasn’t.
SEC v. Private Actions, Dollar Amounts 1998–2009

How does it stack up against the private sector? Here are dollar
numbers on litigation proceedsclass action settlements to SEC
enforcement proceeds since 1998. The SEC is a lot lower. What should we
make of this? My prior was that there would be two lines that never
intersected, with the blue, private line always levitating much higher than
the red. But the lines intersect at both the start and end dates. The private
line levitates spectacularly in 2006, when mega cases like Enron and
Worldcom settled. Lop off that outlier and the lines are not far apart. Now
consider that private plaintiffs evaluate potential cases based on
prospective damage calculations; the SEC presumably looks at the market
numbers too, but also at the gravity of the violation. The private sector has
financial incentives, the SEC staff’s incentives are public service and
resume building motivated, but less keenly. The longer I contemplate these
numbers, the more plausible I find the SEC.
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Here are some roughed out numbers on legal personnel in 2009:
Private sector: 753; SEC enforcement: 782. I got the five law firms
responsible for 63% of the 2009 settlements, counted the lawyers and
grossed up; but the base figure is highthese law firms litigate in other
areas. The SEC figure is closer to the truth. Two armies of roughly equal
size, subject to a complicating factor. At the SEC, only 20% do trial work.
Primary investigation comes first, soaking up 80% of the lawyersthey
make up the front line in the war against fraud. The private plaintiffs free
ride on their workone quarter of the private actions are against
companies that defended an SEC action, and that quarter shows bigger
settlement numbers.
So how does this add up? We are not claiming that today’s SEC
makes the private enforcement supplement irrelevant, just that expansion
and refocusing at the SEC could more than make up for a reduced deterrent
punch in the private sector. So we propose a trade-off; the SEC asks for
more money and refocuses, holding out a rulemaking that blocks private
actions that use fraud on the market to satisfy the reliance requirement
where the issuer is not trading.
SEC Costs and Revenues, 1964–2009
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One last point. This would not cost the taxpayers a nickel. The
shareholders pick up the tab here too. Above are SEC revenues compared
to SEC cost of operations since 1964. The revenues come from fees
collected when shareholders trade and companies issue new securities.
The revenues vastly outstrip the budget for most of recent history, with the
excess disappearing into the Treasury. The recent revenue/cost alignment
stems from a piece of legislation enacted in 2002, the Fee Relief Act,
which was a shareholder protective dictate that lowered the fees to align
the inflows and outflows.
For us, the implication is that what has been adjusted down can be
adjusted back up. And there’s another potential source of enforcement
funds—penalty monies. Under Sarbanes-Oxley’s “Fair Funds” section,
the SEC is to endeavor to return these to shareholders as compensation.
And that’s what it has been doing. There’s an irony here: Congress
redirects cash flows into the SEC back out the door to beneficiaries who
are indistinguishable from class action plaintiffs. Since most of the fines
are paid by companies, this replicates private litigation pocket shifting.
The funds, per the consensus view, would be better redirected to focused
enforcement.
It’s the shareholders’ money, one way or the other. Question: where
do they get more bang for the buck?
Cost to Shareholders, 1999–2009
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Here is an estimate of the cost to the shareholders of private class
actions and SEC enforcement from 1999 to 2009. Class action fees are
roughed out at 32% of settlements and SEC enforcement cost at 34% of
the budget. The highest multiple is 19 to 1, private to public in 2006, and
the lowest 2.8 to 1 in 2008; the average is 7.3 to 1. And there’s another
way to look at this: The class action attorney’s fee numbers imply a
damages return of $2.13 per dollar invested; the SEC enforcement budget
returns $5.80 per dollar invested.
So here’s our question: Which makes more sense for the
shareholders? Maintain the status quo, or double the SEC enforcement
budget and abolish the fraud on the market presumption? I can’t offer a
definitive answer, but I can say that there’s a genuine question, and that
up to now, no one’s been asking it.
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V. CORPORATE FINANCE
A. BOND COVENANTS AND CREDITOR PROTECTION: LAW AND
ECONOMICS, THEORY AND PRACTICE, SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS
Conference on Efficient Creditor Protection in European Company Law,
Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Tax Law,
December 1, 2005
Accompanying Article:
William W. Bratton, Bond Covenants and Creditor Protection: Law and
Economics, Theory and Practice, Substance and Process, 7 EUR. BUS.
ORG. L. REV. 39 (2006)
INTRODUCTION
I would like to begin by thanking the organizers for asking me to
bring a paper about business covenants to this conference. It is an
assignment I welcome. There are only three law professors in the US who
have demonstrated even the slightest interest in bond contracts—Marcel
Kahan, Mitu Gulati, and me. All of us like to write about bonds but we
have noted among ourselves that presenting the papers is problematic,
because we three are the only ones interested in going to the talk. Writing
for this particular conference is doubly nice because one gets this captive,
well-informed audience. Anyway, the paper is called Bond Covenants and
Creditor Protection: Law and Economics, Theory and Practice, Substance
and Process, which means that I wasn’t really sure on what to focus, so I
decided that the safest thing to do was to talk about everything.
AGENCY COSTS AND THE FULL SET OF COVENANTS
I will start with the agency costs of debt and the standard full set of
covenants.
Lenders take a fixed return, so any action by the borrower that
increases the risk of default makes their claims less valuable. Such actions
often simultaneously enhance the value of the equity. The incentive to take
them increases with leverage and the prospect of financial distress. So, the
riskier the debt, the higher the projected agency costs. Lenders in the US
protect themselves with covenants phrased in the negative. This drafting
practice follows case law providing that a lender who affirmatively
controls a borrower has no limited liability from suit by other lenders or
equity holders as regards poor business judgments.
We proceed to the categories of agency costs and the standard
covenants.
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1. Claim dilution, defined as any increase in the amount of equal or
prior debt claims. For protection, a lender gets, first, a debt covenant,
structured around a debt-equity ratio, an interest coverage test, or both.
There also will be a lien covenant, which comes either in the form of an
outright prohibition subject to negotiated exceptions, or in the form of a
negative pledge clause under which the protected loan must be equally
secured by any subsequent mortgage or security interest. A sale/leaseback
prohibition completes the set. Sale/leasebacks are the unsecured lender’s
ultimate nightmare—a premises in the borrowing base is sold to a third
party with the borrower taking back an operating lease under which it
builds up no equity in the property over time even as its business continues
to run as if nothing has happened, at least for a while.
Prevention of claim dilution also implies constraints on mergers. If a
future acquirer has a more highly levered capital structure, a direct merger
implies claim dilution. So a merger will be permitted only if the debt and
lien covenants are met as of the closing. Even so, merger covenants never
really prevent borrowers from becoming targets. A levered acquirer
simply merges the borrower into a clean, shell subsidiary. The covenant is
more likely to bite when the borrower is the acquiring firm and its target
is highly levered.
2. Asset withdrawal. From a lender’s point of view, any transfer of
capital from the borrower to its equity-holders, whether by dividend, share
repurchase, or share redemption, makes the claim less valuable. The
standard dividend covenant covers these transactions, limiting payouts
from the time of the loan to a set ratio of subsequent earnings, perhaps
adding a fixed sum to the permitted pot (referred to as the “DIP”) and
giving credit for new equity financing.
3. Underinvestment. The equity of a levered firm may be viewed as
an option to repurchase the firm from the lenders. Under limited liability,
the equity has an incentive to invest only to the extent it projects that its
option will expire in the money. It follows, on downside scenarios where
there is no in-the-money projection, that the firm will pass up positive
NPV projects, injuring the lenders and maybe society as a whole.
The problem for the drafter of a covenant concerns investment
policy’s noncontractible aspect—a firm cannot meaningfully promise to
make good investments in the future. Full protection implies control rights,
which US lenders cannot reserve. Protection therefore is indirect, with the
dividend covenant playing the main role. The borrower with free cash and
an incentive to underinvest will want to pay out the cash to its equity, but
the dividend covenant blocks the escape. Economists worry that negative
net present value (NPV) projects will result from this, but for a lender,
there’s no problem so long an investment doesn’t result in red ink in the
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form of a net cash outflow. In any event, where there’s a lender there’s
always a good use for spare cash—just make a prepayment on the loan.
4. Asset substitution. Options become more valuable as the
underlying asset becomes more volatile, so the firm, viewed as an option
in the equity, has an incentive to discard its present assets and substitute
riskier investments, even investments that, viewed as long holdings, have
negative NPVs. Investment policy itself being noncontractible, a formal
investment covenant serves a limited purpose—it blocks off investment in
risky liquid assets like common stocks so as to prevent extreme forms of
gambling with the lender’s money. Underinvestment is thereby
discouraged indirectly. The investment covenant works together with two
other covenants to protect against asset substitution—first, a covenant
restricting asset sales to a small annual percentage of net assets, and
second, a covenant preventing the borrower from changing its line of
business. Debt covenants also protect against risky investment by
constraining financing.
Note that a sale of all assets is the ultimate asset substitution because
the obligor entity emerges owning the consideration for the sale, which
could be, say, shares of the acquirer. Protection comes with a covenant
that conditions the sale on the acquirer’s formal assumption of the debt.
Now, recall that the agency costs of debt are the costs of financial
distress. Lenders accordingly may design the covenants to trigger an
occasion for renegotiation if the borrower’s business starts to deteriorate.
Maintenance tests, also called “financial covenants,” or “early warning
covenants,” serve this purpose, establishing minimum levels of net worth,
working capital, and interest coverage.
Finally, note that with a full set of covenants and a successful
borrower, the covenants, particularly the comfort ratios in the debt and
dividend covenants, cause the borrower’s equity cushion to grow, making
the debt more valuable over time. This reverses the wealth transfer—now
the debt benefits at the equity’s expense. A borrower thus burdened can be
expected to reserve the right to call the loan.
EVENT RISK
Event risk is the risk of a wealth transfer from the bondholders to the
borrower’s equity in connection with a leveraged restructuring. When
reviewed historically, it provides an excellent source of instruction about
bond contracting practice in the US.
Prior to the 1970s, investment grade bonds contained debt and
dividend covenants, along with a negative pledge and a sale/leaseback
prohibition—a combination providing minimal but reasonably effective
protection. The best-rated borrowers only gave up a debt covenant. Both
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the debt and dividend covenants dropped out during the 70s. There were
several reasons. More money was chasing top-rated paper, enhancing the
borrowers’ bargaining power. The give up seemed reasonable, given
management’s prevailing growth objective and policy of conservative
leverage. Bondholding patterns were changing also—as diversified
institutions came to dominate the market, exit replaced voice as a
protective strategy.
When leveraged restructurings hit in the 1980s, many bonds were
defenseless and a lot of value was transferred to exiting stockholders.
Almost overnight, event risk sprang up as a new systematic risk of
bondholding. The fact pattern, viewed literally, was covered by a good
faith duty imposed by contract law. The judiciary nonetheless refused to
apply the duty, and not unreasonably. The question was whether bond
contracts should be treated as incomplete, and thus open for the
implication of terms, or complete, with all risk of opportunism on the
bondholder. A normative decision was made to opt for the latter.
Eventually, bond contracts were redrafted, not to go back to the standard
set of covenants and draft a more elaborate set, but to include a right to put
the bonds back to the issuer in the event an actual or threatened control
transfer coincided with a rating downgrade. These clauses, called “poison
puts,” found their way into 40% of bonds in their early years. But their
incidence quickly declined to around 25% as leveraged restructuring
activity waned, with most bond buyers opting to take a 25 to 60 basis point
reward for taking the risk.
The story presents a nice illustration of the operation of the costly
contracting hypothesis of Smith and Warner, which continues to dominate
academic thinking about bonds. Under this, an unprotected loan will be
priced to compensate the lender for the entire projected agency cost. The
borrower accordingly has a high-powered incentive to offer contract
protections, trading off its own freedom to borrow, pay dividends, sell
assets, and make investments, against its cost of borrowing.
INCIDENCE
The costly contracting hypothesis remains robust in the sense that
bond contracts trade risk and return, and that the price reflects the trade.
But the market does not work quite the way the theory predicts.
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Covenants in bank loans, 1993-2001
(source: Bradley and Roberts (2004) from Dealscan)

Above are the Bradley and Roberts figures on a large, recent sample
of bank loans with an average duration of 3.5 years. Bank loans, in contrast
with bonds, are relational—the lender has a reputational interest in being
reasonable about renegotiation. The bank loan market also sweeps in riskier borrowers than does the bond market. It follows that covenant coverage
will be relatively thick. Bradley and Roberts confirm this. Substantial protection is the rule, with increasing resort over time to terms called sweeps.
With a sweep, a borrowing, asset sale, or new equity offering triggers a
duty to prepay a defined percentage of the loan. Even so, contracts lacking
in covenant protection do exist in respect of the best credits; 4% of the
contracts have none of covered the terms, 8% had only one. Remember,
though, that durations are short here.
Same issuer junk bond and bank loan contracts compared
(source: Gilson and Warner (1998))
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Now let’s go to Gilson and Warner and watch a small sample of bank
borrowers go to the junk bond market to pay down their loans. One reason
they go is to get an easier contract that strips away much of the covenant
protection—a much easier contract.
Public bond issues, 1989 and 1996
(source: Nash, Netter, and Poulsen (2003))

Now let’s switch over to the bond market and Nash, Netter, and
Poulsen’s intermediate-sized sample of bonds issued in 1989 and 1996.
Dividend and debt covenants tend to appear as a pair in junk rated issues—
providing substantial if not full protection, with the much lesser appearance of asset sale clauses signaling that a lot of asset substitution is risk
being taken. The negative pledge and sale leaseback clauses tend to appear
together in investment grade issues, with the numbers over time signaling
movement from bonds without covenants to minimally protected bonds.
The increase in the appearance of merger covenants is interesting—here,
given the innocuousness of the covenant, the puzzle is why there has not
always been something close to 100% coverage.
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Bond issues, 1989-2003
(source: Chava, Kumar, and Warga (2004) from Fixed Income
Security Database)

Dividend covenants by credit rating, 1989-2003
(source: Chava, Kumar, and Warga (2004) from Fixed Income Security Database and Lehman Bros. Bond Database)

Here’s a comparison set of data from a megasample analyzed by
Chava, Kumar, and Warga. It is basically confirmatory of the previous
numbers, but the confirmation implies a winding down of the movement
toward more protection of investment grade issues. I found two things of
interest here: First, note the above breakdown of the appearances of
dividend covenants broken down according to credit rating. It is intuitively
satisfying in the sense incidence jumps up when you cross the line to junk
and rises linearly in junk territory. But questions arise: Why do some
investment grade issuers give up the covenant? And why do some junk
issuers get away with no covenant?
Now let’s go back to the data-in-chief to note an important finding:
poison puts are now ubiquitous. This is a big change, a change that seems
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to have crept in unnoticed. I infer that the bond market has finally put its
foot down, so firmly that marketability is impaired in the covenant’s
absence. Why the change? The resurgence in going private deals seems an
obvious answer. In 1994, private equity buyouts made up 1% of public
company acquisitions; by 2003 they made up 27%.
Covenants in bank loans and issuer characteristics, 1993-2001
(source: Bradley and Roberts (2004) from Dealscan)

Now let’s look for a more complete explanation of the overall
pattern: Bradley and Roberts, above, test numbers of covenants against a
range of variables and get intuitively satisfying results. Log market cap is
a firm size proxy, and you get a nice break between big firms with zero or
one covenants and the rest of the pack. Spread gives you the interest rate,
and it goes up linearly with the number of covenants. Leverage and
maturity also go up, less satisfyingly. And tangible assets go down.
Generally, the riskier the loan, the more covenants you see. The results on
bond market data roughly track these.
This is not quite what the costly contracting hypothesis predicts.
Real-world covenants come in predictable clumps as loan risk increases,
so that the interest rate goes up rather than down with more covenants.
Low-risk borrowers don’t seem to surrender covenants in exchange for a
rock bottom rate; contrariwise, high-risk borrowers do not seem to get an
option to borrow unrestricted in exchange for a higher rate, at least from
the banks.
Meanwhile, what most interests the economists in all of this is the
underinvestment problem. I think they tend to overdo underinvestment,
my sense being that it’s an interesting analytical possibility, but that in the
real world under separation of ownership and control, management will
keep on investing up to the point the firm enters fraudulent conveyance
territory. There are in any event two competing predictions: first, growth
firms potentially hold out a downside underinvestment problem and so
should tend to be made to give up dividend covenants; and second, growth
firms will value flexibility highly and thus will resist debt covenants.
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Growth firms
(source, Nash, Netter, and Poulsen (2003))

Above are the results from Nash, Netter, and Poulsen, who divide
their sample into high and low growth segments using market to book as
a proxy. The flexibility hypothesis is confirmed; the dividend covenant
hypothesis is negated. Bradley and Roberts reach the same result, although
they try to squirm out of it, and I hope this is the end of this discussion.
Summing up, the numbers mirror the point that agency costs are the
costs of financial distress: covenants linearly follow the probability of
distress; good credits preserve their flexibility; bad credits have reduced
choices in the matter. At the same time, the market does not hold out a
complex menu of risk/return combinationsfor example, you can’t put
together a portfolio of super low-risk, high-grade issues. There are also
lots of unexplained anomalies. Why do some investment grade issuers get
away with covenant-less bonds and others not? Why do some junk issuers
escape a debt or dividend covenant? Why the slow adoption of basic
protection against mergers and sales of all assets? Costly contracting may
or may not afford answers to these questions.
PROCESS
Some think that bonds should be better protected. I certainly do. But
I’m not a bond buyer. And, given price sensitivity, there’s no way to pump
up my risk-averse reaction to the practice into a full-dress adverse
selection argument. Persistent claims of bond contract inefficiency do
appear, but they go to process rather than substance. The process problem
concerns public bonds only. It has two sides. On the borrower’s side lies
the cost of getting bondholder consents to waivers and amendments. This
has to be done by expensive proxy solicitation. The issuer has to pay for
the consents because the bondholders play uncooperatively. This adds to
issuer resistance to covenants. On the bondholder’s side, there arises the
classic collective action problem, much mitigated these days by
institutional holdings and the presence of aggressive vulture investors.
Amihud, Garbade, and Kahan suggest that bond contracts be
redrafted to invest the trustee with negotiating power over covenant
waivers and amendments on the theory that this would ameliorate both
problems. The projection is that, given such a super-trustee, the market
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would respond with stricter covenants. This is a good idea, but it’s not at
all clear how large of a zone would be opened up in which issuers trade
off lower yields for stricter covenants. Managers may value flexibility
more highly than stockholders and forego the opportunity to save the cash;
investment bankers aren’t incented to negotiate hard terms in the same way
as bankers and insurers.
The Amihud, Garbade, and Kahan paper only concerns the waiver
and amendment of covenants, avoiding the subject of amendment of
payment terms. To go further and ask about payment terms is to step into
a decades-long controversy over the drafting of debt contracts, one that
flared up in the past couple of years in the sovereign debt area. The
controversy concerns the Trust Indenture Act, which mandates unanimous
bondholder consent for amendment of payment terms even though it
permits covenant amendment by majority vote.
Unanimous consent also has been the universal practice in
unregulated debt contracts, so the debate concerns bondholder preferences
as well as the statutory mandate. Majoritarians have been arguing for
decades that majority-based amendment of payment terms would promote
cheaper out-of-bankruptcy restructurings and that the statute is a
regrettable piece of New Deal excess. As it happens, the argument to the
contrary is one of favorites, so I couldn’t resist the temptation to repeat it
here.
Unanimous consent provisions prevent amendments because bond
issuers never get unanimous consent. There are always hold outs. At the
same time, the unanimity requirement can be sidestepped through an
exchange offera public take-it-or-leave-it offer of new restructured
bonds in exchange for the old ones. Hold outs are still a problemif you
keep your old bond when everyone else exchanges theirs, you get 100
cents on the dollar from a healthier, restructured borrower, while everyone
else gets less. To contain that problem, the exchange offer sets a
supermajority minimum participation. If too many bondholders play
chicken and hold out, the offer fails and the borrower slides into
bankruptcy, making the whole situation very unstable. With direct
amendment by a majority, the whole problem is avoided and we get a
composition at lower cost.
I argue that it’s not so simple. There’s a trade-off here. According to
the economists, the more bondholders a borrower has to persuade, the
bigger the cut of the surplus it has to offer. So long as holdouts don’t kill
the deals, and I know of no evidence that they do, the supermajority floor
they necessitate benefits bondholders as a group. But I must be getting
mellow in old age, because I take the occasion in this paper to suggest that
if you extend the super-trustee device to payment modifications and back
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it up with majority bondholder ratification, and then amended the Trust
Indenture Act to allow this on an opt-in basis, you would get a useful
experiment with bondholder preferences respecting the appropriate
process for out-of-bankruptcy compositions. Given all of that, I would
predict a continuing preference for unanimous consent.
CONCLUSION
To conclude. The paper begins by suggesting that covenant practice
is worth studying as a way of evaluating positions taken in debates over
creditor protection mandates. Unfortunately, the evaluative implications
depend on the observer’s ex ante predilections. If you like contract, you
will see a remarkably stable and successful contracting institution—a
practice that has suffered only one external shock in a half century (and
even then took it in stride), along with the concomitant judicial refusal to
intervene to protect the undefended bondholder. The description yields not
a single point at which regulatory intervention clearly would improve
things—even the process problems are amenable to contractual solution if
you just repeal the Trust Indenture Act.
But an observer inclined to be suspicious about the robustness and
completeness of contractual creditor protection also will find much of
interest. Contract law’s assumption of complete contracts is clearly
descriptively inaccurate—debt contracts approach completeness only if
renegotiation is feasible; the institution of contract works really well here
only given small numbers and reputational constraints. That risks and
returns are priced out does not mean that substantive allocations are
optimal. Agency and transaction costs clearly prevent the evolution of a
superior form. Of course, none of this means that regulators should start
expanding the Trust Indenture Act.
But there is regulatory implication. When financial markets project
high agency costs, they either get contractual protection or they refuse to
lend. This implies a function for positive law in contexts less well-suited
to high-cost negotiation or to considered rejection of risky borrowers.

2019]

Collected Lectures and Talks

873

B. THE NEW BOND WORKOUTS
Penn Law Review Symposium, Bankruptcy’s New Frontiers,
October 20, 2017
Accompanying Article:
William W. Bratton & Adam Levitin, The New Bond Workouts, 167 U.
PA. L. REV. 1597 (2018)
COERCIVE AND DISTORTIONARY DEAL-MAKING IN THE ABSENCE OF
JUDICIAL POLICING
Bond workouts are famously dysfunctional. Exchange offers are the
vehicle because direct amendment of payment promises, which in theory
holds out a more user-friendly framework, is foreclosed by Trust Indenture
Act (TIA) § 316(b). Uncooperative bondholders faced with exchange
offers often hold out and attempt to free ride on concessions made by
cooperative majorities. Issuers respond in kind with coercive tactics. Exit
consents are ubiquitous. Under these, bondholders who accept exchange
offers are asked to consent on the way out to amendments that strip the
covenants from the indenture, a ploy that attaches a negative consequence
to holding out and makes the new bonds on offer more valuable relative to
the old bonds. Toward the same end, a second lien can be tacked onto the
new bond. And the coercion doesn’t stop there. The Williams Act applies
only in part to tender offers made by bond issuers. The twenty-day
minimum time rule, yes, but neither the all-holders rule nor the highestconsideration rule come with it. There follow consideration differentials,
side payments, and vote buyingcoercive devices long barred in
stockholder tender offers.
Contract law holds out little in the way of tools facilitating judicial
policing. There are a couple of reasons for this. First, the territory is
sensibly treated as arm’s length—neither bondholder holdouts nor
coercing issuers labor under a duty of good faith solicitude. Second, even
given a fact pattern that begs for policing, there’s no conceptual basis to
support intervention, because there’s no operational principle that
separates acceptable from undue coercion or self-interest. Twenty years
ago, Zohar Goshen very persuasively set out the incidents of a best
available, process context for collective decision-making by investors—a
simple majority vote with no side payment or negative ancillary
consequences for the voters. But this is an all-or-nothing theoretical
construct that offers no help in drawing lines in cases. Meanwhile, we do
have a lot of law designed to control coercion against investors, but it tends
to be rules-based federal law like the TIA and the Williams Act. In
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common law contexts, anti-coercion rules tend to presuppose a fiduciary
duty and there is no such duty owed to bondholders, and even then
common law constraints are stated in rule-like ways. The one exception is
shareholder vote buying, and even that is moving in a narrow, rule-like
direction. Judges just don’t like intervening here.
As a practical matter, then, there is no judicial policing. Yet fact
patterns begging for police presence keep on coming. In 2014, in a case
called Marblegate, the Southern District of New York intervened on one
such fact pattern, invoking a novel interpretation of Trust Indenture Act
316(b). Section 316(b) forbids unconsented impairment of the
bondholder’s right to payment, as follows: “the right of any holder . . . to
receive payment of principal . . . and . . . interest . . . shall not be impaired
or affected without the consent of such holder . . . .”
Traditionally, this was read to block unconsented amendments of
payment terms, preventing indentures subject to the TIA from including
collective action clauses or “CACs” that permit payment haircuts by
majority vote amendment. Under the traditional reading, the promise to
pay in the indenture is the “right,” and “impair” or “affect” refer only to
amendment or waiver of the promise to pay.
Under the new reading, which was quickly followed in other cases,
out-of-court restructurings that detract from a given bond’s value can
violate the section even though nothing in the bond contract is being
amended. That is, “impair” and “affect” can sweep in any unconsented
change incident to a restructuring that makes it less likely the bond will be
paid. The new reading upended assumptions of bond counsel going back
decades—so much so that lawyers from twenty-eight prominent law firms,
seeking to facilitate opinion-giving, issued a joint interpretive statement
last April.
Under Marblegate then, § 316(b) suddenly grew teeth and started
biting. In January, a Second Circuit panel reversed, two-to-one, and
reinstated the traditional reading in all particulars. Significantly, the
Second Circuit opinion looks only to the statutory interpretation question
and stays away from the fact patterns, implying no disagreement on the
question whether there’s a need for policing. As regards the interpretation
question, the Second Circuit has much the better of the argument. The
Southern District went off one phrase in the 1938 House and Senate
reports, concluding that Congress had a one-size-fits-all purpose to force
“restructuring” into bankruptcy court. The Second Circuit took a look at
the hearings and the massive SEC Report that preceded the TIA’s
enactment, and found specific backups for the traditional reading—in fact,
the drafters intended to cover only the amendment of payment terms.
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The Second Circuit’s ruling probably ends the matter, putting us back
at square one. But the flare up revives an old policy question—whether
§ 316(b) should be repealed, and if so on what terms.
THE POLICY DEBATE OVER § 316(B)
There’s a story here. Back in 1987, Mark Roe published a paper
advocating repeal, setting out what has ever since been the baseline picture
of bond workouts. In this, the TIA’s barrier to direct amendment causes
instability, for the only way to deal with exchange offer holdouts and calm
down the cooperative bondholders is to set the offer up with an ironclad
90% acceptance condition, an overly-high hurdle that dooms many good
deals from the start. A bill comes due, said Roe, in the form of unnecessary
bankruptcy costs. Meanwhile, the Depression-era concerns that motivated
the section’s enactment no longer obtained. Finally, because bondholder
self-interest and issuer coercion would create problems even in the event
of repeal, repeal should be accompanied by an aggressive regime of SEC
policing. Victor Brudney responded to Roe back in the early 1990s,
arguing that bondholder collective action problems remained salient and
contending that the opportunity costs were lower than Roe estimated—
many workouts, he said, are bad deals and deserve to fail because the
issuer is going into Chapter 11 anyway.
Significantly, both Roe and Brudney worked from the same practice
picture, a picture that has been confirmed by a collection of financial
economic studies, based, for the most part, on twentieth century data sets.
These show that one-half or less of workouts succeed, but also confirm
Brudney’s skepticism about deal quality, showing that around one-half of
the companies that close workouts go on to Chapter 11. In recent years,
the theme that workouts are too hard to do got louder when Black and Hu
started going on about empty creditors.
When we started up this project, we expected Roe’s picture to remain
more or less in place. But the more we looked at recent practice, the less
prevalent the picture became. The change started with an external shock
in 2008, when DIP financing temporarily disappeared, cutting off the path
to a quick and smooth Chapter 11 restructuring and refocusing everyone’s
attention on the out-of-court alternative. Workout activity did not drop
back to pre-crisis levels after DIP loans returned, and now accounts for
20% of restructurings today compared with 10% a decade ago. The 20%
number is impressive because a workout makes sense only for a subset of
distressed companies: a lot of companies have to go straight to 11 because
they have tax problems, or need the stay immediately, or they have large
numbers of trade creditors, or they need to disaffirm contracts, or they
need to give a super-priority lien.
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DEVELOPMENTS IN PRACTICE
We decided to take a closer look and culled data on recent workouts
from SEC filings, collecting 46 exchange offers involving haircuts,
interest reductions, and/or maturity extensions from 2010 through the
middle of 2016. The results stand in contrast with those in the existing
studies. We find, depending on how you count, that 82.6% or 87% of the
offers closed. Our bankruptcy rate, at 35%, is lower, but still underscores
Brudney’s point.
Only three of the failed deals meet the classic profile—that is,
supermajority support but ultimate failure due to an ironclad 90%
subscription threshold erected for the purpose of limiting holdouts. In fact,
90% minimum tender conditions are not even the rule anymore—they
showed up in only 40% of the cases. And, issuers waive the high
acceptance condition all the time anyway—only 40% of completed offers
met the minimum tender. Around a third didn’t even state a minimum.
Extensions of time occurred in one-half. The picture, then, is loose and
flexible and directed toward getting the deal closed.
Our findings break with those of past studies in other respects as well.
Exit consents, earlier found to be common, now are ubiquitous—they
show up in 82.6% of the deals. In the handful of deals that didn’t have
them there was either something special about the deal or the deal went on
to fail. And issuer pressure doesn’t stop there. Coercive upstream second
liens were included in 60% of the offers and early tenders got better terms
in around half.
Finally, we identified a couple of practice improvements. First, the
deals closed quickly—the average duration was .18 of a year, which looks
pretty good compared to pre-pac bankruptcy’s average duration of .34 of
a year. Second, there is tangible evidence of negotiation. 46% of the
issuers reported an antecedent support agreement with a bondholder
majority. The negotiated proportion of deals probably is higher if you
figure that negotiation can occur without resulting in a formal contract.
The take-it-or-leave it ad in the paper is gone. Now, it is true that these
restructuring support agreements between debtors and groups of creditors
have been criticized for failure to synchronize with Chapter 11 policy
goals. But in this out-of-court context said to be driven by coordination
problems, they seem more like an unalloyed plus.
So, the workout platform is much more robust. This is a big change.
We postulate a couple of explanations. First, the shift to secured creditor
control inside of Chapter 11 has changed incentives. Managers will be less
quick to file and bondholders will be less disposed to hold out and more
disposed to cooperate. Second, lawyers now rely on Rule 144A in place of
1933 Act § 3(a)(9) for a registration exemption for the new bonds. This
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makes the framework more user-friendly, facilitating the use of bankeradvisors as deal makers.
RETAIN OR REPEAL?
Add all of this up and go back to the policy case that Roe made thirty
years ago, and things look different. While § 316(b) may add some costs,
there is no cost emergency. The markets have figured out how to get
around it. And, even in the rare case where frictions due to 316(b) cause
an otherwise viable workout to fail, the added costs of Chapter 11 have
decreased considerably due to prepack bankruptcy practice and creditor
control.
That said, we have a somewhat contradictory follow-up point. Even
though § 316(b) no longer creates all that much of a problem, repeal still
makes sense. It is hard to see any positive contribution. Brudney’s concern
with bondholder collective action problems no longer resonates, and
there’s even been a strange reversal as it regards small investors. Today,
given an exchange offer exempted under 144A, non-QIB holders, which
means a bond portfolio of less than $100 million, are entirely excluded
from the process—they don’t even receive the offer.
The real question is how repeal should be accomplished—whether
as Roe suggests, with a heavy continuing SEC policing presence, or as
Marcel Kahan has suggested, an outright repeal with future process
regulation left to the drafters of trust indentures. The question is whether
indenture drafters can be relied upon to provide process rules for the new
regime. We think so, but with a caveat, placing ourselves between Roe and
Kahan.
We ground our position with an empirical survey of the terms of trust
indentures in 144A offerings. We reviewed 49 trust indentures issued in
the second quarter of 2011, before Marblegate, and 60 from the second
quarter of 2016, after the market had a chance to assimilate the decisions’
implications. We found the boilerplate doing much more work than we
had anticipated.
144A bonds make an interesting test case because they or may not be
subject to the TIA. A 144A offering can be made subject to ex post
registration rights, in which case the indenture needs to be pre-fitted for
TIA compliance. If the bond isn’t subject to registration, it is 144A for life,
and need not be drafted for TIA compatibility. Trading restrictions are
becoming less important in the 144A market, and so registration rights are
less and less in evidence—67% of our 2011s had them but only 36% of
the 2016s.
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144A Indentures, 2011 and 2016

All of the 2011s, whether or not 144A for life, contained a clause that
tracks the language of § 316(b)—which means that the non-TIA bonds
were subjected to the individual bondholder consent requirement on a
voluntary basis. All of the 2011s also contained belt and suspenders
unanimous action voting provisions, which means that if Congress
repealed 316(b) tomorrow, thereby pulling the 316(b) language from TIA
qualified bonds, nothing would change because all the bonds separately
require unanimous action. Any new regime would be entirely prospective
and, unless Congress followed Roe’s advice and made repeal contingent
on an SEC policing regime, the future would lie in the hands of the
drafters.
And, at least in the present context, the drafters like unanimous
action. The unanimous voting clauses tend to cover a wider range of
subject matter than does 316(b). In 92% of the 2011s and 88% of the
2016s, they go beyond the core payment terms to sweep in guaranties,
priority status, conversion rights, even poison puts.
There’s a pattern break with the 2016s. The number of unanimous
action indentures drops to 93%, and the number containing a clause that
repeats the language of 316(b) drops to 81%. The number containing a
clause stating that the TIA controls despite any conflicting term in the
indenture drops from 88% to 42%.
Clearly, counsel were drafting out from under Marblegate in the
144A for life subset. But only four indentures did this with a CAC. The
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rest stuck with unanimous action for core terms but evaded the broad
reading by modifying their 316(b) clauses. Instead of the statute’s openended “right to receive payment shall not be impaired without consent,”
they substituted “contractual right to sue for payment shall not be amended
without consent,” or just the “the right to bring suit for payment.” One way
or another, 23.7% of the 2016 indentures drafted out from under the
Southern District.
Finally, a surprise: 67% of the 2011s and 79% of the 2016s also
explicitly sanction voting by exit consent, a move nominally at odds with
the drafters’ preference for unanimous action. We don’t think this can be
dismissed as issuer-favorable boilerplate. Given pervasive unanimous
action clauses, the bondholders quite rationally can prefer simultaneously
to leave a door open for coercive exchange offers. And in any event,
there’s a reason for so doing unrelated to distressed restructuring; most
exchange offers are made by healthy issuers as a way of paying down bond
issues drafted without an optional prepayment right.
BOND CONTRACTING IN THE WAKE OF REPEAL
So what would happen if 316(b) were pulled today? As regards
substance, our data provide no basis for making a prediction. Maybe
investors just prefer UACs. Or maybe the voluntary UACs are a product
of path dependence due to the TIA, and investor preferences would change
in an unregulated environment. We have stark evidence of path
dependence: 62.5% of the 2011 144A-for-lifes and a decreased 18.4% of
the 2016 144A-for-lifes leave the standard clause stating that the TIA
controls even though in fact, the TIA doesn’t even apply because the
indenture isn’t qualified.
Contrariwise, there’s no sign of a pent-up demand for CACs, what
with only four 2016s indentures going the CAC route despite the
Marblegate shock. Our projection: were repeal to trigger substantial
change in the drafting pattern, the change would occur slowly.
The data do provide a basis for making a more limited prediction. To
wit, drafting treatment of process problems in restructuring can be
expected to be extensive and responsive to events without being complete.
A drafter in the wake of repeal would have a series of questions to
answer. First comes the CAC/UAC choice. Given a CAC, there would be
further questions concerning percentages and differentials across subject
matters. There also would be a critical question whether to bar exit
consents; indeed, whether to bar exchange offers altogether. Arguably,
with a 66 2/3% or 75% CAC, exchange offers no longer would serve a
legitimate purpose in workout contexts. A prohibition would foreclose a
long list of coercive possibilities. There’s also a drafting choice to be made
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about vote buying, particularly offers of consideration to less than all
bondholders. Finally, there are questions concerning bondholder conflicts.
Under the present pattern, the contracts repeat the TIA’s disqualification
of issuer and affiliate votes but go no farther. Going farther, say, to cover
empty voting, implicates contractibility problems due to limitations on
observability and verification, but there are some strategies available.
All of the questions, except those concerning CAC design, come up
in the present context. Yet the indentures address them only intermittently.
The most glaring omission concerns selective vote-buying. A lawyer has
tipped us off to a provision in circulation that prohibits it, but it didn’t
show up in our sample. The drafters also could stretch the voting ban on
issuer affiliates in 316(a) to cover other taints of self-interest.
And, as we have seen, where there is coverage, it is incomplete across
indentures. Why do two-thirds and 80% of the indentures sanction exit
consents but not all? Why do only 24% of the indentures explicitly draft
out from under Marblegate? Why are only 80% of parent guaranties
covered by a UAC? Heterogeneous preferences? Or slack? And what do
we make of the 39% of the 2016 144A-for-lifes that omit the TIA controls
clause but include the classic 316 language? Intention to be draft out from
under Marblegate, or just drafting inattention?
CAVEAT
The slack opens up possibilities for abuse. If 316(b) were repealed
and the drafters opted for across-the-board CACs without simultaneously
barring exit consents, highly coercive exchange offers along the lines of
the British Assenagon case could and we think would follow.
We worry about this, and project that repeal would work best with a
change in the background default regime applicable to process matters.
For heavy lifting against issuer coercion we would not rely on direct
application of contract good faith, which is a dead issue so far as it
concerns bond issuers. We instead would proceed by indirection, crossing
the aisle to the bondholder side and pre-1939 common law intercreditor
duties, a jurisprudence that shriveled after 1939 because its platform
disappeared when restructuring activity was diverted into bankruptcy and
the fact patterns came to be dealt with under bankruptcy law. The notion
is that an actor cannot exercise a power unilaterally to enforce or act in
collaboration with the issuer to the detriment of the value of the issue as a
wholeit amounts to a situation-specific playing out of something
resembling the corporate law majority-minority fiduciary duty. The
doctrine has been brought to bear aggressively against highly coercive exit
consents in the U.K., and could easily could pick up most of the abuses
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showing up in the recent 316(b) cases. But it would just be a default,
designed to push issuers and lawyers toward completeness.
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C. A THEORY OF PREFERRED STOCK
Penn Law Institute for Law & Economics Corporate Roundtable,
December 14, 2012
Accompanying Article:
William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A Theory of Preferred
Stock, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1815 (2013)
INTRODUCTION
This paper has three motivations. First, its time. The last major paper
on preferred qua preferred was Dick Buxbaum’s synthesis published in the
California Law Review in 1954. More recent work focuses on venture
capital, and as it has accumulated, I’ve got the sense that someone needs
to go back and look at preferred qua preferred stock because a lot of
problems assayed in the VC literature stem from the form of VC
participation.
Second, theoretical interest. This is a special case of corporate law’s
who’s in and who’s out problem. In the generally-accepted picture,
stockholders are in and the rest of the world, including employees, is out.
The excluded constituents are treated as contract counterparties and
remitted thereto for protective rights. A theoretical story supports the
division. The shareholder contract, we are told, is incomplete;
shareholders need fiduciary duties to fill the inevitable gaps. Other
corporate constituents, we are told, can negotiate into complete contracts.
I’ll spare you the rest of this familiar account.
Meanwhile, the dividing line between ins and outs is fairly clear until
you get to preferred, which is stock with contract rights tacked on. Do we
treat it as stock and under corporate law, or as a senior security under
contract law? Do we treat it as an incomplete contract filled out by
fiduciary duty or as a complete contract with the drafting burden on the
party asserting the right? No law review article has ever asked these basic
questions.
Maybe that’s because people tend to assume one or another answer.
Importantly, both assumptions are wrong. Preferred is both—it is both
corporate and contractual, neither all one nor all the other. It sits on a fault
line between two great private law paradigms and draws on both. The
overlap catches up two grundnorms and brings them into conflict: (1)
managing to the common stock, as residual interest holder, maximizes
value, and, (2) holding parties to contractual risk allocations maximizes
value. When questions arise concerning the relative rights of preferred and
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common, the norms hold out conflicting answers. Decision-makers choose
between the two. The law vacillates.
Third, the law of preferred, like a lot else in corporate law, has
become more Delaware-centric. Delaware was the venue for 12.7% of
reported preferred cases from 1940 to 1950, but since 1980 is the venue
for 60% of the cases. And this isn’t just a matter of venue. In the olden
days, treatments fragmented across the states. In Delaware, since the late
1970s, there has been a growing, self-referential body of precedent that’s
trying hard to cohere, not just within itself but within Delaware law as a
whole. The project of integrating preferred with the rest of Delaware
corporate law both inspires innovation and causes stresses and strains.
A trio of recent Delaware cases takes the integration project to new
levels of both innovation and stress, and the paper is built around them.
There’s a merger case, a case about the enforceability of a promise to
redeem, and a case where VC preferred in control engineers a sale of the
company that wipes out the common. A cross-section of topics.
The cases show two facets of Delaware law coming to bear as the
integration proceedsfirst, reliance on independent directors for dispute
resolution, and, second, the common stock value maximization norm. We
think things are going in the wrong direction as a result, making three
generalizations. First, the meaning and scope of preferred contract rights
should be determined by courts rather than by issuer boards of directors.
Second, conflicts between preferred and common should not be decided
by reference to a norm of common stock value maximization. Enterprise
value should be the referent, more particularly, maximization of the value
of the equity as a whole. Third, independent director determinations of
conflicts between preferred and common should not be accorded ordinary
business judgment review. Instead, a door should be left open for good
faith review tailored to the context—a showing of bad faith treatment of
the preferred where the integrity of a deal has been undermined, burden of
proof on the board.
MODULE 1: MERGERS
To create an absolute contractual claim against a corporation in
exchange for an infusion of $1 million of capital, all you need to do is to
get an authorized officer to take out a piece of paper and write, “The
corporation promises to pay you $1,000,000” and then sign it. There are
only two ways to make the claim go away, either get the holder to consent
to novation or declare bankruptcy. Preferred works very differently. Its
financial rights are embedded in a corporate charter and, during the
Depression, the courts decided to allow issuer boards and common
stockholders to join together and amend charters to strip preferred contract
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rights in cram-down recapitalizations, without the protection of a fairness
rule framed in absolute priority terms. This is corporate territory,
sacrifices are made for the general good, and the ordinary rules of contract
consent do not apply.
The charter amendment rights-stripping problem was later
ameliorated by statute, but in Delaware persists in mergers. Where a bond
stays in a merging company’s capital structure untouched by operation of
law, preferred can be turned into whatever and how much the negotiating
parties determine.
Accordingly, to protect itself in a merger, Delaware preferred needs
one of three things in the chartereither a class vote on a merger, a
provision deeming a merger to be a liquidation or otherwise fixing a price,
or a provision requiring the preferred to be left in place in the issuer’s
capital structure.
It’s not safe to assume that any given issue of preferred has any one
of the three. We collected recent certificates of designation from EDGAR.
These show that the drafting situation is a lot better than it used to be, but
that unprotected preferred still gets issued. The split in public offerings is
50% protected, 50% unprotected; in private placements, the protected
portion goes down to 29%.
Assume a class of preferred with a liquidation preference of $100
and a cash-out merger to a third party. We are on the downside. The
preferred’s pre-merger going concern value is $50. The merger involves
a premium for the common, which gets $25, up from $15 pre-merger.
Let’s try three possible outcomes: first, the board is nice and shares
the gain with the preferred, paying it $60; second, the board leaves the
preferred where it is and pays it $50; and third, the board takes the occasion
to transfer some wealth to the common and pays the preferred $40. Let’s
check in with the paradigmatic alternatives.
The corporate paradigm holds out scrutiny by analogy to majority to
minority fiduciary duties to common stockholders. But there are problems.
There’s no objective calculus that identifies a fair allocation, so the courts
scrutinize the process. Process scenarios vary depending on number and
degree of independent directors, so the standard of review presents a
question. And whatever the governance variables, as a process
proposition, resolution of a conflict with the preferred is more complicated
than resolution of a majority-minority common conflict as regards, say, a
parent-sub cash-out merger, because the common-preferred dispute arises
even as the issuer simultaneously negotiates with a third party. The usual
expedient of an independent director committee doesn’t solve the
problem—you’ve already got a committee that’s beholden to the common.
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So, how about a second committee to go in and negotiate for the preferred?
Require that and you could mess up the negotiation in chief.
And there’s another problem. Look at the case where the preferred
comes in and complains that $60 isn’t enough. Nothing in corporate law
blocks the claim. But then nothing in corporate law says that preferred has
a gain sharing right either, that is, a claim at more than $50. We conclude
that there shouldn’t be such a right by reference to an upside fact pattern—
where the company has done well and the value of the preferred is $100
or more. Here it gets redeemed out or, if its convertible, its left to convert,
and nobody cares if the common takes all the merger gain. It’s a senior
security and there’s a cap, just as there is with a bond.
So, fiduciary review based on an analogy to the common is messy.
Now let’s try the contract paradigm. This means modeling the
contract as complete and putting the drafting burden on the party asserting
the right, including the right to receive the pre-merger $50. Take the $40
rip off fact pattern and this leaves a bad taste. But a hands-off approach is
still plausible if you add appraisal as a possibility, which gives the
preferred a chance to get back to the $50 it started with. Unfortunately,
appraisal doesn’t hold out a complete backstop because it’s not always
available.
To get a better sense of the exploitative possibilities, all you have to
do is set up a dummy merger. It’s easy and it’s fun. There’s no third-party
acquirer. The preferred issuer drops a wholly owned subsidiary and then
merges into it. The surviving company emerges with an all common
capital structure. The preferred is converted into common at a ratio set by
the issuer. To make the deal particularly nasty, let’s do the merger only
two weeks after the preferred is originally issued for $100 and hand it $50.
If the common paid in the merger is publicly traded, the preferred have no
appraisal rights and no remedy at all without some kind of fiduciary
scrutiny.
You can still argue that the preferred could and should have drafted
to prevent this from happening, but it’s still complicated.
A preferred class vote requirement solves the problem but runs the
risk of a hold up of the common on a downside fact pattern like this one.
In our case, the preferred refuses to vote in favor of the merger unless it
gets more than $60, more particularly, anything up to the take out of $100
such that the common still votes to approve the merger. A merger as
liquidation provision creates exactly the same problem. A promise to leave
the preferred in place also can get in the way of progress—if the acquirer
is a bigger company that can get better terms, it will want to take the
preferred out. The preferred will say fine, do so, for the $100 take out price
previously agreed on.
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Leaving protective terms out, then, gives the issuer board useful
elbow room when negotiating downside mergers.
Let’s go to Chancellor Strine’s opinion in LC Master Capital Fund
v. James. Facts: Nonvoting convertible preferred, issued at $25, with
conversion value at $18 at the time of issue. It has no class vote in a
merger. The issuer’s value deteriorates and it’s looking to merge at $8 for
the common. The preferred’s conversion value is now $13. The acquirer
refuses to leave the preferred in the capital structure. An independent
director committee gets stuck between the preferred and common, all of
which is owned by hedge funds or private equity firms. No second special
committee is appointed to negotiate for the preferred. The single
committee eventually fixes the conversion value of $13 as the preferred
payout. And the preferred sue.
Delaware law holds out a cluster of applicable principles:
1. Fiduciary law may protect preferred in a merger where the
preferred is in an exposed and vulnerable position vis-à-vis the board. It is
conceivable that the duty implies formation of a special committee to
protect the preferred, but there’s no per se requirement.
2. Directors owe fiduciary duties to the preferred where the right
claimed is not a preference, but a right shared equally with the common.
Take a close look at this. It sounds good—a nice corporate/contract split—
but what does it mean? If say, in our hypothetical, where the common gets
$25, does the preferred have a claim only if it gets less than $25, which is
arguably the equity core? That’s probably not what this principle means,
but it doesn’t prove very helpful.
3. Generally it is the duty of the board, when discretionary judgment
is to be exercised, to prefer the interests of the common. Corollary: it is
conceivable that a board of directors could breach a duty to the common
by improperly favoring the preferred in making an allocation.
4. There’s a preference for preferred to seek appraisal.
5. Preferred should protect itself contractually.
There then are the tools in the doctrinal box. Scan them, and there’s
internal tension—all of the alternative but contradictory treatments are in
there. This is our theory of preferred in actionprinciples come to bear
from both paradigms. If you juxtapose them and ask for ordinary
coherence, you will be confused and disappointed. It’s a collection of
either/or’s.
The judge is left to decide whether or not to protect the preferred on
the facts. In James, Chancellor Strine chose not to do so, on the ground
that the charter provided that in the event of a merger the preferred had
right to conversion value only, the $13 that it got. We don’t read the charter
in question that way, but no matter. The message is clear enough—there’s
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a preference for contract treatment because corporate treatment implies
process overkill.
We ask whether the either/or poses too stark a choice—fairness and
overkill versus no scrutiny at all. The paper suggests that the either/or
could be patched over by displacing intrinsic fairness with good faith
scrutiny, burden of proof on the board. We not only want independent
directors to do the job here, we want them to know that there’s a possibility
of judicial second guessing. In addition, common stock value
maximization needs to be taken out of this doctrinal toolbox. It is
analytically unsuitable. Taken together with the equity core notion, it
means paying $25 in the hypothetical. In any event, the norm can be stated
more narrowly: The preferred has no right to share in merger gain.
MODULE 2: THE PROMISE TO PAY
Now to the second opinion, from Vice Chancellor Laster in SV
Investment Partners v. ThoughtWorks. The case is about preferred drafted
to work like a bond—an issue with a promise to pay, mandatory dividends,
and a set redemption date.
Strange things happen on this fact pattern. The corporate paradigm
comes to bear to make the promise to pay intrinsically conditional—
payment on the promise may not traverse the legal capital rules, may not
amount to a fraudulent conveyance, and may not otherwise impair creditor
interests. No lawyer will opine on this promise unless it is qualified by the
phrase, “out of funds legally available.” Unfortunately, exactly what that
means isn’t too clear, and the cases are old. But one point does emerge.
You don’t see a class of preferred getting a judgment and thereby
bootstrapping itself to secured creditor status. The best it gets is a court
ordered payment plan.
The preferred in ThoughtWorks is held by a venture capitalist trying
to secure a large past due redemption payment. Vice-Chancellor Laster
takes the occasion to do a top to bottom restatement of the law. “Funds
legally available” now works as follows. First, the issuer has to have the
ready cash in the drawer and no assets may be liquidated to pay off
preferred until all of the company’s debts have been paid. Second,
preferred making a claim that there is cash available has to prove that the
board is in bad faith; that the calculation of inability to pay is constructive
fraud. Restating, so long as the board has any other use for the money, it
doesn’t have to pay.
We don’t like this, but we can’t blame the Vice Chancellor for
formulating it. The old test tried to finesse the corporate/contract overlap
by asking the court to determine whether the issuer had the ability to pay
without impairing creditor interests. That’s ultimately a business

888

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 42:755

judgment, and the law-to-fact determination draws a diligent enforcing
court deep into the company’s finances, potentially on an ongoing basis.
Delaware courts don’t do that anymore, if they ever did. ThoughtWorks
avoids this by pushing the payment problem off of the overlap and deep
into corporate territory—the question isn’t whether they can pay, but
whether the board did an adequate job in justifying nonpayment; a
restatement of the old test for the modern corporate law context.
The problem is that, read literally, the restatement rubs the promise
out of the contract. So we do a thought experiment. If clarity here lies in
pushing the promise away from the overlap and into a paradigm, would
not the problem be better solved by pushing the promise onto the contract
side?
Once you do this, you see that a money judgment doesn’t mean
dismantling the going concern. The “funds legally available” test predates
the Bankruptcy Act of 1938 as well as the modern business judgment rule.
Give the preferred a judgment, and the issuer files under Chapter 11 before
the preferred levies execution. It follows that the preferred can’t bootstrap
itself to secured creditor status. And it’s entirely possible the preferred
doesn’t want the issuer in Chapter 11. In that case, either the parties
successfully negotiate a for real payment schedule, or there’s a control
transfer. Nothing messy comes to the door of the Chancery Court.
There’s also a policy reason for going in the contract
directionmandatory redemption preferred is integral to the VC business
model and in economic models of VC relationships, potential separation
of the entrepreneur from the technology is a core efficiency property.
MODULE 3: VENTURE CAPITAL, PREFERRED IN CONTROL
Now to the last topic, VC preferred in control and Chancellor
Chandler’s opinion in In re Trados, which is finding its way into the
casebooks.
Trados is a tech company with five successive rounds of VC
financing, with the VC’s designees controlling the board in tandem with
the CEO and the number 2. Liquidation value is payable to the preferred
in event of merger, and it comes to $57.9 million.
The VCs get antsy and want to liquidate their investments. They turn
down a $40 million offer for the company and bring in a new CEO to clean
the company up for sale and set up an incentive plan under which top execs
get a slice of merger proceeds. After a year, they sell the company for $60
million, of which $7.8 million goes to the execs under the incentive plan.
The preferred take the rest, less than liquidation preference, and the
common are wiped out.
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The common get by motion to dismiss on a simple theory: the merger
was approved by a majority of interested directors, therefore intrinsic
fairness applies, and the merger was unfair because there might have been
some money for the common had the preferred waited longer.
This is the Delaware integration project at work again. Here we have
a conflict of interest between a control group and a common stock
minority. Historically, such conflicts have been addressed at the
shareholder level; the question was whether the majority was self-dealing,
and self-dealing meant effecting an unequal outcome to the detriment of
the minority. If there was self-dealing, intrinsic fairness scrutiny followed.
Now, we skip that and go right into the boardroom, where we expect
independent directors to be taking care of things and base a breach of duty
on the designees’ interestedness.
We think the old approach was more difficult in application but better
tailored to the situation. But there’s a “who cares” question. Can’t the VC
in control just incur the expense of a majority independent board so that
we safely can assume that all will be well in the next case?
Unfortunately, it’s more complicated than that.
Trados applies a norm of common stock maximization as it evaluates
the board and in so doing chills advantageous deals.
Compare two hypotheticals:
1. Same as the case, except that the VC liquidation preference is
$40,000,000. There’s a $40,000,000 offer. The value of the company is a
function of the following projections:
Turnaround $60 M x .75 = 45
Disaster
$30 M x .25 = 7.5
$52.5 M = expected value of the company if
sale is delayed. Here the VC acts out the classic scenario of a senior
securityholder with an incentive impairment. It is fully paid at $40 million
and so has every incentive to sell at a sacrifice of upside value.
2. Now compare a case where the offer is $60 million and liquidation
preference is $57.9 million. Here is the value breakdown:
Higher offer $70 M x .25 = 17.5
Turn down $50 M x .75 = 37.5
$55 M = expected value given delay.
Here, in a replay of Credit Lyonnaise, a board pursuing common
stock maximization and refusing the $60 million sacrifices $5 million of
enterprise value in exchange for a chance for the common to realize
$750,000, net of the incentive payoff to the execs.
Trados creates a problem for an independent director in the second
hypothetical because it privileges common stock maximization. There
follow litigation hold-up opportunities for underwater common,
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opportunities which become more salient as the pre-VC angel investment
sector gets larger.
To ameliorate the problem, enterprise value needs to be substituted
for common stock value as the maximand.
But wait, can’t we, the VC, contract out of this in advance? Answer,
not after this opinion. Historically, where the VC wants to line up advance
common stockholder consent to a merger, the lawyer drafts a shareholders’
agreement that binds the common to vote in favor of support the VC’s
deal. It’s called a drag-along. Unfortunately, Trados denudes drag-along
rights of preclusive effectiveness when it restates what used to be a
shareholder-level problem as a director to corporation duty-of-loyalty
problem.
Now, back to the first hypothetical, the $40 million deal.
Interestingly, Doug Baird and Todd Henderson, anticipating Trados,
argued that this deal shouldn’t be actionable either, because the common
accepted the risk of it when it transferred control to the VC. They argue
that a waiver of the fiduciary claim is bound up in the VC financing, or in
our paper’s terms, that the corporate paradigm should be completely
suppressed.
Trados cuts off any such waiver by moving the matter to the director
level. Putting that to one side, we’re in sympathy with Baird and
Henderson, but are unable to go along with their per se approach. Waivers
should be express not implied, so we want to see the waiver on a piece of
paper signed by the given shareholder. If you take out the NVCA standard
drag-along form you can find a waiver buried in there. Maybe buried a
little too deeply, but I’d enjoy arguing the case.
More generally, the fact pattern calls for a considered
accommodation between the corporate and contract paradigms. Trados
shows that foursquare corporate treatment facilitates hold ups by
underwater common and destabilizes heavily negotiated transactions.
Control having been given up at arm’s length, interested director approval
should not by itself trigger intrinsic fairness review. At the same time,
absent a drag-along, it is not clear that the common in a VC-controlled
investee has bargained away its right to complain of a sacrifice of
enterprise value.
So we recommend that common stock complaints alleging such
sacrifices be entertained, but would substitute good faith for intrinsic
fairness as the standard of review, burden of proof on the board, and
there’s precedent for that in Bill Allen’s Orban v. Field opinion.
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CONCLUSION
The trio of cases makes promises to preferred harder to enforce,
fiduciary protection in situations of vulnerability harder to get, and
bargained for control rights less effective. Always plagued by ambiguity,
preferred stock emerges more problematic than ever. But then conceptual
instability is inevitable given paradigmatic overlap. You can push in one
or the other direction but in the long run, preferred stock always reverts to
the overlap. It is structurally unavoidable.
The overlap brings two grundnorms into conflict—(1) managing to
the common stock, as residual interest holder, maximizes value, and (2)
holding parties to contractual risk allocations maximizes value. Delaware
makes the former a trump, while Baird and Henderson would make the
latter a trump. We would do neither, but tend to think the balance presently
weighs too heavily in favor of the corporate norm. More generally, we find
enterprise value the more reliable maximand because it holds room to
accommodate transactional results, and by one or another doctrinal move,
would scrutinize minimally, but do so across the board.
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D. SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITIES AND SCANDALS FROM DREXEL TO
ENRON TO GOLDMAN SACHS
Roundtable, Faculty of Law, London School of Economics,
February 28, 2013
Accompanying Article:
William W. Bratton & Adam Levitin, A Transactional Genealogy of
Scandal from Milken to Enron to Goldman Sachs, 86 SO. CAL. L. REV.
783 (2013), reprinted in 56 CORPORATE PRACTICE
COMMENTATOR 251 (2014)
INTRODUCTION
This paper tells a story, a story that has for me been an exercise in
self-education in the telling. Restating, this paper has provided me an
excuse and an incentive to figure out highly technical stuff that had always
been murky to me. The paper succeeds as a story if the reader comes away
feeling that he or she now has a handle on the selfsame highly technical,
previously murky stuff. If the reader doesn’t come away with that feeling,
the paper fails, and is just an excuse to pick up some SSRN downloads
with a come-on title.
Here’s the story of this backstory. Back in 2009, I read through a
stack of books on the financial crisis. One of them was Fools Gold, by
Gillian Tett, a journalist’s account of the creation of the first “Bistro”
financing at JP Morgan in 1999. As it turned out, the book really didn’t
have much to do with the financial crisis. But I was taken with the book
because everything in it devolved on a report on the terms of a single deal
and when the book got down to explaining that deal, I just couldn’t follow
it. I read the section multiple times but still didn’t understand and came
away with the impression that the author didn’t quite understand either.
In early 2010, I heard a gripping report on National Public Radio
about an outfit called Magnetar, which was allegedly selling securitized
paper to suckers and then secretly betting short against them. Then the
Goldman Sachs Abacus securitization scandal hit the papers, with the
central character, Fabrice “Fab” Tourre, soon testifying under the lights in
a Senate committee room.
A lightbulb went on at that point. I’d seen the structure they were
talking about on NPR and in the press as it reported on Goldman
somewhere before. It was the Bistro deal described in the Tett book. I
picked up Fool’s Gold again, and was frustrated to find that I still couldn’t
quite get the hang of the deal. So I researched the Bistro structure until I
finally did. As I went about that exercise another bulb lit—the Bistro
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structure was about swapping with your own Special Purpose Entity
(SPE), and that was what Enron had done. Bistro was the parent
transaction of not only Abacus, but one set of transactions at the heart of
Enron’s collapse. The other main set of transactions implicated in Enron’s
downfall turned out to be predecessors to the bank SIVs.
A dotted pattern was emerging. I decided to fill in the dots in a paper.
After talking about it with Adam Levitin, I came away persuaded that bank
Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs) also were a part of the pattern. We
weren’t sure exactly what part was going to be, but certainly were
connections to be explored.
I wrote up the Bistro parts of the paper and sent it to Adam to fill in
the SIVs. The project grew at that point. Adam decided that he wanted to
trace the dodgy SPE transaction structures back to Michael Milken at
Drexel Burnham in the late 1980s. The written record was sketchy, so
Adam tracked leads and talked to people who were there in the day. The
final pattern that emerged is depicted below.
The Pattern
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The story became the long one that’s on the table and I’m not sure it
quite coheres. But it’s my story and I’m sticking with it.
THREE OBSERVATIONS ABOUT SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITIES
The tie that binds the variegated topics treated is the Special Purpose
Entity—the paradigm smashing shell entity that companies use to get or
keep assets and liabilities off of their balance sheets or to arbitrage
regulatory capital requirements. SPEs sprang up in practice during the
1980s, descendants of project finance structures invented during the 1960s
and 1970s. They proliferated without becoming well-understood. No one
outside of banks, big law firms and the higher rungs of the accounting
profession had any idea what they were. It took Enron to give them policy
salience. I wrote about Enron and monitored the regulatory responses
thereto and came away with the notion that some law reform had occurred
regarding SPEs. I was not, however, quite sure exactly what the reform
said or did. I would find out in 2007 when the bank SIVs became insolvent
that the problems had not really been solved. It became clear to me that
just as the system had failed so had I: sitting on my legal academic perch
I still didn’t understand how companies had been doing what they were
doing with SPEs without somebody in authority having blown the whistle
on them. It all remained opaque and confusing. What was needed was a
descriptive theory with heuristic value but no one was articulating it.
Toward the end of illuminating this dark corner of corporate finance,
we make three broad points about SPEs in this paper.
First: SPEs are the apotheosis of the nexus of contracts theory of the
firm; they are as such entities that occupy a high evolutionary plateau. This
is because they are nexuses of complete contracts that perform all the
functions of a firm. With an SPE, every function the firm performs can be
determined in ex ante documentation; there need be no troublesome
contracting gaps that require filling in ex post by reference to governance
structures or fiduciary law. Indeed, with an SPE the firm doesn’t even need
agents, just contract counterparties. It follows that SPEs are very
complicated contractual nexuses and so lack accessibility: only the most
sophisticated actors can get anywhere near them. Finally, and importantly,
from the point of view of economic theory, none of this is necessarily a
problem. Indeed, because SPEs are entirely contractual, they are
presumptively productive when viewed through an economic lens. Nor,
from this point of view, does the fact that evasion of existing regulatory
constraints figures prominently in the motivational profile of SPEs
become problematic, at least prior to 2008.
Second: SPEs create regulatory problems because people tend to look
at them as a variant on the conventional operating company and as a result
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come to misunderstand them. There are a number of basic expectations
about firms and how they work—one expects, for example, a capital
structure that has debt and equity; that the equity holders are essential
governance players on the inside of the firm; that lenders and other
contract counterparties are outside of the firm’s system of governance
rights and duties; and that salient and control relationships and affiliations
result from cross-ownership of equity securities. To understand an SPE,
you have to drop those basic assumptions and start over when you take out
the governing contracts and try to figure out who’s in, who’s out, and
who’s responsible and get a handle on the risk-return relationships effected
by the contracts. A ground-up rethinking is proceeding, but not in
academia or at the Fed or the SEC. The salient intellect is the Financial
Accounting Standards Board.
Third: SPEs are intrinsically suspicions. The suspicions arise partly
from information asymmetries—SPEs are complicated, understood only
by a handful of industry insiders. Suspicions also arise from SPEs’
motivation—they are used for regulatory arbitrage. There is also a
suspicious conflict of interest bound up in SPE transaction structures. An
SPE is brought into existence by a “sponsor” to be an arm’s length contract
counterparty with the sponsor, a contract counterparty the sponsor
meaningfully controls by designing the contracts that govern it. This
element of control is later disregarded when the entity is organized,
deployed as a holder of assets, and treated for legal purposes as a wholly
independent entity. The SPE sponsor is treated neither as a parent
company, a sibling company, a control party, nor an alter ego. It is a
denominated “sponsor” and despite the closeness of its relationship with
the entity is treated as an unrelated, arm’s length contract counterparty.
This is business law’s ultimate triumph of form over substance.
The suspicions have been fully justified in history. During the many
years in which SPEs were largely unregulated and treated as entities
separate from their sponsors, they created occasions for companies to get
away with things. Their tendency to show up in the middle of financial
scandals is not only unsurprising, it follows from their very nature.
MYTHIC ORIGINS
Now to the story.
Return with me now to those heroic days of finance capitalism, the
1980s, when Michael Milken sat at the X-shaped trading desk at the Drexel
Burnham office in Beverly Hills and built a junk bond empire. Regulations
were inhibiting the junk bond market’s growth. Legal investment laws
kept pension funds out of the market entirely and restricted the proportions
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of junk bonds permissible in savings and loan and insurance company
portfolios.
Basic Securitization

Meanwhile, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had learned how to
securitize residential mortgages. As I am sure you know, in this sort of
transaction, a bank transfers a fistful of mortgages to an SPE which it itself
creates, and causes the SPE to raise the money to buy the mortgages by
selling notes in the public credit markets. The division of SPE-issued notes
into senior and junior tranches vastly elevates the transaction form’s
utility, because tranching much lowers the cost of money to the SPE.
Tranching of SPE-issued notes began in earnest in 1986, when a Revenue
Ruling permitted the sponsor to retain a junior tranche amounting to 10%
of the notes issued.
It was a moment begging for financial innovation. Why did the debt
securities in the SPE necessarily have to be home mortgages? Couldn’t the
structure be used to move junk bonds out of the portfolios of Drexel
clients, importing added liquidity to the market?
The answer was yes, and one of Drexel’s big S&L customers,
Imperial Savings, floated the first collateralized debt obligations in 1987
and 1988, the first deal to use tranches to bootstrap the junk bonds’ credit
ratings. The senior over junior structure of the SPE’s notes resulted in an
investment grade credit rating for the senior tranche, thus avoiding
preclusive application of legal investment laws and expanding the class of
potential institutional buyers of junk bonds.

2019]

Collected Lectures and Talks

897

But the handwriting was otherwise on the wall for junk bonds by
1988. The market was softening, poised for complete collapse in mid1989.
The market’s deterioration caused problems for Milken’s biggest
client, Fred Carr and his First Executive Life Insurance Company. Under
the applicable capital rules, junk bonds required the backing of equity
capital on the right side of the balance sheet at 20% of face value. With
higher ratings, you could get the requirement reduced to 2% or 1%. Carr,
with the value of his junk portfolio sinking fast, had to scare up some new
equity capital fast, or in the alternative, find some way to get his junk
bonds from the 20% category to the 1% category.
First Executive SPEs

So here’s what he did: he set up a limited partnership, taking back
the limited partnership interests and putting a trusted stooge in as the
general partner. The LP then formed six SPEs. The SPEs took $789
million of junk bonds out of Carr’s portfolio and sent back new notes in
the same face amount. What was the point? Well, this positioned First
Executive to claim that due to the tranching, the notes coming back in the
swap are more creditworthy, lowering the applicable capital requirements.
The Imperial Savings deals had received good press. But this time
there was blowback. The California State Insurance commissioner sat on
the First Executive deal for a year and finally said no. But it turned out that
it didn’t matter, for by then first Executive was insolvent anyway.
But what a sham it had been! At no juncture in the above-depicted
transaction structure was there the slightest hint of economic substance:
create an alter ego, and swap your low-rated debt to it in exchange for
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high-rated debt, and presto, your regulatory capital burden decreases by
$100 million.
THE FULCRUM—BISTRO
Now let’s fast forward to 1997, the year JP Morgan created Bistro
and managed to succeed where Fred Carr had failedswapping with its
own SPE and getting regulatory capital relief into the bargain.
Hypothesize a big bank in 1997. It’s got a large portfolio of corporate
loans and has relationships with its corporate borrowers. Under the Basel
rules, it must support these loans with equity capital at 8% of principal
amount. That’s expensive and the bank would like to reduce the burden.
But how?
The bank is already securitizing its residential mortgages but that
won’t work here for two reasons. First, interest rates; the bank can finance
its corporate loan portfolio very cheaply with debt of its own, and its
corporate borrowers are good credits that pay low rates accordingly. So
here, there’s no cost of money advantage stemming from an SPE transfer.
Second, the powerful people in the corporate loan department warn that
the true sale will disrupt confidential relationships with the borrowers, who
will have to be notified of the transfer.
Credit Default Swap

Alternatively, the bank could enter into credit default swaps
respecting particular loans with financial counterparties. The
counterparties promise to pay the principal amount of a loan in the event
of a default, in exchange for periodic payments by the bank of what
amounts to an insurance premium. This shifts the default risk to the swap
counterparty and works better than securitization. There will be no transfer
of the loan, which remains on the bank’s balance sheet, and the borrower
needn’t be notified. And, if the bank can find another creditworthy bank
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to be the swap counterparty, the Federal Reserve will allow it to reduce
the equity capital support level from 8% to 1.6%.
But there are still some sticking points. To swap only with other
banks is to limit the set of potential counterparties. Worse, a counterparty
taking the risk of a single loan may want to due diligence the borrower,
and the bank’s confidentiality agreement will get in the way.
So, the bank wants two things. It wants to shift the risk of a whole
portfolio of loans all at once, just as it does when it securitizes mortgages,
and not go one by one. This lets it take advantage of loan portfolio
diversification. But it also wants to do so via a credit default swap that’s
open to the entire credit market, not just other banks, and get capital relief
to boot. But how?
Broad Index Secured Trust Offering (Bistro), Step 1

Why, with Bistro, a structure that combines the benefits of
securitization with those of credit default swaps through the device of
something called a “credit linked note.”
Let’s a take a loan portfolio with a principal amount of $700 million.
The bank sets up an SPE. The SPE sells $700 million of credit linked
notes. The proceeds go into the SPE, which invests the $700 million in
treasury securities. Holding the money in the SPE is okay, because this
time the SPE isn’t going to be buying the loans from the bank.
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Bistro, Step 2

But we haven’t gotten very far. At this point, the SPE can only return
to the note investors the return on treasuries minus transaction costs, and
that’s not a competitive return. So let’s add a transactionthe SPE enters
into a credit default swap with the bank, pursuant to which the SPE accepts
the default risk on the loans in exchange for a fee paid by the bank. The
premium on the CDS, added to the returns on the treasuries provides a base
for a competitive return on the SPE notes.
But, wait, what’s the point of swapping with a shell counterparty
that’s not a real credit? Think about it. It’s the same credit play that occurs
when you buy a collateralized mortgage obligation—the assets in the SPE
provide security for the obligation under the swap, and here the collateral
is rock solid treasuries. If there’s a default on a portfolio loan, the SPE
pays under the swap, drawing on the treasuries; the loss is borne by the
SPE noteholder. But that’s okay; the noteholder is taking the credit risk on
the loan portfolio.
It looks nice and neat. But now let’s go to the real world, where, back
in 1997, Morgan wants to have this arrangement cover a lot more than a
$700 million dollar loan portfolio. It wants the proceeds of $700 million
of SPE notes to cover the default risk of a portfolio of $9.7 billion of loans
to 301 borrowers, and to get the Federal Reserve to grant it equity capital
relief on the whole portfolio!
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Bistro, Step 3

That was the tricky part. Morgan will be dividing the SPE notes into
tranches and have the SPE issue $700 of junior and mezzanine notes.
These will take the first default risk on the $9.7 billion portfolio. But what
about the senior tranche—here called the “super senior” tranche?
Unfortunately, there was no way to sell the super senior notes for $9
billion, put the proceeds into treasuries, and tack on a swap so that the
resulting note payment stream would be competitive. The return on the
senior swap was just too low. So Morgan volunteered to take that tranche
itself, constructively—that is, it would retain the risk. It proposed to the
Fed it should get equity capital relief for the whole $9.7 billion portfolio
because its quants had produced a risk analysis showing that defaults over
$700 million could not possibly occur. To its credit, the Fed rejected the
pitch.
Bistro, Step 4

So Morgan turned around and entered into a credit default swap with
AIG respecting the risk on the unfunded, super senior tranche, paying AIG
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two cents per year per dollar of risk taken on residual loan portfolio. This
the Fed accepted, AIG having been triple A. Regulatory capital on the
entire $9.7 billion went down to 1.6%, allowing the Morgan bank to
leverage itself more steeply and increase its return on assets. Morgan
marketed the structure widely, continuing to use AIG to square the circle.
Thus did the banks sow seeds of financial disaster in the late 1990s and
early 2000s.
To sum up, let’s strip Bistro down to its essentials. An originator that
seeks to swap away the risk of a portfolio of securities sets up an SPE; the
SPE funds itself with borrowed money; the borrowed money supports a
swap between the SPE and the originator; and the SPE’s noteholders
assume the economic risk of a decrease in the value of the originator’s
portfolio, taking as compensation the swap premium and the proceeds of
the SPE’s collateral.
ENRON
Bistro opened up possibilities. Could the structure be adapted for
more highly levered off-balance sheet transfers? Why need the collateral
inside the SPE be Treasury securities? Should not any securities with a
positive value be fit for the job? And why does the outside investor in the
SPE have to be a buyer in the market for long-term securitized paper?
Might not another mode of financing do just as well?
Why do I ask? Well, down in Houston, Jeffrey Skilling and Andrew
Fastow were watching enviously as the banks raised their return on assets
by used securitization structures to go asset lite and thereby jack up their
return on assets.
Enron had an investment portfolio stuffed with large block holdings
of newly issued tech stocks. Enron’s income statement had reflected
unrealized gains on the portfolio as the tech bubble rose. A falling market
would do the opposite, crushing Enron’s earnings figure. Exacerbating the
problem, the stock issues were illiquid and thinly traded; hedges were
unavailable; there was no counterparty for an equity swap. This left Enron
in the position of the Morgan bank: It needed a swap counterparty for a
portfolio of illiquid assets. As the market was not bringing forth that
counterparty, Enron, like Morgan, needed to create it.
Once again, the counterparty would be an SPE.
Now, Enron already was a heavy user of SPEs. It used them as
dumping grounds for junk assets, of which it had a lot. It had run into
compliance problems. In those days, when you used an SPE creatively, it
fell into a residual accounting category within which it was thought that
3% of the value of the assets in the SPE needed to be funded with equity
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from a third party. It turned out to be hard to find third parties willing to
take the downside equity risk in levered SPEs stuffed with junk assets.
Enron, Fastow, and LJM

So Andy Fastow took a cue from Fred Carr and set up his own limited
partnership investment vehicle called LJM, modeling it along the lines of
a private equity firm. He was the managing member of the general partner.
LJM raised capital from institutional investors. One of its functions was to
take the 3% equity interest in Enron SPEs.
The Enron-LJM Swaps

We are now ready to redo Bistro. Enron, like Morgan, sets up an SPE
with which to swap the downside risk on its portfolio, here tech stocks
rather than corporate bonds. It gets outside investors—that’s what LJM is
for. But the outside investors kick in only 3% of the funding for the SPE,
and are there only to meet the accountant’s outside equity requirement.
But where was Fastow going to get the capital to cover potential
losses on the swap—the remaining 97% of the capitalization of the SPE?
Such a deal wouldn’t make sense to third-party investors and there was a
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need for speed at all events. So, he sit down at Enron HQ and had Enron
issue $1.2 billion of common stock to the SPE in exchange for $1.2 billion
of SPE notes. Arm’s length sale, or sham transaction? As with Bistro, the
SPE is financed with debt—but not from an outside source. Indeed, here
no money even crosses the table, just pieces of paper. It was more Fred
Carr than it was Morgan Bank. Further, here there was no follow-up
investment by the SPE in super safe treasuries. The SPE just sat on the
Enron stock.
It all promptly went south. Enron used the swaps to cover a $1.1
billion loss on the tech stocks, figure that amounted to 72% of its reported
net income during the period. Then Enron’s own stock started dropping,
causing the SPEs to become insolvent. Ultimately, Enron was forced to
collapse the SPEs back to its own balance sheet and restate its income,
admitting the $1.1 billion loss. Bankruptcy and scandal followed quickly.
Bistro holds out a comparative tool that helps us appreciate the
insidious nature of Enron’s transaction structure. Bistro had outside
funding in cash. Enron financed with a note for stock swap with itself,
which means the risk was never really externalized—if the SPE lost
heavily on the swaps but without exhausting the value of the Enron stock
with which it was funded, it still would have had no capital left to repay
the loan from Enron. The only scenario that avoids the write-off requires
an increase in the value of the Enron stock in the SPE by $1 for every $1
of loss covered by the swaps.
The structure would have been questionable even if the Enron stock
had gone up. Stock goes up because earnings increases are projected.
Earnings projections depend on recent earnings results. In this case, Enron
was stoking its earnings with a swap contract that derived its economic
substance from Enron stock, which in turn derived its economic substance
from positive earnings reports, reports that would not be forthcoming
absent the swap contract.
Enron in substance issued its own common stock to cover a loss on
its own income statement. This one may not do under the most basic rules
of capitalism.
STRUCTURED INVESTMENT VEHICLES
I’d like to start my discussion of structured investment vehicles with
a look at one last Enron transaction structure.
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Enron Asset SPEs

As noted above, Enron also used SPEs as off-balance sheet
junkyards, financing the sale of junk assets to the SPE with SPE debt. The
arrangements were conditional and put Enron back on the hook for the
debt if its stock price fell below stated levels. It received its final kick into
bankruptcy when those off-balance sheet obligations came due. They went
off like roman candles during its last week of life.
Meanwhile, the banks were doing something structurally similar
with SPEs called structured investment vehicles or SIVs. Now, the SIV
business model presupposed high quality assets, as opposed to the junk
assets involved in the Enron SPEs. The bank SIVs invested in top-rated
debt paper that would support the lowest possible borrowing cost when the
SIV went into the credit markets for financing. Even so, the SIVs ended
up in the same place as did the Enron entities.
Bank SIVs
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The SIVs borrowed partly in the commercial paper market and partly
with medium term secured notes. There also was a junior tranche, 10% or
so of the capital came through subordinated notes. And there was a
nominal equity tranche, fobbed off into a charitable trust. The play was
durationalthe debt securities in the SIV were all long term; the mediumterm notes and commercial paper used to finance them had lower rates
because the maturities were shorter; a spread opened up.
The first SIVs had 100% liquidity backing from their bank
sponsorsliterally a promise to take out the third-party lenders if the SIV
couldn’t refinance its short-term obligations. But over time, the market
stopped requiring 100% coverage and the explicit liquidity put shrank
back to less than 10% of the asset base. Even so, it was widely understood
that the banks backed their SIVs. This was the so-called “implicit
guarantee.”
Let’s step back and see if this adds up for the bank: you take topclass assets off your balance sheet; you finance for a durational spread;
and you make guarantees, explicit and explicit. Question: isn’t the bank
losing the value of the spread to the charitable trust that has taken the
equity sliver?
Of course not. Nothing ever reaches the charity. The bank siphons
off the spread in two ways: first, the SIV has an asset manager, and that
just happens to be the bank, under a performance-based advisory contract;
second, the bank takes half of the subordinated notes that make up 10% of
the SIV’s financing. Interest on the notes is performance sensitive also.
The bigger the spread, the bigger the yield on these contracts.
Interestingly, the FASB had amended the accounting rules to make
sure Enron never happened again. Under the new rules, the bank could
conceivably be required to consolidate an SPE on the basis of sponsorship,
debt investment, and/or contingent guarantees on the ground that the bank
bore the entity’s downside financial risk. The new rules were drafted in
accord with contemporary fashion to be principles as opposed to rules
based. The banks gamed them nonetheless and succeeded in keeping the
SIVs off-balance sheet.
The SIVs eventually played the role of canary in the coal mine for
the financial crisis. They went down in 2007 as a result of market jitters
over mortgage-backed debt securities. It was a classic death spiral with
short-term lenders refusing to roll over their paper and the SIVs dumping
assets to generate liquidity, thereby driving down the values of their own
portfolios.
The bank sponsors bailed out the SIVs (and their lenders) doing
exactly what Enron had done with the LJM SPEs. The banks yanked SIV
assets and liabilities back onto their own balance sheets. They thereby
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further softened themselves up for the blows of 2008. And the banks did
this despite the fact that any guarantees were implicit only.
We describe this as the scandal that wasn’t but should have been,
because, well, it was a disgrace. If the assets were coming back onto the
banks’ balance sheets at the first sign of a downdraft, the SIVs should have
been consolidated with the balance sheets all along. If the SIVs really had
been independent entities, their creditors should have been stiffed. It
should have been one or the other, but not what happened.
Why then was there no scandal, or at least an immediate regulatory
push-back? Sometimes gaming the rules works exactly as intended, so the
banks were in formal compliance. Meanwhile, the bank regulators were
putting out other fires as 2007 closed and the disaster of 2008 loomed ever
larger. The boats were rocking and the regulators were disinclined further
to rock them any further.
There nonetheless are multiple parallels to Enron. Surrounding your
balance sheet with SPE land mines set to go off due to contingent
guarantees? Check. Excess risks run on the assumption that as asset that’s
good today is good forever? Check. Transfer of nonperforming assets to
one’s own balance sheet to enhance information asymmetries and
reputation simultaneously? Check. The FASB reacting by redrafting and
creating new rules designed to make sure this never happened again?
Check. Happily, this time the FASB redraft was materially more
successful. Now consolidation can follow by virtue of the fact that you are
drawing off the profits through an advisory contract, and risk-return
analyses have to be updated periodically.
GOLDMAN SACHS
Let’s go back to Bistro one more time. Morgan there used a credit
derivative to hedge the risk of a portfolio of debt securities. Credit
derivatives also can be used to speculate. With speculative usage, the
counterparty doesn’t own the reference security and uses the swap to make
a naked bet against it. If the asset defaults, the speculator gets a windfall
payment under the swap.
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Synthetic Securitization

The Bistro structure was quickly adapted to such betting. There’s a
key, counterintuitive fact in the Bistro pattern: nothing requires the party
in the position of the sponsor bank actually to own a loan portfolio and use
the structure to hedge it. The deal can be set up by reference to a
hypothetical portfolioanything the parties want so long as the securities
are out there in the real world and their performance can be tracked. You
just have your analyst construct it. That done, the table is open for bets on
how the portfolio is going to do. The party in the position of Morgan isn’t
hedging an asset it owns but pulling parties making bets as to whether
assets other people hold will or will not default. Thus situated as an
investment bank “sponsor,” it that may or may not have exposures in
connection with the transaction.
Recall also that in Bistro, there was nobody to take the super senior.
Same here. It’s just easier now to elide that problem. Since there’s no real
portfolio—just bets on a hypothetical portfolio—and no one is looking to
fulfill the economic function of a complete hedge, you don’t need to have
a senior tranche or senior protection seller. It even turns out that nothing
requires the buyers of the notes fully to fund the SPE; just have them back
up the SPE as swap counterparty to the extent positions have been taken
and have the quants work out the math. A tranche exists only to the extent
there’s a party who is willing to place a bet. If there’s no one there to place
the bet, the tranche is a ghost that exists only in the math. After 1999, most
Bistro deals, by then termed “synthetic securitizations,” were done this
way.
As such, they facilitated risk-taking in debt securities backed by
residential real estate mortgages and gave us a leg up disaster. How?
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Actual securitization means transferring debt obligations owned by one or
more parties into an SPE and using the proceeds of debt securities issued
by the SPE to fund the transfer. When it’s bets on a hypothetical portfolio,
you can package the structure more quickly and cheaply and can tailor
notes and swaps to the demands of particular customers. When demand
for CDOs is high, as it was from 2004 to 2007, this is the quickest way to
get a deal done. And close them they did, magnifying the total amount of
risk run on subprime mortgages. If there had to be a scandal about
synthetic securitization, that’s what it should have been about.
ABACUS 2007 AC-1

Instead, we got Goldman Sachs and Abacus, which was one of many
such synthetic financings. Like Abacus, many of them ended up in
default—actual and synthetic CDOs were the riskiest debt securities
issued during the real estate securitization boom.
In a synthetic securitization, the sponsor is the focal point actor
playing its more particular role as a swap dealer. There are two parties to
be brought together at the swap desk. First, there must be a party who
wants to take a short position on the so-called “reference portfolio.” Here
that’s John Paulson, one of the Big Shorts, looking to short two billion
worth of collateralized mortgage obligations. On the other side, you need
parties who want to take the credit risk on the portfolio. By the time
Abacus was done, the list of clients wanting to go long on these structures
was shrinking fast.
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But wait, who decides what goes into that hypothetical portfolio? In
the Abacus deal, Goldman advertised that an outfit called ACA
Management would be the “independent portfolio selection agent.” But
Paulson—who was betting against the portfolio, also had a hand in the
process. From here later would spring the fraud case, after all of the long
securities in the structure had gone into default.
In the newspapers, the alleged fraud lay in the fact that Goldman
failed to disclose that fact to the note buyers; and that’s one of the SEC’s
allegations. But there were only two note buyers in the deal, one of which
was ACA, which in fact knew about the Paulson inputs. The real fraud lay
in Fabrice “Fab” Tourre’s statement to ACA that Paulson would be taking
the junior equity tranche of SPE notes—a position that amounted to a long
bet. In fact, Paulson (a Big Short) was doing no such thing. And thus was
ACA lulled into thinking that Paulson was even longer on the portfolio
than it was so that it shouldn’t worry about its portfolio selection inputs.
(We still have trouble imagining how ACA could have closed this deal
under a misapprehension as to Paulson’s role).
Strong case or weak case, this looks to us like a perfectly ordinary
fraud case, and not even an interesting one. So why all the brouhaha, at
least apart from the fact that the alleged fraudster was a Goldman
employee?
The SEC’s enforcement action is seen as a part of a general move to
impose customer fiduciary duties on broker-dealers. Goldman defends by
claiming that it’s just acting here as a swap dealer, bringing together
sophisticated shorts and longs together at arm’s length. If this is a question
about the imposition of fiduciary duty and the answer is yes, then
Goldman’s defense is countered. But we wonder whether the fiduciary
glove fits, and find much less in the fraud case than meets the eye.
Not that we think Goldman shouldn’t take responsibility. We just
think outside of the box and view Goldman on this fact pattern as a
securities issuer rather than as a swap dealer—we think it should stand in
for the issuing SPE as a “firm.” Our reason: when an SPE issues a security,
there literally are no issuer agents, just a bunch of contracts. With
conventional securities issuance, there is whole firm there to take
responsibility for the paper—it’s not just a portfolio of assets, there are
actors. We have no trouble merging the sponsor into the issuing firm to
yield an amalgam of issuer and underwriter bearing responsibility for the
structure. The fiduciary theory of the case is a move in the same direction,
a move that stretches existing relational law to a potentially inappropriate
place. A bolder approach makes more sense: when there is no there there,
it makes sense to put the promoter into the missing issuer’s shoes.
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VI. ACCOUNTING AND THE LAW
A. RULES, PRINCIPLES AND THE CRISIS IN US ACCOUNTING
Conference, After Enron, Tilburg University Faculty of Law,
March 28, 2004
Accompanying Article:
William W. Bratton, Rules, Principles, and the Accounting Crisis in the
United States, 5 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 7 (2004)
INTRODUCTION
The US corporate governance crisis has disrupted many settled views
and expectations. Such disruption often results in denial. The denial can
be persistent, and distort the articulation of regulatory responses.
Accounting reform presents an excellent example of this.
When Enron fell, the accounting profession, led by Arthur
Andersen’s Joe Berardino, blamed the standard setters, the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the SEC. Enron, said Berardino,
had only followed the rules. If its financials had been unfairly stated, then
the rules needed to be changed. Practitioners needed more specific
guidance on treatments for controversial transactions.
Similar defensive-aggressive arguments had worked well for the
accounting profession on many past occasions. But this time, the strategy
blew up in profession’s face. The counter-response came first from the
SEC Chairman, Harvey Pitt, and thereafter from just about everybody else.
The problem, they said, was that there was too much guidance. Generally
accepted accounting principles, or GAAP, had evolved into an exhaustive
system of check the box rules. The rules had fostered a culture of
regulatory arbitrage in which it paid to invest in gaming the system to get
transactions and treatments that, while technically in compliance with the
rules, evaded the spirit of the regulation. US accounting needed to look to
Europe and transform itself into a principles-based system.
Since then, principles-based accounting has become a focal point in
the US governance and reporting reform movement. The Sarbanes Oxley
Act ordered the SEC to study its feasibility and the SEC responded with a
report ordering FASB to get with the principles-based program as soon as
possible. FASB, ever the compliant standard setter, has signaled that it will
do so, just as soon as it gets a chance.
I have been watching this discourse with growing alarm and dismay.
This is not because I have anything against reference to Europe for
regulatory guidance. Quite the contrary. And this is certainly not because
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I have anything against principles-based regulation. I was schooled by a
generation schooled in turn by Karl Lewellyn and other legal realists, and
I still subscribe to their point that a principles-based approach offers the
distinct advantages of factual responsiveness and flexibility as to outcome.
My dismay stems from the view that principles-based regulation works
well only in incentive-compatible institutional frameworks.
Unfortunately, the US accounting and auditing environment is not yet
incentive compatible and the cleanup process has a long way to go before
it will be.
Meanwhile, I suspect that much of the motive force behind the
juggernaut for principles in US accounting stems from denial. Joe
Berardino and Harvey Pitt’s different arguments followed from common
presuppositions. First, both assumed that the form the regulations take
matters more than the incentives of the actors applying them; second, both
assumed that the standard setter was at fault; and third, both assumed that
the gravamen of the corporate reporting problem lay with rules-compliant
but unfairly stated financial reports. These assumptions neatly shifted the
blame from both the managers choosing accounting treatments, the
auditors approving their choices, and the federal agency overseeing both,
and deflected attention from the seriousness of the incentive problem.
Today’s paper attempts to knock some sense into the discussion. It
raises eight objections to movement to principles-based accounting in the
US at this time.
FIRST OBJECTION
US generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) are not rulesbased.
It is true that effective accounting standards need a basis in
principles. It just so happens that US GAAP is a system that provides just
such a basis. Indeed, unlike any other system of business law with which
I am familiar, it makes its own metatheoretical statement—FASB’s
Concepts Statements. These set out the first principles from which all of
GAAP’s further instructions are derived. The system is thus explicitly
principles-based, even as it contains many elaborate rules, each replete
with bright-line tests and multiple exceptions importing internal
inconsistencies. With this mix of principles and rules, GAAP resembles
not only the UK accounting system and International Accounting
Standards, but every other system of business regulation with which I am
familiar. I will concede, without having conducted a serious study of the
matter, that GAAP contains more rules than either IAS or UK accounting
principles.
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SECOND OBJECTION
America’s accounting scandals, for the most part, do not stem from
manipulation of rules-based GAAP.
GAAP’s critics point their fingers at the rules on derivatives and
hedging, leasing, real estate transfers, equity compensation, consolidation
and off balance sheet treatment of related entity assets and transactions,
and pre-2002 M&A. And, to be sure, there’s nothing pretty about these
labyrinthine bodies of rules.
But what do they have to do with the reporting crisis? At the eye of
that storm, we find the 10% of US reporting companies that have been
forced to restate past financials in recent years due to GAAP violations.
54% of these restatements concern misapplication of the standards on
revenue and expense recognition, which is for the most part principlesbased territory within GAAP. Earnings padding at WorldCom is the most
famous example: over three years, WorldCom shifted $8 billion of line
costs over to asset accounts and thereby kept the sum from being deducted
as expenses on its income statements. This capitalization of what should
have been expensed resulted from a bad faith application of a principle.
Most remaining restatements, although certainly not all, also implicate
principles-based GAAP treatmentsstuff like loan write-offs, asset
impairment, and inventory valuation. These are matters that require
preparers to exercise judgments, and the preparers made their judgments
in bad faith.
This stands to reason. GAAP abandons principles and opts for
labyrinthine rules in order to provide roadmaps to compliance and to make
noncompliance easier to detect. The main problem with these rules is not
noncompliance but compliance. The rules tend to lead to reporting results
that suit the preferences of complying managers. The critics dislike such
compliant reporting treatments. And, where unfair financial statements are
the result, the criticism is completely justified. The problem is well-known
and antedates the scandalsthat’s why Pitt was so quick to take up the
cudgel for principles after Enron. He was mouthing a standard criticism.
THIRD OBJECTION
Enron violated GAAP, even as it manipulated rules-based standards.
The critics ascribe the gaming of rules-based treatments a causal rule
in the Enron disaster. And it is true that misleading accounting of
transactions between Enron and off-balance sheet entities lies at the
scandal’s core, and that the applicable GAAP is rules-based. It’s also true
that dissatisfaction with these rules’ effects was widespread before
Enronin fact, FASB had been trying to move along a principles-based
reform initiative for twenty years only to be stymied by industry
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opposition. It’s also true that Enron aggressively gamed rules-based
GAAP, paying substantial sums to lawyers and accountants who devised
elaborate, nominally compliant transaction structures that exploited the
rules’ structural weaknesses and encased sham transactions.
The problem with the story is that even as Enron aggressively gamed
the rules, trying to remain compliant even as it padded its earnings, when
it really needed a result it violated any rules and principles that got in its
way. The famous LJM structures may have complied with the rules at
inception, although I would argue that they did not. But the outcome of
that discussion doesn’t matter—the transaction structure had intrinsic
flaws and quickly went out of compliance. Had Enron followed the rules,
it would have had to consolidate the LJM entities’ SPEs and would not
have been able to cover $1 billion of income statement losses with sham
swaps. The means to the bad end at Enron was old fashioned concealment
rather than high tech regulatory arbitrage.
Other standards were ignored from the get go. For example, GAAP’s
related party transactions rules required footnote disclosure adequate to
describe the LJM transactions and show their impact on earnings, even
assuming appropriate off-balance sheet status. Had the transactions’
dubious substance been put on the table for inspection and criticism, things
might have unfolded differently.
The same goes for Enron’s $7 billion of hidden SPE and equity
affiliate guarantees, the triggering and revelation of which earned the
company its ticket to Chapter 11. Under GAAP’s standard on guarantees,
there should have been footnote disclosure as to the obligations’ nature
and amount.
The central problem, then, lay with the corruption of the actors
applying the rules, rather than with the rules themselves.
FOURTH OBJECTION
GAAP tends toward rules because reporting companies and their
auditors demand and procure rules from a responsive standard-setter and
nothing in present reforms promises to free FASB from its subordinated
political position.
FASB operates at close proximity to the profession it regulates. Its
members are selected by an independent not-for-profit corporation, under
a process regime apparently designed to prevent capture by the industry.
More specifically, FASB has seven seats. Accountants may fill no more
than three of them. The remaining four seats go to two corporate
executives, one financial analyst, and one academic. This is supposed to
prevent the audit industry from dictating to preparers and users. But it does
not prevent influence, assuming a community of interest between the
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preparers and their auditors. The result is that, even as FASB has
performed with admirable independence in recent years, pushing for
reforms on topics like derivatives, stock options, and merger accounting
in the teeth of corporate and audit firm opposition, it is, on a day-to-day
level, highly responsive to requests from audit firms and preparers. They
with regularity ask for scope exceptionsrules that exclude stated
transactions from treatment regimesand treatment exceptionsspecific
rules that take whole industries out of treatment regimes governed by
general principles. Once they get these, audit firms and preparers follow
up by asking for detailed instructions regarding implementation. FASB
hears them sympathetically because it understands the pressures under
which they operate and believes guidance to be a good thing. As a result,
GAAP more and more has been articulated as rules.
In one sense this presents a paradigm of responsive regulation. But
in another sense, it is a classic case of regulatory capture, indeed, a case
worse than usual. GAAP rules result from internal conversations between
the profession and the firms it regulates. Asymmetries of information and
methodological wherewithal retard outside monitoring in the public
interest. You have to be a member of the guild in the first place even to
know what’s going on. And, this is a guild that displays notable solidarity
when it comes to public discussion of the merits of GAAP treatments and,
even more so, discussion of audit practice. Given public conflict, the
accountants close ranks and keep quiet, which is not surprising given a
universe of only four to eight firms with the resources to audit public
companies, all sharing a common fear of litigation.
The legal profession, with all its faults, behaves very differently. For
every lawyer who closes ranks with a corporate client, there’s another
lawyer looking to bring suit against that client. When a corporation’s
lawyer goes to Capitol Hill to get the client protective legislation, the trial
lawyers already are there, working the other side. When accountants play
an advocacy role for their clients, as now happens routinely, no faction
within their profession has a financial stake in an adversary position. The
entire burden of critique and correction falls on FASB, the SEC accounting
office, a handful of academics, and now, the PCAOB.
FIFTH OBJECTION
Audit firms demand rules because they are disempowered as
professionals; nothing in present reform necessarily alters auditor-client
relationships so as to cause the demands to cease.
When an auditor objects to a treatment, its inconvenienced client is
likely to respond by saying: Show me where it says I can’t do this. With
principles-based standards, the auditor then has to say that the client’s
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treatment traverses the spirit of the regulation, at least in the auditor’s
professional judgment. Auditors hate being put in this position. Making
such negative judgments disrupts their client relations. Better to have a
rule to which to point and shift the blame for the naysaying to the standard
setter. There results a high demand for rules.
Fear of litigation aggravates this. Principles heighten the possibility
of second-guessing ex postthe auditor who has passed on a principlesbased treatment that later is held to be noncompliant has to verify the good
faith judgment that motivated its earlier, erroneous determination. That
defensive case turns on uncontrollable inferences from complex facts.
Check-the-box rules make the ex post defense much easier.
The economics of auditing also fuel the demand for rules. The audit
process starts with an appraisal of the risk of compliance failure at the
client. The risk appraisal determines the scope of testing conducted during
the audit. The greater the risk, the wider the scope of testing, and the higher
the fee. Where the financials follow from the client’s fact-sensitive
applications of principles, the audit is more likely to involve timeconsuming hassles, and the cost of these is hard to predict. Check-the-box
verifiability gets the job done more quickly and predictably. This eases the
pricing process. To the extent the firms compete on priceand some
assert that they dorules are doubly desirable.
So strong is the US auditing profession’s desire for check-the-box
rules that it invents them where they don’t exist. Consider the famous 3%
outside equity rule that Enron exploited in setting up the LJM SPEs. It
turned out this wasn’t a FASB rule, or even a rule. It came from a 1991
SEC opinion concerning the treatment of a lease. That opinion clearly
stated that the 3% result followed from the facts of the case—that is, that
a principle, not a rule, was implicated. The SEC, in subsequent statements
to the profession, repeated the point—the amount of outside equity
necessary to support off-balance sheet treatment for an SPE depended on
all the circumstances. But the profession paid no attention, applying the
opinion as a bright-line rule, and not just at Andersen. The materiality
principle is applied the same waythe SEC says noncompliance can be
deemed immaterial only in all the circumstances; the profession uses a
bright-line 5% test.
In thus demanding rules that ease stress on their professional
relationships, accountants only mimic the behavior of US legal
professionals. Before saying no to a client, corporate lawyers also like the
backing of a precise instruction, always instructing their associates to find
a case on all fours to denude their negative responses to clients of any
suggestion that the naysaying stems from the lawyer’s judgment rather
than the terms of the law. Demand for rules is registered across business
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law, as lawyers repudiate the legal realists’ assertion that fact-specific
adjudication under principles makes law more responsive. Just compare
the Revised Uniform Partnership Act with the old Uniform Partnership
Act. Or track the evolution of the Uniform Commercial Code and the
caselaw thereunder for the last two decades. There are, of course, many
reasons for this development. I can also cite decreasing confidence in
judicial decision-making and a negative reaction to the expanding scope
of jury control over mixed law and fact questions. There is also the
debatable notion that specific ex-ante instructions import a certainty that
enhances economic welfare.
Whatever the complex of motives, the result is clear: US drafters will
continue to generate rulebooks until the demand creases.
SIXTH OBJECTION
Rules hold out benefits.
Cost savings is one. GAAP covers homogenous, recurrent situations
where actors need ex-ante instructions and have incentives to invest in
compliance. On this analysis, an across the board shift to principles only
makes sense if the cost of constant rules-revision to keep up with
unintended applications due to regulatory arbitrage outweighs the benefits
of advance specification. That seems unlikely.
Transparency is another benefit. Precise instructions narrow the
room for differences of judgment and thereby make it easier to see what
companies are doing, even as they may distort the aggregate story told by
the report’s bottom line. Rules also ease verification because they import
a common basis of assumption and knowledge. They thereby make it more
likely that the auditor discovers a noncompliant treatment, even as they
put the auditor in a position to say no to the noncompliance once
discovered. Since a rule also facilitates ex post scrutiny, it aggravates
litigation risk, further strengthening the auditor’s resolve.
SEVENTH OBJECTION
Lack of transparency makes financial reporting a subject matter
unsuited to principles-based regulation.
Principles hold out benefits too. There is no such thing as a complete
set of rules that anticipates all future contingencies. Principles allow
unanticipated, company-specific information to be brought to bear in the
law to fact application, importing flexibility, and, in theory, superior
regulatory results.
But there’s a problem. To see it, return to the legal realists’ case for
principles over rules in private law. The case presupposed that law-to-fact
applications would be explained in judicial opinions. The idea was that the
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reported cases would accumulate in number and give the practitioner an
expanding body of fact-sensitive instructions, offering more and more
certainty about the principle’s meaning over time even as flexibility was
maintained. There is much to be said for this, at least so long as litigation,
or alternatively, published agency guidance, is not prohibitively
expensive.
Decision-making about financial reports doesn’t necessarily work
this way. Even assuming a long set of footnotes, many of the decisions
that result in the reported treatments become merged with the bottom-line
numbers, subsumed in a black box. And such decisions are not made by
state-empowered adjudicators. They are made by the regulated actors
themselves, the preparers, with the auditor standing in for the judge. This
is a flawed substitution, given the auditor’s much diminished power to say
no and financial incentive to say yes.
This gets me to my last objection.
EIGHTH OBJECTION
Successful principles-based regulation presupposes unbiased
exercises of professional judgment.
Let’s go back to the recent spate of reporting failures and
restatements, whether these implicate principles or rules-based GAAP,
and assuming no negligence or other adverse selection problem, the
failures imply opportunism and misaligned incentives. Preparers have
been guided by short-term solicitude for their stock prices rather than
fidelity to accounting principles, and auditors have not been motivated to
stop them. Proponents of principles believe that substituting principles for
rules solves the problems. The belief is unfounded.
Sir David Tweedie, in his lectures to the Americans, has stressed that
a move to principles means heightened reliance on law-to-fact
determinations by regulated actors. The SEC’s Sarbanes Oxley report
makes for an interesting comparison. The agency parts company with
Tweedie and steps back from pure principles, whether out of solicitude for
the audit profession or fear of perverse effects. It describes a middle way
in which the standard setter backs its principles with extensive
implementation guidance. In the SEC’s principles-based regime, all scope
and treatment exceptions disappear, restoring comparability across
companies, even as everybody gets precise instructions and no one relies
on professional judgment.
But how does a regulatory regime articulate precise instructions and
at the same time avoid ever conceding exceptions to its categories? Linedrawing is exactly what caselaw under principles is supposed to do.
However attractive the SEC’s vision of a regime of standards all meshing
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like part of well-running machine, I suspect that it is unlikely to be realized
in practice.
It follows that Tweedie is rightprinciples-based accounting relies
on the judgments of preparers and auditors. Preparer and auditor incentives
accordingly matter critically. In the US, it is the job of the PCAOB to
realign these incentives. And maybe PCAOB will succeed at this. If it
does, principles could become relatively superior to rules. But until it does,
if it ever does, US GAAP needs all the rules it can get and the principlesbased cure could be worse than the disease.
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B. SHAREHOLDER VALUE, FINANCIAL CONSERVATISM, AND
AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
Harvard Business School Faculty Workshop, April 1, 2003
Accompanying Article:
William W. Bratton, Shareholder Value and Auditor Independence,
53 DUKE L.J. 439 (2003)
INTRODUCTION
One thing corporate law professors do these days is write papers that
start at Enron and goes through to Sarbanes Oxley and then goes back to
the late 1990s stock market and maybe even earlier than that, and then give
the author’s take on what it all means. This one is mine.
It is a reflection on a stock market momentspecifically the drop of
January 29, 2002, the day the market finally woke up to Enron’s
implications for the quality of the numbers on corporate bottom lines more
generally. It is also a reflection on a conversation I had that same week,
with a fellow teacher of the Accounting for Lawyers course, who reminded
me of Arthur Levitt’s famous point that auditors need to remember that
the firm’s managers are not their clients; the audit clients are the
shareholders. He and I agreed that Levitt had called it right and that the
solution to the crisis of confidence in audits lay in fidelity to the
shareholder interest.
Now, at that very time I was asserting in a paper then circulating that
Enron’s collapse followed from its managers’ very adherence to the
shareholder value maximization norm. The present paper reflects one
question put to me the first time I gave a paper I wrote about Enron: How
could I plausibly blame Enron on shareholder value maximization when
the sham transactions engineered by its managers had in fact destroyed
shareholder value? My questioner had a point. I answered that I was not
taking on the norm at a theoretical level, where I had no quarrel, but was
addressing the world of practice, where the norm’s cheerleaders had to
confront a real world, behavioral reproach bound up in Enron. Its
managers had internalized the norm and invoked its name even as they
brought down their own company. So the norm needed a more careful
articulation at the very least.
This paper is my attempt to do a better job of answering that question.
My meditation on shareholder value causes me to part company with
Arthur Levitt. I no longer think that you adequately can confront the
auditor responsibility problem by making the auditor the fiduciary to a
shareholder beneficiary. You have to go a step farther and ask about the

2019]

Collected Lectures and Talks

921

operative model of the shareholder and tell a more particular story about
the shareholder interest.
Unfortunately, the moment you start unpacking the notion of the
shareholder, the incentive picture gets complicated. So complicated that I
am sticking my neck out to say that an auditor’s professional responsibility
can and maybe should be conceived without direct reference to the
shareholders’ interest.
MODELING THE SHAREHOLDER
If you could verify the value of a share on any given day, finance
would be a world of technologies and technocrats. But since you can’t
verify even as all shareholders stake substantial amounts, there is much
room for behavioral variation and diversity of approach amongst
shareholders. And so the world of finance is every bit as much a world of
politics and politicians as it is a world of technologies and technocrats.
Instead of a unitary shareholder, you get a series of binary
alternatives:
Left Side
Speculation
Short term
Noise trading
Dumb money

Right Side
Investment
Long term
Fundamental value-investment
Smart money

You can draw from either column in modeling the shareholder
beneficiary. But draw too many characteristics from both columns at once
and you will not get unitary model from which to deduce governance
instructions.
The columns’ left-right organization shadows the left-right split of
public politics. I’ve got a label for the right side—“financial
conservatism.” And, in the interest of full disclosure I should tell you I am
a true-blue financial conservative, in my scholarship, my teaching, and the
conduct of my personal affairs. Unfortunately, I don’t have an omnibus
label for the left side.
The first binary, speculation versus investment, comes from Graham
and Dodd’s Security Analysis. On the left side are those who play the
market looking for quick upsides. On the right side are those who do their
homework and look for stable, competitive, well-run companies and
patiently invest in the cash flows those companies produce. In the Graham
and Dodd picture, the market price is not necessarily the best available
shot at the fundamental value on offer. And given a market full of
speculators, it certainly won’t be.
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Next to the short-term versus the long-term. People use this
distinction today as an omnibus left-right binary that avoids the pejorative
implications of Graham and Dodd’s label for the left side. If management
is supposed to maximize present shareholder value, then a short-term time
horizon can’t be bad. We only get into problems if the short-term
shareholder interest registers demands that constrain and impair
investment policy, as with the leveraged restructurings of the 1980s, or
otherwise leads management to take ill-advised steps that backfire and
depress firm value, as with today’s insecurity respecting financial reports.
Next comes the noise trading versus fundamental value distinction
drawn in the branch of financial economics that allows itself to be
influenced by behavioral psychology. Noise traders trade on information
generated in the market. They chase trends. They have marked behavioral
biases. When that stock price is trending up, they react too favorably to
good news. Once a down trend has asserted itself, they react too
unfavorably to bad news. And, at the moment when the trend turns, they
can be a little slow to read the handwriting on the wall. And so on.
Fundamental value investors invest in hard cash flows. A longerterm perspective is implied, as is a set of information looking only at facts
respecting the investee and the economy, rather than the latest word from
the Street. The trends and the noise do not impress them.
Finally, to a related binary: dumb money versus smart money. The
dumb money is congruent with the noise trader, but could also include a
patient fundamental value investor who still has a lot to learn and who,
say, does something really stupid like investing based on the
recommendation of a stockbroker. The smart money includes a lot of
fundamental value investors, but I have a capacious notion that includes
other actors as well. Some smart money watches the noise traders and
invests on market information. When the noise goes on an upside tear,
bidding up stocks in a feedback loop where an uptick is good news that
triggers another uptick, smart money certainly can ride along—there is
after all money to be made. But the smart money always will be ready to
be the first to bail out.
The smart money also is said to be able to take a look at a trend, and
see that the fundamental value isn’t there, and buck the trend, shorting the
stock or the whole market or buying puts. Given a lot of noise, smart
money is likely to be contrarian.
I need to mention the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) here
because it accepts the presence of dumb money and noise trading even as
it asserts that smart money trumps dumb money, keeping stock prices as
correctly aligned with fundamentals as they can be. Given all these
binaries, I bet you expect me to dismiss it as free market hokum, but I
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actually think it’s a good story. But right now in the corporate law
professoriate, a noise trading description is ascendant, with noisy supply
and demand intermixing with fundamental value because there isn’t
enough smart money to trump the dumb money in the short term.
Contrarian investment is just too risky. But in the long-term, fundamental
value always prevails.
MANAGED EARNINGS AND THE SHAREHOLDER INTEREST
Now, just because the market is noisy, it does not follow that
fundamental value information is irrelevant. For all stockholders, left or
right side, nothing is more important than news about fundamental value.
And of all fundamental value information, earnings information is the
most important subset. Given that here everybody more or less agrees, how
could we stumble into a crisis about the numbers?
Well, some of the accounting that is now widely condemned was
viewed with favor or indifference by left-side actors only a short time ago.
The supply-demand dynamic respecting audit services was operating to
make auditors sensitive to the left-side shareholder interest. Some of
today’s condemnation follows from a shift by the left-side to right-side
conservative values. The same shift occurred after 1929, with
conservatism prevailing for decades thereafter. If a left side demand for
aggression returns in the future, and it will at some point, the supplydemand signal respecting audits shifts back. On this analysis, even an
absolute prohibition of audit firm consulting does not solve the auditor
incentive problem, a problem closely tied to the corporate governance
system’s evolutionary assimilation of a norm of shareholder
responsiveness.
Now, why, prior to 2002, were shareholders impervious to
aggressive accounting?
Let’s take a benign example of 1990s earnings management: the
cookie jar reserve. Here the issuer takes an extraordinary loss in a given
quarter respecting an unsuccessful line of business but tops up the loss
reserve. In a later quarter when the earnings are coming in a tad less than
what was expected for that quarter, management conveniently revisits the
loss reserve and reduces it, with the released sum supporting earnings in
the later quarter.
Management can offer a couple of justifications for the manipulation.
First, shareholders like smoothly increasing sequences of earnings because
volatile streams of returns are worth less. Income smoothing reduces
volatility without necessarily corrupting the trend.
Alternatively, to take a much-used example from the later 1990s, if
the firm misses its expected quarterly earnings number by 1 cent and the
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overheated market is going to punish the stock by bidding it down 10%,
then a reserve that holds out the missing penny is a very good thing. It
allows a management to anticipate and counteract the left side’s behavioral
shortcomings, protecting the stock price from short-term market mood
swings.
How the explanations fly will depend on your politics and the state
of the market.
The fundamental value investor will be 100% against this because it
wants an unvarnished report. For accurate valuation, the last thing that’s
needed is management advocacy that results in smoother numbersyou
need to see that volatility. In fact, better to do without the
reserveexpense the costs as they are incurred, not in advance, giving an
unvarnished set of earnings numbers from period to period.
The smart money and long-term investors have slightly different
profiles.
The smart money is supposed to be able to see through the ruse to
the periodic cash flows, at least so long as the published reports give it an
adequate basis for doing so. It will only hurt the cost of the analysis,
something it’s going to do anyway. With disclosure, the treatment is
irrelevant.
The long-term investor, once situated in a stock, isn’t going to be
destabilized if management is a couple cents short of expectations in the
current quarter. At the same time, earnings management, pursued in
moderation, isn’t going to inflict any significant injury either—for in the
long run, the empirical cash flow absolutely controls. The long-run
question is whether the company produces competitively, so a long-term
investor’s confidence is not necessarily destabilized by a little massaging
of numbers for the left side.
Now, what about that left side?
If you buy a stock on a trend chasing basis, and the trend is that
earnings are up, and your holding period is short or intermediate, so that
anything that might be hyped as bad news might destabilize you and cause
you to sell, then a little finagling to avoid the firm being short on its
earnings projections is not a bad thing. Just by arranging the numbers,
management here protects you from yourself and the manic nature of the
market.
But, unfortunately, earnings management holds out some problems
for the left side, even as it’s the nominal beneficiary. It works well only so
long as management massages the numbers to protect an upward trend that
responds by staying on trajectory. But if management pours balm over bad
news as the trend turns down where the unvarnished truth might have
prompted the holder to sell, the left side investor management is trying to
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protect becomes a victim. But it’s hard to see that in a bull market, where
earnings management works beautifully and, critically, presently
favorable market results have a way of validating business practices. In a
bear market, when the noise traders overreact to all the bad news, the left
side investors do an about face on the subject, suddenly demanding
unvarnished truth.
The paper argues that a similar dynamic obtains respecting the
revenue and cost recognition defalcations responsible for most of the
recent spate of accounting restatements.
THE SHAREHOLDER BENEFICIARY AND THE CHOICE OF TREATMENT
Now, to regulation. Let’s hypothesize a firm with a choice of
treatments. All are either clearly GAAP or can be defended in good faith
as GAAP. Under Number 1, this year’s earnings are $1 billion. Number
2—$1,050,000,000. Under Number 3—$950,000,000. Where do you go
for a norm that tells you which to choose?
Alternative 1: A norm sitting right there in existing GAAP that tells
you to choose Treatment 3. It is an accounting convention termed
“conservatism”—the substance is easy: when in doubt, understate. And if
you are understating, when in doubt there is no such thing as aggressive
accounting.
For a second alternative, you can leave the choice in management’s
business judgment envelope. But this won’t do if you lack confidence in
management’s incentives and choices—and in 2003, you do lack
confidence. So we go a third alternative of revising GAAP so as to narrow
the range of choices.
My question is whether there is a fourth alternative of going to the
interests of the shareholder beneficiaries for instructions as to the choice.
If you take the fourth alternative, you get different answers
depending on how you model the shareholder and the stock price. I see
four possibilities.
First, you can look to the EMH, which says that smart money rightside shareholders determine the market price. Here, the choice of treatment
is irrelevant so long as enough information is disclosed that the smart
money can see how the books have been prepared and translate back to the
hard cash truth. Of course, this story becomes less persuasive as you
interpolate noise into your picture of the market price. The choice of
treatment will start to have market value implications if not necessarily
fundamental value implications.
So we fall to a backstop position and admit the noisiness of prices
but nonetheless assert that we should structure market regulation as if the
story told in orthodox financial economics, the EMH especially, was true.
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The idea here is that if the regulatory structure treats traders as if they were
well-informed rational actors, in the long run they will be pushed toward
rationality. Restating, don’t regulate even though the markets are like
jungles. Paternalism only protects the dumb money unproductively.
If you accept this, Sarbanes Oxley is a bad development and we don’t
need a Public Oversight Board. But the choice of treatment is still
irrelevant given transparency.
Second, we could try to derive a profile of the real-world shareholder,
firm by firm, a sociological approach. You do a survey and find out what
kind of clientele the firm attracts. A high-water dot com presumably would
have a noisy clientele while a solid old economy company would have a
more fundamental value-oriented group. But, of course, you have to leave
out the outliers, and the clientele could be bipolar, or it could shift in time,
if indeed a meaningful clientele could be described in the first place. So I
don’t think this is going to be helpful.
Things improve if we reverse this and model investors of different
types choosing among firms. It follows that each firm should make
disclosures about its reporting policies in advance and then stick to them,
letting the shareholders sort themselves as they may.
Third, you could drop the shareholder value paradigm and substitute
a constituency model with multiple beneficiariescreditors, other
contract counterparties, and employees, as well as shareholders. This is a
route to a conservative choice. The creditors, having no upside, do
negative analyses looking to default risk. They presumably would want
accounting’s conservatism convention to be applied firmly. In the standard
picture, the employees are similarly risk-averse.
But this isn’t politically correct in corporate law, and worse,
conservative accounting runs headlong into securities law policy because
it insists on verifiability and accordingly rejects fair value treatments.
Fourth, you can model the shareholder as if the shareholder was a
right-side fundamental value shareholder, taking the paternalistic step of
imposing right-side values and forgetting about the real-world
shareholder. If you look at existing corporate legal theory, there’s
disagreement about whether to model only on fundamental value or
whether also to make reference to a long-term horizon. I’d go long term
myself, but I am not prepared to prove one must go long term.
If you take an additional step and model the right-side shareholder as
smart, you wind up back at the EMH asking only for transparency as to
treatment. That triggers another conflict with securities law policy, which
usually wants to protect dumb money. So you end up relaxing your
conservatism to address both sides of the smart-dumb binary.
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Now, what are the right-side values to be imposed? I personally
would do one last thing and read in accounting’s conservatism convention.
In my view, if you’re serious about solving the audit crisis, then
conservatism provides the one clear answer. But how many would join me
in that? How deep is the support for the approach?
From the right side, there is always support. And right now
conservatism looks more than usually welcome to the left side. But how
long lasting will be this right-side shift in the shareholder demand
respecting audit practice? Left side voices, their protectors in securities
regulation, and management can be expected to resist conservatism much
of the time.
Or, restating the question more precisely, is there a market for an
audit firm with a commitment to conservatism?
At first blush, you would think so. There is a right-side interest out
there. There are even right-side managers. By hiring the auditor that
always says no to aggression, they can send a credible signal to the markets
about the reliability of their bottom lines.
It has been argued that there is a market for such a firm, but that
industry concentration precludes its emergence. If we had twelve or fifteen
firms with the resources to audit large cap companies, things would be
different. Maybe. But I wonder whether the incentive structure works
differently.
Let’s go back to our differentiated investors. Management today
worries a lot about the stock price. This is less because a low stock price
means a takeover, than because institutional investors have become
empowered actors in corporate politics. Their agents, while sophisticated,
worry about quarterly bottom lines and having their portfolios judged
against comparable funds. As a result, they have to watch what’s moving
the market as opposed to watching long-term fundamentals. This puts
them in the thick of the noise.
CONCLUSION: FIDELITY TO THE SYSTEM
Return now to the three treatments. In an unstable institutional
environment, why would management choose an audit firm that has a
powerful reputational incentive to refuse to give its opinion unless the
lower treatment is chosen? Given shareholder empowerment, management
will want an auditor with a reputation for flexibility. Even if conservatism
makes sense this year, it may be the last thing you want next year to the
extent you make your choice of treatment in response to shareholder
demands.
So, to the extent regulators, audit committee members and auditors
model the shareholder, I think a fundamental value, long-term perspective
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is appropriate, with occasional reference to dumb money needing the
protection of a conservative authority figure.
But having gone through this analysis, I end up wondering how often
you have to model a shareholder principal at all. GAAP isn’t just a bunch
of rules. It’s a sophisticated set of rules backed by generally stated
principles. There’s enough there to let us can dispense with the model of
the beneficiary and make reference to the system, to GAAP itself, and do
so as we articulate the fiduciary duty. The auditor should be faithful not to
the shareholders, but to the rulebook and the reporting system it articulates.
Any departure from or unprincipled application of the rules in the interest
of client advocacy compromises that mission. The CPA represents the
system. Its professionalism should come from the system rather than from
the client relation.
This plea for positivism in a sense just reinvents the wheel. It’s a
fancy explanation for the most basic rule in this profession’s canon of
ethics: The auditor does not hold the client’s stock. It’s also the idea
enshrined in Sarbanes Oxley’s § 108(d), which orders up a study of
something called principles-based accounting. But, pending the
appearance of the study, I read the statute to pitch principles to the wrong
place. It addresses its principles prescription to FASB, impliedly accusing
it of excess attachment to rules. But I don’t buy that diagnosis. This is less
a legislative problem concerning the relative merits of rules and standards
than a problem of professional practice in a regulatory system made up of
both, a system that needs to get back to reporting and away from managing
numbers. Firms are managed for their shareholders. Numbers can be
reported for their own sakes.

2019]

Collected Lectures and Talks

929

C. PRIVATE STANDARDS, PUBLIC GOVERNANCE: A NEW LOOK AT THE
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD
Boston College Law Review Symposium: Owning Standards,
March 31, 2006
Accompanying Article:
William W. Bratton, Private Standards, Public Governance: A New Look
at the Financial Accounting Standards Board, 48 B.C. L. REV. 5 (2007)
INTRODUCTION
So why come to this symposium and talk about the history of the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)? Well, I am a member of
the law school accounting professoriate. It’s a small, exclusive club, and
Larry Cunningham, one of this conference’s organizers, is its universally
acknowledged president. So when he asked me to come here, it meant that
for me, the standards under discussion would be generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP) and the standard setter the FASB. As it
happened, I had a long-anticipated project on the FASB that I’d never
gotten around to undertaking.
The project’s origins lie in a wonderful moment that occurred during
the Enron winter of 20012002, when Harvey Pitt, the soon to be
disgraced SEC chairman, went up to Norwalk to lecture the members of
the FASB about their responsibility for the mess. Pitt was pitching
principles-based standards along with cost-sensitive responsiveness to
management demands, a combination I found oxymoronic. But that didn’t
deter Pitt. You see, FASB-bashing is a reflexive political expedient in a
business law crisis.
The truth was that we were in a crisis because management had
captured the audit firms, a process Pitt had encouraged. So attention
needed to be deflected elsewhere. And here was this underfunded,
underappreciated little standard-setter—the one link in the self-regulatory
daisy chain that hadn’t been captured. The FASB was slowly, doggedly
muddling through even as Harvey Pitt and his bar room bullies—big cap
management, Silicon Valley, House and Senate Republicans, and the Big
Audit firms—blamed it for doing its job.
So I stepped up to the plate and wrote an on the fly symposium piece
that defended rules-based accounting. That piece turned out to be
problematic. Not because it was wrong—it was right—but because
contrary to expectations, people actually read it and it didn’t state the case
particularly well. So when Larry called me last year, I had an old agenda
item—I was looking for an opportunity to write another accounting paper
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that would do a better job of stating the case for rules. And there was also
a back-burner item. It had always seemed to me that the FASB should have
been the dirty, the captured lapdog that Harvey Pitt and his thugs always
had wanted. Public choice theory, which I often find a source of cogent
explanations for the operation of business law institutions, predicts that a
standard-setter like the FASB will be captured. So I couldn’t help but
wonder, how had the FASB escaped?
Hence, this paper. It started out as an exercise in public choice
research. If you look at the present FASB, there’s an informal arrangement
under which three of seven seats go to CPAs and two go to management
reps. This suggests that the audit firms and their clients should be running
the show with a five to two voting coalition. I figured there had to be a
literature on this. And there was. Because B-schools teach a lot of
accounting, there’s an enormous stable of academics interested in the
FASB. It turned out that empirical political scientists and economists had
been all over the FASB’s case since its 1973 founding. Its proceedings had
been put under the academic microscope and the result is clear: there have
been no significant voting coalitions. The FASB has been tested for
capture, and to the extent that the matter can be determined by the
observable data, it has been independent. This was news to me, but I saw
at once that it’s a basic point in the FASB world.
My project accordingly veered off in an unanticipated direction. I
found myself writing an administrative law paper. Now, at Georgetown
we don’t talk about ad law anymore, we talk about “governance.” I figured
I would be wrapping the FASB in a sort of Jody Freeman cocoon of publicprivate cooperation. FASB would turn out to be problematic and
conflicted, but striving for independence. But the project ended up with an
emphasis on a different variation on the theme of troubled standard-setter,
rooted in Richard Stewart’s 1975 Harvard Law Review excursus on the
evolution of thinking about administrative agencies, in particular, his
description of the mind set of James M. Landis and the classic New Deal
agency model.
In my paper, Landis is the godfather of this particular private setter
of public regulatory standards.
ORIGINS
The story begins in 1938 when the SEC dumps the standard-setting
problem into the lap of the accountants’ professional organization, which
today calls itself the AICPA. There follow 64 years of chronically
underfunded private standard setting, an era that ends in 2002 when the
Congress endows the FASB with the proceeds of fees collected from listed
companies. Two predecessor standard-setters, both part-time AICPA
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committees, fail between 1938 and 1972. In both cases, the standardsetters were too close to the profession and unequipped to perform
adequately in an era of increasing demands due to expanding market
volume and volatility. The FASB comes into existence in their wake, the
result of an ad hoc process led by the AICPA, but with input from heavy
hitters from management and Wall Street.
Yes, ladies and gentlemen, it was spontaneous order in the private
sector. And it worked because the FASB’s founders had a high-powered
incentive. They wanted an effective standard setter that would serve their
needs without ceding the territory to a federal agency, which they in those
days associated with a high risk of domination by progressive, anticorporate types. But, to make the arrangement stick, important
concessions had to be made to public legitimacy.
The new standard setter was as a result formally separated from the
profession. The FASB’s members are appointed by members of the
Financial Accounting Foundation, a not-for-profit, whose members in turn
are nominated by a collection of constituent organizations. The third time
around we also got a standard-setting institution with full-time players and
a staff rather just than a committee. The FASB is independent—its
members resign from their posts and separate themselves from their assets,
very much like holders of high government office. They set their own
agenda. But they at least have to listen to a built-in advisory council made
up of representatives of various constituencies, the Financial Accounting
Standards Advisory Council (FASAC), also appointed by the FAF.
The FASB’s founders, then, wanted the new standard-setter to be
independent and public regarding, yet simultaneously responsive to
constituent interests, and all the while remaining insulated from political
pressure. But their governance design had critics to the right and critics to
the left. The classic public choice commentaries denounce the whole thing
as a rent-seeking scam. But these had limited political impact. The FASB
flunks public choice scrutiny only because it is a cog in the larger machine
of the federal mandatory disclosure system. If the SEC were put out of
business tomorrow, with the FASB remaining in its present form as a
private body generating strictly optional standards and open to
competition from rival setters, it would be held out as a public choice
exemplar.
The early FASB’s problems lay instead with the staffers of
democratic Congressmen, who laid down the standard progressive
pluralist gauntlet. According to this, choices of accounting principles have
significant allocative consequences; accounting standard-setting therefore
is a high-stakes game in which the setter has no alternative but to balance
interests. Because the setter resolves political rather than technical issues,
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its legitimacy depends on political responsiveness. It followed that the
FASB’s independence was not a virtue but a guarantee of irrelevance,
isolation, and unaccountability. The standard-setting authority should
instead be an agency directly responsible to the Congress. The FASB was
not independent in any event, because it depended on contributions from
the preparers and auditors, groups with high stakes in all of its outcomes.
This pluralist shot was fired in the corridors of the Congress in the
mid-1970s. The FASB dodged the bullet. But it also got the message, and
promptly reorganized itself to strengthen its public bona fides. Most
importantly, it distanced itself from the AICPA. It originally had a
majority of four CPAs along with a five to two supermajority voting rule
inserted to prevent domination by a CPA voting block. The CPAs were
reduced to three, and the voting majority reduced to four. Contributions
from the Big Audit firms were capped. The AICPA retained a majority on
the FAF, but eventually lost that one as well. More recently, in the wake
of Sarbanes-Oxley, the AICPA was expelled entirely from a standard
setting role respecting GAAP for publicly traded companies.
The FASB also decided to take the K.C. Davis playbook of process
legitimacy more seriously. For the sake of independence, it had started out
working in secrecy during standards’ preparatory stages. Across the board
sunshine was substituted.
Summing up, we see that public processes assist in legitimating
empowered private actors. But we don’t have an explanation for the
FASB’s survival in the teeth of constant constituent opposition. So far in
the story, it has got only one thing going for it politically, the business
world’s preference for a private rather than a public agency. But that
became less and less an imperative once Reagan arrived in 1981 and the
threat of progressive capture receded from view.
Yet the FASB held on against constant constituent pushback. From
what did it derive this ability to resist?
DECISION USEFULNESS
Let’s go back to the FASB founders’ exercise in agency design.
Standard-setting discretion in an independent body creates a
legitimacy problem, whether the body is public or private, and quite apart
from any capture allegations. Under the New Deal agency design template,
the solution to the discretion problem lies in an explicit statement of the
agency’s goal. Given that, the regulator’s expertise solves discretion
problem—as the independent expert applies its knowledge to realize the
stated goal, the standards emerge as a function of the expertise and the
state of the world, supported by objective bases. One might not approve of
the standard, but one cannot dismiss it as arbitrary.
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The FASB founders seized on this point. They decided that what the
new standard-setter needed was an explicit substantive mandate. They
accordingly charged the FASB with the task of creating what came to be
called the “Conceptual Framework.” That is, the FASB itself would
articulate generally accepted goals that would determine the standards and
thus contain its own discretion.
One more structural point needs to be noted. Even as the FASB’s
founders outfitted it with a built-in advisory board made up of constituent
representatives, they otherwise denied the relevance of the pluralist view
that turns rule-making into a legislative and political process of balancing
conflicting constituent interests. Under that model, legitimacy comes to
depend on the agency’s political responsiveness. Indeed, if we carry the
pluralist model to its logical conclusion, the agency merely functions as
an aggregator of outside preferences and the independence model is
completely negated. The FASB founders’ aversion to pluralism
accordingly made good sense in view of their choice to follow the
traditional New Deal independence model. The FASB’s pluralist critics
would soon offer further confirmation when arguing that an inherently
political process like accounting standard-setting should be conducted in
the public sector.
The FASB duly promulgated its Conceptual Framework only to be
derided by its critics. The Conceptual Framework would never have
succeeded in its appointed task of determining the standards set by the
Board even if it had gotten positive reviews. It proceeds as much too high
a level of generality to yield any outcome-determinative traction.
We are left with a private standard setter that is independent in the
sense of being insulated from constituent demands, but whose discretion
presents a classic agency accountability problem. It’s at this point that the
Conceptual Framework does make a contribution. We take a single
unprepossessing sentence in Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts
No. 1: “Financial reporting should provide information that is useful to
present and potential investors and creditors and other users in making
rational investment, credit, and similar decisions.” This is called “decision
usefulness” and it seems to state the obvious. But it was radical.
Financial reporting serves two purposes—it imports external
transparency and also serves as a part of a rational system of internal
management. Three decades ago, the prevailing concept of the purpose of
accounting standards, called “stewardship,” encompassed both purposes.
That meant that corporate managers had a place at the table along with
market actors as important users of the standards. Indeed, they claimed
primacy. The FASB departed from this history and elevated the outside
interest over the management interest with decision usefulness. It thereby
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completed the project of adopting the independent expertise agency model
and avoiding the pluralist trap mediating in a world of multiple users with
varied and conflicting preferences.
Decision usefulness, however useful as a matter of agency design,
would have availed the FASB nothing had it not also imported policy
legitimacy. Fortunately for the FASB, it has done exactly that.
It did two more particular things. First, it implied a one-size-fits-all
theoretical justification for the enterprise as a whole. Back in the 1970s,
management was evoking national competitiveness and public welfare to
argue for a cost-benefit burden of proof to be met by every new accounting
standard—an argument that later would register in the Congress with
respect to public agency rulemaking. The Conceptual Framework’s focus
on the markets let the FASB come back and argue that information is a
public good that will be underprovided absent regulation. Standards
directed to user utility reduce the social costs of information asymmetries,
which include high transaction costs and thin capital markets with low
liquidity.
Second, decision usefulness aligned the FASB’s goals with that of
its governmental overseer, the SEC and its goal of investor protection. The
two agencies maintain a cooperative relationship that works well. The
paper accounts for this by drawing on Sid Schapiro’s work to note that the
SEC has never so much relied on the FASB as to close its own accounting
office. This equips it to monitor the FASB intensively, so that it usually
gets what it wants in the ordinary course, only rarely resorting to its big
stick.
The FASB’s problem lies not with the SEC but with corporate
management. The FASB sets its agenda independently, again and again
pursuing decision usefulness in disregard of management opposition.
Management sees this as a betrayal, a classic case of an unresponsive
agency promulgating regulations for their own sake. Management uses the
FASB’s notice and comment and advisory processes to object. But it gets
only occasional concessions, as FASB keeps cranking out standards
management would just as soon do without. The managers fight back with
proposals for a new agenda control mechanism—an oversight board with
power to block agenda items and force revision of existing standards. They
pitch this as a pluralist case for public accountability. But the initiatives
haven’t succeeded. The FASB is very good at backing down at the critical
moment and throwing bones to attack dogs.
Question: Doesn’t this imply a democratic deficit? Answer: No. The
managers who prepare financials hardly can be said to lack influence or
political access. They have wielded their political muscle to block
proposed standards on several occasions. They lobbied for and secured
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two of FASB’s seven seats, and, at least for a while, procured a
supermajority voting regime to go along with them. Meanwhile, the FASB
emerges from this four decades back and forth with an enviable reputation
for independence and Wall Street’s implicit support.
So, the FASB and its founders sought to legitimate private standard
setting by adopting the New Deal model of the independent, expert
agency. Much like an independent public agency, it ran into a range of
pluralist, public interest objections to exercises of regulatory discretion.
But, in the long run, faithful adherence to the New Deal playbook worked
well. This happened in no small measure because the FASB put itself on
history’s winning side with decision usefulness. It thereby aligned itself
not only with the SEC, but the broader economic shift away from
managerialism toward capital market governance under the shareholder
value norm.
RULES AND PRINCIPLES
Now to the standards themselves and the never-ending chorus of
complaint. Complaint number one: standards overload. But that’s just
management’s way of complaining that it doesn’t have agenda control.
Complaint number two: excess complexity. But management never
complains about complexity when it likes the bottom-line result.
Complaint number three is more serious: the FASB drafts too many rules,
seeking to supply a clear answer to every possible situation, pursuing the
objective with detailed statements, bright-line tests, and multiple
exceptions. This has perverse effects. Internal inconsistency often results.
Comparability also suffers: Reporting entities hewing to the same strict
standard appear comparable on faces of their financials when their
arrangements in fact are dissimilar. Worse, the rules lead to transaction
structuring and other strategic behavior that undermines the quality of
financial reporting. Financials thus manipulated, while rule compliant, do
not truly and fairly state the reporting company’s income and financial
position. The rules foster a dysfunctional, check-the-box approach to
compliance. Preparers and auditors apply them mechanically, ignoring the
substance of the transactions being reported.
All of this is true. Actors at the FASB reply that the rules follow from
demands generated by management and its auditors, who want treatment
and scope exceptions and “roadmaps” that hold out “guidance.” It’s sorry,
but it’s just being a responsive regulator. But such responsiveness has a
dark side. According to the FASB’s public choice critics, the federal
securities laws requirement of an independent audit makes the large audit
firms providers of a necessary professional service, positioning them to
collect rents. Complex, rules-based standards aid and abet the rent seeking.

936

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 42:755

Complexity by itself generates work, and over time strengthens entry
barriers because fewer and fewer firms possess the technical resources
necessary for engagements with large clients. Finally, innovation is
choked off to the extent that it decreases auditability and exposes the firms
to legal risk.
All of this also is true. The paper defends the rules anyway, arguing
that the FASB has to take our second-best world as it finds it. And the
world is a nasty place where incentive problems impair the auditor-client
relationship, auditability does matter, and the standard-setter has to worry
about scandal prevention. Rules have advantages in such a place. Although
not ideal, they provide a base of common assumptions and knowledge for
both preparers and auditors. They decrease differences in measurement;
they make noncompliance more evident. And, as room for differences in
judgment narrows, transparency is enhanced.
So, intense demand for rules can be expected to persist, and rentseeking by the audit profession figures into the demand. That said, auditor
rents do not necessarily figure into the FASB’s pattern of positive
response. Rules can be justified independently on a principled basis– they
decrease the likelihood of audit failure. So, if audit failure becomes less
likely because the PCAOB succeeds in hitting the auditors over the head,
I expect the FASB to move to principles over time. Otherwise, I would
predict no change.

